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ABSTRACT 
This study aims to investigate issues on knowledge-sharing in the new product 
development process through a single embedded case study of Iran Khodro Company 
(IKCO). Although IKCO is a flagship automotive company in Iran, it has struggled 
to develop new products independently, despite its experience of jointly developing 
new products with international partners. This raises an important question with 
regard to knowledge-sharing practice within IKCO, and knowledge-transfer from 
international partners. Accordingly, this study investigates the way in which Western 
theory on knowledge-sharing and knowledge-transfer can be applied, refined or 
developed in the Iranian context. The empirical data are based on 40 in-depth semi-
structured qualitative interviews conducted with 25 senior and middle managers from 
key departments relevant to the new product development process. Secondary data 
based on published industry reports and unpublished company reports are 
incorporated to support the analysis of the interview data.  
The findings reveal a range of factors that influence four key knowledge-sharing and 
knowledge transfer processes within the IKCO: (a) knowledge-sharing through a 
centralised knowledge repository; (b) knowledge-sharing through interaction and 
socialisation; (c) knowledge-transfer from international partners; and (d) knowledge 
acquisition, retention and creation within the Research & Development Centre. The 
findings highlight that, although theory on knowledge-sharing and knowledge- 
transfer developed in the West are applicable to the Iranian context to some extent, 
knowledge-sharing and knowledge-transfer processes are considerably influenced by 
the idiosyncratic organisational context, which in turn is influenced by the wider 
context, such as the political regime, industry dynamics, technological development 
and institutional framework.  
 
5 | P a g e  
 
LIST OF FIGURES:  
Figure 1: IKCO Group Structure................................................................................. 68 
Figure 2: Iran Khodro's available passenger products ................................................ 74 
Figure 3: Model of Knowledge Creation .................................................................... 86 
Figure 4: Example of a department-stage model ........................................................ 98 
Figure 5: Activity-stages in the NPD process ............................................................. 99 
Figure 6: Example of activity-stage model ............................................................... 100 
Figure 7: NPD process as a conversion process........................................................ 101 
Figure 8: A network model of NPD .......................................................................... 104 
Figure 9: The research frame work ........................................................................... 133 
Figure 10: IKCO’s organisational chart .................................................................... 159 
Figure 11: Follow-up interview................................................................................. 167 
Figure 12: A way of Classifying Methods in Social Research ................................. 168 
Figure 13: preparation, organising and reporting process in the research.  ............... 188 
Figure 14: Factors affecting the research theme ....................................................... 251 
Figure 15: The research frame work after discussion ............................................... 263 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 | P a g e  
 
LIST OF TABLES:  
Table 1: Worlds auto makers (2007–2008)................................................................. 21 
Table 2: IKCO's Samand overseas reach .................................................................... 26 
Table 3: The world’s top 30 automakers ..................................................................... 30 
Table 4: Iran Auto Sector Trade.................................................................................. 32 
Table 5: Car ownership ............................................................................................... 33 
Table 6: Foreign investments under FIPPA from 1993–2007 (000$)......................... 40 
Table 7: Passenger vehicles production in Iran........................................................... 42 
Table 8: PSA production line around world................................................................ 43 
Table 9: Iranian Automakers ....................................................................................... 46 
Table 10: IKCO & SAIPA .......................................................................................... 47 
Table 11: The Iranian automotive production quality league table (2012)................. 51 
Table 12: Explanation of (-) N point: (Negative point) .............................................. 52 
Table 13: Explanation of the way the N (-) point is calculated: ................................. 52 
Table 14: Quality comparison between different cars ................................................ 58 
Table 15: Events that have taken place from 1966 to 2013 in IKCO ......................... 61 
Table 16: Composition of IKCO’s Shareholders by 19th March 2009-2010 ............. 67 
Table 17: Investments in shares of other companies (IKCO Internal Source) ............ 69 
Table 18: IKCO Passenger vehicle production line employees only (2011) .............. 70 
Table 19: The number of employees in the R&D in IKCO (Design and NPD) ......... 71 
Table 20: The IKCO’s personnel breakdown from 2006-2010 .................................. 71 
Table 21: The IKCO’s personnel breakdown in passenger car section ...................... 71 
Table 22: The IKCO’s organisational levels ............................................................... 71 
Table 23: IKCO’s sales network in global markets  .................................................... 73 
Table 24: IKCO’s Production sites overseas ............................................................... 73 
Table 25: IKCO's productions in the quality league table (2009)............................... 74 
Table 26: Explanation of N (-) point: .......................................................................... 74 
Table 27: Knowledge creation modes ......................................................................... 86 
Table 28: Knowledge creation facilitators .................................................................. 87 
Table 29: Categorisation of tacit knowledge transfer ................................................. 91 
7 | P a g e  
 
Table 30: Factors influenced knowledge transfer ....................................................... 92 
Table 31: Ansoff matrix .............................................................................................. 96 
Table 32: Model of NPD process .............................................................................. 109 
Table 33: Potential benefits of Joint Venture............................................................ 119 
Table 34: Factors influencing IJVs performance ...................................................... 121 
Table 35: Relevant situations for different research strategies  ................................. 146 
Table 36: Tests of validity, generalisability and reliability....................................... 151 
Table 37: Sampling techniques ................................................................................. 157 
Table 38: Sampling Designs ..................................................................................... 158 
Table 39: IKCO’s Passenger production line employees (Feb 2011)  ....................... 162 
Table 40: The number of employees in the R&D at IKCO ...................................... 162 
Table 41: List of participants for first interview (first draft) ..................................... 164 
Table 42: The final list of participants for the first visit (IKCO/June 2010)  ............ 165 
Table 43: The final list of participants in the follow-up interviews.......................... 166 
Table 44: Purposes for using inductive approach: .................................................... 181 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8 | P a g e  
 
LIST OF APPENDICES:  
Appendix 1: Opening Questions ............................................................................... 316 
Appendix 2: General questions: ................................................................................ 317 
Appendix 3: Prior knowledge ................................................................................... 318 
Appendix 4: Absorptive Capacity ............................................................................. 319 
Appendix 5: Knowledge Creation............................................................................. 323 
Appendix 6: Knowledge Transfer ............................................................................. 324 
Appendix 7: New Product Development .................................................................. 325 
Appendix 8: Closing questions: ................................................................................ 326 
Appendix 9: Inter- Org Factors: ................................................................................ 327 
Appendix 10: Organisational Factors:....................................................................... 328 
Appendix 11: R&D Department Factors:.................................................................. 329 
Appendix 12: For the French Members only: ........................................................... 330 
Appendix 13: First visit Questions in Persian ........................................................... 331 
Appendix 14: Follow-up questions in Persian .......................................................... 341 
Appendix 15: The candidates' personal information……………………………….344  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 | P a g e  
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DECLARATION OF AUTHO RSHIP .......................................................................................................................... 2 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................................................................................................................ 3 
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................................................. 4 
LIST OF FIGURES:  ..................................................................................................................................................... 5 
LIST OF TABL ES:  ....................................................................................................................................................... 6 
LIST OF APPENDICES:.............................................................................................................................................. 8 
TABLE OF CONTENTS .............................................................................................................................................. 9 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................................................................ 10 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH ...................................................................................... 13 
CHAPTER TWO: RESEARCH CONTEXT: THE IRANIAN AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY...................................... 18 
CHAPTER THREE: LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................................................................ 77 
CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  ............................................................................................... 140 
CHAPTER FIVE: DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS:  ......................................................................................... 191 
CHAPTER SIX: DISCUSSION ................................................................................................................................ 250 
CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION  ....................................................................................................................... 266 
REFERENCE:  .......................................................................................................................................................... 276 
APPENDICES ......................................................................................................................................................... 316 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10 | P a g e  
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DECLARATION OF AUTHO RSHIP .......................................................................................................................... 2 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................................................................................................................ 3 
ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................................................. 4 
LIST OF FIGURES:  ..................................................................................................................................................... 5 
LIST OF TABL ES:  ....................................................................................................................................................... 6 
LIST OF APPENDICES:.............................................................................................................................................. 8 
TABLE OF CONTENTS .............................................................................................................................................. 9 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ............................................................................................................................................ 10 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH ...................................................................................... 13 
1.1.  RESEARCH OBJECTIVES ........................................................................................................................... 13 
1.2.  THE RATIONAL OF THE RESEARCH ........................................................................................................... 13 
1.2.1. Academic Significance..................................................................................................................... 13 
1.2.2. Methodological Relevance............................................................................................................. 14 
1.2.3. Practical Implications ...................................................................................................................... 15 
1.3. THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS....................................................................................................................... 16 
CHAPTER TWO: RESEARCH CONTEXT: THE IRANIAN AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY...................................... 18 
2.1. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................................... 18 
2.2.  HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE IRANIAN AUTO INDUSTRY.................................................................. 20 
2.2.1. International Automakers  .............................................................................................................. 22 
2.3.  THE STATE OF THE IRANIAN AUTO INDUSTRY ........................................................................................... 30 
2.3.1. Vehicle Ownership........................................................................................................................... 32 
2.3.2. Suppliers issues ................................................................................................................................ 33 
2.3.3. Regulation and Competitive Environment in the Industry....................................................... 34 
2.3.4. Iran Business Environment PEST Analysis ................................................................................... 37 
2.3.4.1. Poli tical factors .............................................................................................................................37 
2.3.4.2. Economical factors........................................................................................................................37 
2.3.4.3. Social factors.................................................................................................................................38 
2.3.4.4. Technological factors....................................................................................................................39 
2.3.5. Key Players of the Industry ............................................................................................................ 46 
2.3.5.1. SAIPA profile: ................................................................................................................................47 
2.3.6. Key Issues in the Industry............................................................................................................... 48 
2.3.6.1. Quali ty of new auto products in the Iranian auto industry..........................................................49 
2.3.6.2. Iranian Standard and Quali ty Inspection (ISQI): ...........................................................................53 
2.4.  THE CASE STUDY: IRAN KHODRO COMPANY (IKCO) ............................................................................... 60 
2.4.1. Brief Historical Overview of Development.................................................................................. 60 
2.4.2. Timeline of Key NPD Activities and Knowledge Management Development in IKCO......... 61 
2.5. CONCLUSION.................................................................................................................................................. 75 
CHAPTER THREE: LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................................................................ 77 
3.1.  INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................................... 77 
3.2.  KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT.................................................................................................................. 78 
11 | P a g e  
 
3.2.1. The Origin and Significance of the Knowledge-based View ..................................................... 80 
3.2.2. Types of Organisational Knowledge ............................................................................................. 82 
3.2.3. The Knowledge Management Process......................................................................................... 85 
3.2.4. Summary of Knowledge Management ........................................................................................ 94 
3.2.5. From Knowledge to New Product Development  ....................................................................... 94 
3.3.  NEW PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT AS A KNOWLEDGE-CREATION PROCESS .................................................... 95 
3.3.1. NPD Process (Historical Development) ........................................................................................ 97 
3.3.1.1. Departmental-s tage model : .........................................................................................................98 
3.3.1.2. Activi ty-s tage model : ....................................................................................................................99 
3.3.1.3. Decision-stage model : ................................................................................................................100 
3.3.1.4. Conversion-process  model : ........................................................................................................101 
3.3.1.5. Response models :.......................................................................................................................101 
3.3.1.6. Cross-Functional Teams (CFTs):..................................................................................................102 
3.3.1.7. Network models .........................................................................................................................103 
3.3.2. Types of NPD .................................................................................................................................. 104 
3.3.2.1. The linear model of NPD process ...............................................................................................105 
3.3.2.2. The coupling model  of NPD process...........................................................................................107 
3.3.2.3. The interactive model  of NPD process .......................................................................................108 
3.3.3. R&D as the Hub of Knowledge-sharing in the NPD Process................................................... 110 
3.3.3.1. Vertical and horizontal  knowledge -sharing:...............................................................................118 
3.3.4. Inter-organisational Knowledge-sharing ................................................................................... 118 
3.3.4.1. Trust between partners , and the ability to understand the foreign partner’s knowledge  .......122 
3.4.  KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT CONTEXT................................................................................................. 123 
3.4.1. Institutional/Macroeconomic and Organisational Contexts .................................................. 123 
3.5.  A BRIEF REVIEW OF KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT IN IRAN ..................................................................... 126 
3.5.1. Information Technology and Iranian Knowledge Management ........................................... 127 
3.5.2. Top Management Support and Iranian Knowledge Management  ....................................... 128 
3.5.3. Political / Economical Factors and Iranian Knowledge Management  .................................. 129 
3.5.4. Role of trust among Iranian organisations ................................................................................ 131 
3.5.5. Knowledge sharing and acquisition in Iranian organisations................................................. 131 
3.6.  THE RESEARCH FRAMEWORK................................................................................................................ 133 
3.7.  CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................................... 134 
CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  ............................................................................................... 140 
4.1.  INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................... 140 
4.2.  RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY........................................................................................................................ 140 
4.2.1. Interpretivist ................................................................................................................................... 141 
4.2.2. Research Approaches: Quantitative and Qualitative .............................................................. 143 
4.3.  RESEARCH STRATEGIES ......................................................................................................................... 145 
4.3.1. Alternative Research Strategies  .................................................................................................. 145 
4.3.2. Case Study ....................................................................................................................................... 148 
4.3.3. Embedded Case Study  .................................................................................................................. 149 
4.4.  EVALUATION OF THE RESEARCH ............................................................................................................ 150 
4.4.1. Generalisability .............................................................................................................................. 151 
4.4.2. Validity ............................................................................................................................................. 152 
4.4.3. Reliability ......................................................................................................................................... 155 
4.5.  SAMPLING PROCEDURES ...................................................................................................................... 156 
4.5.1. IKCO’s Organisational Structure and Key Players .................................................................... 159 
4.5.2. The Follow-up Interviews ............................................................................................................. 165 
4.5.3. Back-up Plan for the Follow-up Interview ................................................................................. 166 
4.6.  DATA COLLECTION ............................................................................................................................... 168 
4.6.1. Alternative Data Collection Methods ......................................................................................... 168 
12 | P a g e  
 
4.6.2. Primary Data (Interview)  .............................................................................................................. 169 
4.6.3. Secondary Data .............................................................................................................................. 170 
4.6.4. Semi-structured Interviews.......................................................................................................... 171 
4.6.5. The Study Challenges .................................................................................................................... 173 
4.6.5.1. Permissions .................................................................................................................................173 
4.6.5.2. Organisational chart ...................................................................................................................173 
4.6.5.3. Set-up interview schedules : .......................................................................................................174 
4.6.5.4. National & international political issues ....................................................................................175 
4.6.5.5. No overseas staff allowed to be interviewed.............................................................................175 
4.6.5.6. Transcribing and translation.......................................................................................................175 
4.7.  THE INTERVIEW QUESTIONS ................................................................................................................. 176 
4.7.1. The Follow-up Interview Questions ........................................................................................... 177 
4.8.  THE IMPORTANCE OF ETHICS ................................................................................................................ 178 
4.9.  METHODS OF DATA ANALYSIS AND INDUCTIVE APPROACH .................................................................... 180 
CHAPTER FIVE: DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS:  ......................................................................................... 191 
5.1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................ 191 
5.2. KNOWLEDGE SHARING THROUGH KNOWLEDGE REPOSITORY ........................................................................... 192 
5.2.1. Knowledge as power ..................................................................................................................... 193 
5.2.2. Effectiveness of information technology................................................................................... 197 
5.2.3. Top and Middle Management Support  ..................................................................................... 205 
5.3. KNOWLEDGE SHARING THROUGH INTERACTION AND SOCIALISATION ............................................................... 211 
5.4. KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER FROM INTERNATIONAL JOINT VENTURE PARTNERS ...................................................... 221 
5.4.1. Cultural distance between IKCO and international partners................................................. 225 
5.4.2. The role of trust in knowledge sharing ...................................................................................... 227 
5.4.3. Political influence on the IJVs’ behaviour with regard to knowledge sharing .................... 232 
5.5. KNOWLEDGE ACQUISITION, RETENTION AND CREATION WITHIN THE R&D CENTRE .......................................... 237 
CHAPTER SIX: DISCUSSION ................................................................................................................................ 250 
6.1  THE RESEARCH FRAMEWORK AFTER DISCUSSION................................................................................... 263 
CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION  ....................................................................................................................... 266 
7.1.  EMPIRICAL CONTRIBUTION ................................................................................................................... 274 
7.2.  LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH  ................................................................................................. 275 
REFERENCE:  .......................................................................................................................................................... 276 
APPENDICES ......................................................................................................................................................... 316 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 | P a g e  
 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION TO THE RESEARCH 
1.1.  Research Objectives 
Formulating and clarifying the research topic is the starting point of a research 
project (Chauri & Gronhaug, 2002). Saunders et al., (2003, p.25) argued that a 
research project “may begin with a general focus research question that then 
generates more detailed research questions or may use general focus research 
question as a base from which we are going to write a set of research objectives ”. 
This study aims to investigate issues on knowledge-sharing in the new product 
development process in a single embedded case study that of Iran Khodro Company 
(IKCO). In particular, this study investigates the way in which Western theory on 
knowledge-sharing and knowledge-transfer can be applied, refined or developed in 
the Iranian context.  
1.2.  The Rational of the Research  
The rationale of the research is mainly three-fold in terms of its academic 
significance, methodological relevance and practical implication.  
1.2.1. Academic Significance  
In the knowledge management literature, the majority of researchers argue that 
knowledge management refers to a wide range of practices within an organisation to 
identify, create, represent, distribute and enable acceptance of insights and 
experience; such insights and experiences could be embodied in individuals’ minds 
or embedded in organisational processes or practices (Nonaka, 1991). As Barclay & 
Murray (1997) argue, knowledge management researchers often make a direct 
connection between an organisation’s intellectual assets explicit (codified 
knowledge) or tacit (personal know-how) and the bottom-line performance of the 
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business. Prior literature has already investigated the issues and factors affecting the 
knowledge management processes (specifically knowledge-sharing) within 
organisations (Walsh and Ungson, 1991; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Spender, 
1996; Kogut and Zander, 1992; Santos et al., 2012). However, our understanding of 
knowledge management processes and practices outside the developed world is 
limited. This is especially the case for a large, state-controlled Iranian organisation, 
such as Iran Khodro Company (IKCO). Within the existing literature, Iranian 
automotive companies and their knowledge-sharing practices in the new product 
development process in particular have not been studied systematically. A review of 
the academic literature showed that there is a gap in this research area in Iranian case 
study compared with the large number of studies on international automakers 
(Abdolshah and Abdolshah, 2011). Therefore, the significance of this study is that it 
will investigate the way in which Western theory on knowledge-sharing and 
knowledge-transfer can be applied, refined or developed in the Iranian context, and 
in particular in IKCO. 
1.2.2. Methodological Relevance 
One of the reasons why there is little prior research on Iranian automotive companies 
is the difficulty associated with gaining access to these companies. Iranian 
companies are very cautious about outsiders coming in to investigate their business 
practices, as is explained in detail in the Methodology section of this thesis. For 
example, between 2011 and 2012, the Iranian government forbade Iranian students 
studying abroad from writing any thesis or research about Iran. Mohammad Sossain 
Majlis-Ara, the director general for student affairs in the Science Ministry announced 
that, “the new rule applies not just to students on Iranian government scholarships 
but also to those students paying for their own education abroad” (New York 
Community Media Alliance, 2011). This is due to a multitude of factors. The 
political regime of the country tightly controls key state-controlled organisations, 
such as IKCO. As a result, Iran’s political relationships with other countries are 
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reflected in its organisational policies with regard to engaging with international 
researchers. Following the political turmoil in Iran in recent years, Iranian 
companies, such as IKCO, do not allow foreign researchers to collect information 
from within their organisations (Iran Times, 2011). Iranian students studying abroad 
also face greater difficulties in gaining access to these organisations and this recent 
attitude shows that Iran as a society has been much less open to the outside world 
compared with many emerging market economies and developed economies. Iran’s 
reluctance to engage with the outside world makes it very difficult for researchers to 
gain access to its organisations. This has been observed in this study, and is 
explained in further detail in the Methodology section. It is very difficult for 
researchers to secure research access over a reasonable period of time in order to 
conduct a large number of in-depth qualitative interviews. This study has had to 
overcome all of these challenges in order to conduct an embedded case study 
primarily based on 40 in-depth semi-structured qualitative interviews conducted with 
25 senior and middle managers from key departments relevant to the new product 
development process. Therefore, the empirical work of this study provides unique 
insights into the largest state-controlled automotive company, IKCO.  It is important 
to mention that based on experience gained during this research, an organisation such 
as IKCO has a very complex organisational and management structure and the top 
management team is often associated with the political party in control. This means 
that a change in the political regime leads to change in the top management, which in 
turn leads to a change in middle management and usually affects the process of 
research and access.  
1.2.3. Practical Implications 
The Iranian automotive industry, as the second main industry after Iran’s oil and gas 
industry, plays a very important role in the country’s economy. The industry has 
more than 50 years of history and employs over half a million people. It has been 
recognised as one of the biggest automotive industries in the region of the Middle-
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East, Central Asia and North Africa. IKCO is Iran’s most important automaker, 
holding over 50% of the local market in terms of unit and value, exporting its 
products to over 35 different countries all around the world, and employing over 
50,000 staff. The company has been an automaker since 1962 and has been involved 
in many projects, including a number of projects working with international 
automakers such as Talbot, Mercedes-Benz, Peugeot, Renault and Suzuki, since its 
establishment. The organisation’s production lines cover different types of products, 
such as commercial cars and passenger cars, which are locally or jointly developed. 
In addition, IKCO has its own Research and Development Centre. The significance 
of IKCO in the context of the Iranian economy, its history as the largest Iranian 
automaker, and its experience of developing new products independently (such as 
Samand cars) and jointly with international partners (such as SD206 with Peugeot) 
make IKCO an interesting and relevant case to study knowledge-sharing and 
knowledge-transfer in the new product development process. The findings of this 
study provide first-hand insights into how IKCO operates within its organisational 
and institutional contexts and how its knowledge-sharing and knowledge-transfer 
processes are comparable with international players.  
1.3. The Structure of the Thesis 
Following this Introduction, Chapter Two will explain the Research Context, in 
particular the Iranian automotive industry, in order to provide background 
information on the case study. Chapter Three will review key academic literature in 
the area of knowledge management especially knowledge-sharing in the new product 
development process to provide a foundation for the empirical investigation. 
Following this, Chapter Four will discuss the key methodological issues, research 
design and methods employed in this study in an effort to explain how the research 
was conducted and how the findings were derived. Chapter Five will report the 
analysis of the data according to the key analytical themes that emerged from the 
17 | P a g e  
 
empirical work. Chapter Six will discuss the key findings in relation to the prior 
literature and finally, Chapter Seven will summarise the conclusion of the research.  
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CHAPTER TWO: RESEARCH CONTEXT: THE IRANIAN AUTOMOTIVE 
INDUSTRY 
2.1. Introduction  
The aim of this chapter is to clarify that the auto industry is an important trade area in 
the Iranian economy and has the potential to be a valuable case study for a research 
project. This research aims to study the performance of Iran Khodro (IKCO) in the 
NPD processes. To conduct this research successfully, it is important to first 
understand the industry domestically and internationally. The IKCO is the largest 
automaker in the Middle East and in Iran, founded with a registered capital of 100 
million Rls on 18th of August 1962 by the Khayami family. IKCO’s original name 
was Iran National, but since the 1979 revolution it has been known as Iran Khodro 
(meaning car in Persian). IKCO is a public joint stock company, which aims to 
produce different types of vehicles and parts, as well as after sales service and 
exports. Iran Khodro is holding over 50% of the domestic vehicle sales in Iran. This 
chapter aims to review the automotive industry at the domestic and global levels. 
Chapter Two will be introduced in three main sections; it will explore the automotive 
industry and will challenge issues within the Iran Khodro Corporation (IKCO). As a 
result of data protection policies in the IKCO and in Iran, and owing to access 
limitations with regard to the data and figures, the company’s internal reports and 
BMI’s statistics are two main sources for the company’s profile. In addition, national 
and international news agencies are two other major sources for this chapter. The first 
part of this chapter will explore the background of the industry (economic, political, 
geographic and historical development) and the importance of the trade for the 
country. In the second part, on the one hand focus will be placed on domestic 
automakers, and they will be compared locally in terms of quantity and quality, and 
on the other hand the Iranian auto industry will be compared with its international 
competitors. This comparison study will show the current stand of the Iranian auto 
Industry. The last part of the section will explore and explain the issues within the 
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industry and identify the arrangement and planning for the field work. In recent years, 
Iran has increased the volume of cars produced, rising to the rank of 16th globally in 
2007 and becoming the leading supplier of automotives to the Middle-East (Research 
and Markets, 2008).  “By 2008, Iran was producing over a million cars or about 
1.43% of global automotive production” (AtiehBahar, 2008, p.1). There are 28 
automotive manufacturing units, which are mostly subsidiaries of the 13 main state 
and privately owned automakers in Iran, actively producing both light and heavy 
vehicles. These local automakers are engaged in joint ventures with several well-
known international automakers such as Peugeot (France), Kia (South Korea), Proton 
(Malaysia), Chery (China), Mazda (Japan), Nissan (Japan), Mercedes-Benz 
(Germany) and other established producers of light and heavy vehicles. These 
automakers produce a wide range of automotives, including motorbikes, passenger 
cars, vans, mini trucks, medium sized trucks, heavy duty trucks, minibuses, large size 
buses and other heavy automotives used in commercial and private activities in the 
country.  
Research and Markets (2008) reported that there is a high demand for vehicles in the 
country, with estimates indicating a requirement of 1.5 million vehicles. This 
requirement cannot be met due to a lack of capacity in the country's closed car 
market. Foreign companies which include mostly European and Asian companies are 
gradually entering the Iranian automotive market for the purpose of assembling 
improved vehicles in completely knocked down (CKD) kits.  
Research and Markets (2008) reported that, despite the high production levels in Iran, 
it is generally believed by experts that the demand for automotives far outstrips the 
supply. According to Iranian estimates in 2008, demand stands at a maximum of 1.5 
million vehicles, which cannot be reached by the local producers. Such an increase in 
production is vital for Iran where more than 25% of the cars on Iran’s roads are over 
20 years old.  
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2.2.  Historical Development of the Iranian Auto Industry  
According to a report by Piesing (2007, p.1), in 2007 “Tom Donnelly, the director of 
the Motor Industry Observatory at the Coventry University Business School, believed 
that Iran is the major player in the Middle East, and has aims to play with the main 
automakers of the world motor industry, with a target to raise production to the 1.5–
1.6 million vehicles in the near future”.  Tom Donnelly argued that if this target is 
achieved by Iran, it would make Iran’s auto production equal size to Britain’s auto 
market. However, the question that arises here is: can the Iranians achieve  this target. 
It is important to remember that Iran believes that the Peugeot 206, 206SD and 
Samand are its state’s automotive industry symbols and can be seen as Iranian auto 
industry icons in the international auto market (Piesing, 2007). 
According to Aftab (2006), 66 million cars were produced worldwide in 2006 and 
Iranian carmakers reached a record of 1.1 million vehicles produced including 
different ranges of cars. BMI (2009) statistics show that the number of car ‘units’ 
produced has risen every year in Iran since 1997; however, domestic market capacity 
limitations which may be around 1.5 million unit vehicles a year are forcing domestic 
carmakers to look for new markets and new customers outside the country’s domestic 
market to ensure that their future business activities are profitable. For instance, 
Peimani (2003) reported that the Chinese Industry, in a bid to reach its goals of 
increasing profit and securing its future business activities, has undertaken the step of 
building relations with companies outside China. In addition, China’s Chery Auto Co 
announced in late February 2003 that it would start making cars in Iran. Apart from 
friendly ties between the two countries based on their common views on various 
regional and international issues, the announcement demonstrates that China is taking 
steps to turn its domestic auto industry into a global player a move in tune with its 
status as a rising economic power. For example, BMI (2009) confirmed that Chery 
(Chinese firm) is going to start its operations in Iran.  
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In addition, the Iranian automakers IKCO and Saipa have already started to take a 
role in the global auto market. According to Sanat-e Khodro SAPCO (2009, 
Shahriver, p.15), “the latest statistics on the world’s automakers show that Iran has 
two car manufacturers among the world’s top 30 carmakers. Iran Khodro (IKCO) is 
ranked as 21st and SAIPA as 20th in the world rankings”. Table 1 shows the World’s 
top automakers. 
Table 1: Worlds auto makers (2007–2008) 
No Company 
Unit of 
car 
No Company 
Unit of             
car 
1 TOYOTA (Japan)  9.237.780 16 Avtovaz (Russia) 801.563 
2 GM (USA) 8.282.803 17 TaTa (India) 798.265 
3 WV (Germany) 6.437.414 18 FAW (China)  637.720 
4 Renault & Nissan  5.812.416 19 Fuji (Japan) 616.497 
5 Ford (USA) 5.407.000 20 Saipa (Iran)  591.529 
6 Hyundai (Korea) 4.172.461 21 IKCO (Iran)  566.200 
7 Honda (Japan) 3.912.700 22 Isuzu (Japan)  538.810 
8 PSA (France) 3.325.407 23 Chana auto (China)  531.149 
9 Suzuki (Japan)  2.623.567 24 DongFeng Auto (China) 489.266 
10 Fiat (Italy) 2.524.235 25 Beijing Auto (China)  446.680 
11 Daimler (Germany) 2.174.299 26 Chery (China)  350.560 
12 Chrysler (USA) 1.893.068 27 SAIC (China)  282.004 
13 BMW (Germany) 1.429.918 28 Volvo (Sweden)  248.991 
14 Mazda (Japan)  1.349.274 29 Brilliance (China)  241.553 
15 Mitsubishi (Japan) 1.209.231 30 Harbin Hafei (China) 226.754 
           Sanat-e Khodro SAPCO (2009, Shahriver, p.15)  
 
Aftab (2006) reported that Husain Nive, Human Resources Manager of Ford 
automotive industry believes that, as a result of the rise in the oil price, the country’s 
(Iran) GDP is also going up, resulting in a large number of local people now being 
able to buy a car in their home country market, which is pushing automakers to keep 
production levels up for the local market. Moreover, as already mentioned, the low 
range of car ownership gives other hope to the automakers in Iran.  
According to the statistics presented by the Iranian government (Omidvar, 2005; 
BMI, 2009; OICA, 2006) the number of car units being made is increasing rapidly 
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between 2005-2009. However, according to the Iranian Ministry of Industry and 
Mines, the quality of the cars being produced by companies in Iran is very low. For 
instance, SAIPA’s most popular model, Pride, 330,000 units of which have been 
produced, has a very low quality ranking (–333.1). This (–333.1) point will be 
explained in the section on the industry’s issues in the following pages (Iranian 
Standard and Quality Inspection, 2012). Another weakness in the car industry in Iran 
is the limitation for export due to the low quality. During the period 2005–2006, only 
15,000 cars were exported to Syria by Iran Khodro and SAIPA, whilst IKCO 
exported just 3,000 units Samand to Russia. Nevertheless, they are both planning to 
export over 100,000 vehicles and, as result of these plans, Iran Khodro (IKCO) has 
opened plants in Senegal, Syria, China, Venezuela, Azerbaijan and Belarus. 
Moreover, another key plan for the future of Iran Khodro (IKCO) is to export the 
Peugeot 206SD and Renault Logan L90 worldwide (BMI, 2009).  
Furthermore, Azad (2006) reported that Renault’s former Chief Executive suggested 
that Iran could export the L90 if the Renault quality standard could be reached. He 
also maintained that having IJVs between Iranian domestic carmakers and their 
International partners could help Iranian companies to enter the International market 
easily. For example, during 2005–2006, fifty Iranian auto part makers entered the 
Renault-Nissan network and were able to make trade agreements of up to 640 million 
dollars. Renault agreed to build the L90 locally in Iran and had manufactured 300,000 
units in Iran Khodro and SAIPA by the end of 2010.  
2.2.1. International Automakers  
The joint ventures with Peugeot Citroen and Renault have provided Iranian 
automakers with the technology that is vital to achieve their aim. Renault has even 
prioritised production in Iran over China as it was a late player in China, and with the 
absence of the Americans due to the sanctions, the Iranian market is uncluttered, as 
stated by Professor Donnelly. However, how much technology would you transfer to 
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the Iranians if you were a European producer, knowing their ambition? On the other 
hand, however, the Peugeot 405 is not exactly considered cutting-edge technology 
(Piesing, 2007).  
Aftab (2006) mentioned that it has been agreed, that in order to increase the quality of 
products in the automotive industry in Iran, domestic carmakers need to have a strong 
relationship with International automakers. The former Chief Executive of Iranian 
Industry development has said that he believes that if the Iranian auto industry wants 
to be recognised internationally then it needs to have a strategic relationship with 
international partners. If this is not done, the industry will collapse in this competitive 
market. Piesing (2007, p.1) reported that Dave Leggett, the editor of the Motor 
Industry News & Analysis, believes that “the Iranians are with their big ambitions for 
the new Samand Soren, and that the L90 may be their best bet owing to its price, 
quality and technology”. Dave Leggett in his interview with Piesing (2007), argued 
that in contrast to the UK, the Iranian government has decided to have a local car 
manufacturing industry rather than a car manufacturing industry in Iran. Dave 
Leggett cited in Piesing (2007, p.1), stated that, “the Iranian factories’ R&D is 
remarkable; designing and engineering prototypes despite the sanction”. Leggett 
further stated that, “in actual fact, the sanction encouraged Iranians to be self-
sufficient: much like the industry in apartheid-era South Africa and unlike apartheid-
era South Africa, there are no shortages of those who will help the Iranians avoid the 
sanction”.  
As mentioned previously, the Iranian market is almost unique but it is linked to the 
political and economic situation within the country. Indge & Godfrey (1998), 
reported that the number of vehicles in Iran is around 9 million units, with more than 
25% of these being more than 20 years old. Combining this information with the 
estimate that 18 million people in 3.5 million households are in the financial bracket 
that would allow them to purchase a vehicle, one can see the pent up demand that 
would exist under more favourable circumstances. If there were only one car for each 
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of these households, then there is a minimum potential for over 3 million vehicles 
both as additional to, and replacements for, the existing aged units.  
BMI (2009) has argued that assembly operation under licensing agreements will 
continue to form the backbone of Iran’s automotive industry. Iran Khodro (IKCO) 
has made significant investments to upgrade its facilities, and uses robotics 
extensively throughout the vehicle-assembly process. BMI (2009) argues that the 
heavily protected domestic-market will favour Iranian producers and give foreign 
investors a greater reason to set up joint ventures within the country where there is the 
largest potential market in the area. BMI (2009) believes that, despite the damaging 
implications of limited sanctions on investment and technology inflows, a number of 
factors, most importantly investment by Russia and China and Europe, are likely to 
alleviate such pressures on Tehran. Iran Khodro is also expanding its manufacturing 
base outside Iran, concentrating on Samand. In July 2007, the carmaker confirmed  its 
plans to begin the production of the Samand in Senegal. Based in the capital, Dakar, 
the plant is scheduled to begin production before the end of March 2008. The 
likelihood of a rise in completely knocked down (CKD) exports to new foreign 
plants, part-owned by Iranian auto firms, will also help raise auto exports over the 
forecast period. Despite previously expressing doubts, BMI (2007) now believes that 
the new plants are set to be completed on or just after their target dates, leading to 
more substantial increases in exports than were previously forecast.   
The history of Iran’s auto industry can be divided into three periods:                   
1969–1978; 1979–1993; and 1994 up to the present time. Iran International Magazine 
(2003b, p.2) explained that, “the time span in the first category, falling before the 
1979 Iranian revolution, is called the period of ‘incomplete support’ during which the 
industry depended heavily on oil-related hard currency revenues and its activity was 
mostly of an assemblage nature”.  
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The time span in the second category partially coincided with the Iraq war (1980–
1988). During this period, cars were regarded as luxury items, and did not receive the 
necessary attention due to the country’s preoccupation with war and the shortage of 
hard currency. As a result the production of cars dropped significantly. When the war 
ended, there was a brief time span, viewed retrospectively with regret, and referred to 
as the period of ‘lost opportunities’ during which a huge sum of money, about $2 
billion, was spent on importing 164,000 passenger cars. This $2 billion could have 
been spent constructively to improve the auto industry and an opportunity was lost.  
Nevertheless, in 1993, a new shift began in the Iranian auto industry, which could 
truthfully be called auto manufacturing activity. Auto manufacturing typically begins 
with assemblage in most countries; that is, the construction of domestic 
manufacturing bases for mass production. In between these two phases come parts 
design, auto design, manufacture of production line machinery etc. The Iranian auto 
industry developed step by step up until the third stage and due to the strong 
backwardness that existed at the time, all domestic auto manufacturing units tried to 
move on a equivalent course, in an attempt to compensate for the backwardness 
within a reasonable time (Iran International Magazine, 2003b).  
The process of industry development began in 1920, when a complete built car 
(CBU) was imported. This was followed by the assembly of different models of 
vehicles, CKD (Complete-Knocked-Down), built vehicles and finally a locally built 
national car named Samand, which was introduced to the market in 2001. Most of 
Iran’s domestic automotive industry dates from 1958 when the government began 
issuing licences for the assembly of motor vehicles. During the 1960s, the Iranian 
Jeep Company commissioned the first production line with a total capacity of 3,000 
Jeeps a year (Indge & Godfrey, 1998). The first passenger car manufactured in Iran 
was known as the Paykan. It was produced by Iran Khodro Corporation (IKCO), 
licensed by the British Talbot Company and offered to the market in 1967 (Iran 
Yellow Pages, 2008). 
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Iran Khodro was established in 1962 for the production of Mercedes-Benz buses and 
mini buses and began production of passenger cars in 1967 when it signed a long-
term contract for a local version of the Hillman Hunter (Talbot), which was called the 
Paykan, meaning (Arrow). Subsequently, over the next 20 years, over a million 
Paykans were produced, with local substance rising to 67% (Indge & Godfrey, 1998).   
In addition, General Motors (GM) and Renault entered the market in the 1970s; GM 
took over the American Motors plant in 1974 to produce Chevrolets, and later Buicks 
and Cedillas. Renault took over the Citroen plant and introduced an Iranian version of 
the Renault 5. In the 1980s, the automotive industry was hit by the withdrawal of 
many foreign investors around the time of the 1979 revolution; due to the war, this 
was followed by a sharp decline in the oil price. Not only was there a drop in 
production to 25% of capacity between 1987 and 1989, but also plans for updating 
technology had to be abandoned due to the lack of financial resources and diminished 
foreign investment (Indge & Godfrey, 1998).  
BMI (2009) argued that in the early 1990s, the Iranian government launched a crash 
programme to boost production by making available over $2 billion for imported 
components and raw materials; finally, the IKCO manufactured the first Iranian 
national vehicle, the Samand, which was exported to five different countries at the  
time. Table 2 shows IKCO’s exports to those five countries: 
Table 2: IKCO's Samand overseas reach 
Country 
Capacity 
(CBUs per annum) 
Start-up 
Total investment 
(US$ million) 
Azerbaijan  
6,500 first stage 
18,000 second stage 
May 2006 10 
Belarus 
6,000 first stage 
60,000 optional second stage 
August 2006 
25 (40 for optimal 
second stage) 
Venezuela  15,000 November 2006 11 
Syria  5,000 2007 60 
Senegal 
15,000 first phase 
45,000 second phase 
Na Na 
                   (BMI, 2009, p.41)  
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The figure shows an increase within the industry in terms of car quantity. However, 
in terms of car quality, the figures show that vehicle quality is not very good 
compared with other international competitors’ products and the world standard.  
Based on the above background, the researcher believes that over the last 50 years, 
the industry was unable to benefit from its international partners’ experiences and its 
foreign partners could not deliver a tangible benefit to the Iranian local auto industry. 
Furthermore, the Iranians did not have enough ability to gain more knowledge from 
their foreign partners. For more than a half a century, local carmakers focused on 
assembling foreign vehicles rather than aiming at a long-term plan to design a world-
class national brand. Peimani (2003, p.2) argued that one of the main reasons for this 
could be “the 1979 Iranian revolution that suddenly damaged Iranian-American 
relations and made the American carmakers withdraw from Iran. It also damaged 
Iran’s relations with the most western countries, which lasted to varying extents until 
the late 1990s”. 
Peimani (2003) further argued that the political and economic situation has opened up 
new opportunities for South Korean companies to break through the Iranian market. 
In the late 1980s, the steady development of Iran–European relations also helped 
French companies to boost their production into Iran. Japanese companies, such as 
Mazda and Nissan, also joined the Iranian auto industry. French Peugeot and South 
Korean companies became the largest car producers and automakers’ partners in Iran 
through joint ventures with certain automakers.  
The following interviews highlight some of the historical issues that have arisen 
within the industry. Ellis (2006, p.2) believes that a “population over 75 million 
people has much great effect on the country’s future. Iran’s auto industry has boomed 
in recent years to become one of the biggest sectors outside of oil/gas, employing 
over 450,000 people (directly) and accounting for about 4% of GDP. With nearly one 
million vehicles produced in recent years, as many as in Australia or Thailand, Iran 
boasts the largest car industry in the Middle East, Central Asia and North Africa”.  
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Ellis (2006, pp.2–3) has interviewed several Iranian auto executives, and has further 
explored the industry’s issues. Iran Khodro, the country’s oldest and largest 
carmaker, is best known for the Paykan, a discontinued knockoff of the Hillman 
Hunter a 1960s British marquee formerly owned by Chrysler and Peugeot. For 
example, Mr Mirzaei Iran, Khodro’s Deputy President stated, “we can work with 
European companies, even with Americans. Business is business, and they do not like 
to lose the benefit of the Iranian market and the region. The past is past and after five 
or six years, I believe we will be producing Chevrolet”. Moreover, “the market is not 
small here”, stated industry analyst Jonathan Poskitt of J.D Power Automotive 
Forecasting.  
There is a huge population of people aged under 40 with money in Iran, and they 
want the same things as everyone else. However, a number of political issues between 
Iran and Western countries, particularly the USA, have affected the Iranian auto 
industry in the last 30 years. Hussein Momeni, SAIPA’s Director of Strategic 
Planning stated that his company negotiated with executives from Chrysler in the 
1990s, who said to their would-be partners that US-Iranian relations had thawed 
sufficiently to warrant exploratory talks. He suggested that Chrysler wanted to 
introduce a version of the Plymouth Acclaim to Iran, and that the vehicles had even 
been tested for Iranian conditions. The negotiations proceeded to a semi-advanced 
stage based on representations by Chrysler that it was able to follow through despite 
the state of political relations.  
Ellis (2006, p.2) also interviewed a former SAIPA executive, who was part of its 
negotiating team, and who asked not to be identified but backed up this account. He 
said that, “Chrysler fronted negotiations through its Canadian division and that 
discreet meetings were held in Istanbul and Dubai, with the two sides agreeing on 
price and production details. The talks petered out, and after George W. Bush made 
his Axis of Evil speech, lumping Iran with North Korea and Iraq, chances of 
rapprochement became as remote as ever. Chrysler has denied that there were any 
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such talks”. Chrysler’s spokeswoman stated that neither Chrysler nor any of its 
subsidiaries had engaged in or authorised anyone else to engage in any meetings or 
negotiations with any state-owned or other automobile companies in Iran”.. The 
political crash between the US and Iran gave European and Asian automakers an 
opportunity to enter the Iranian auto industry without a high level of competition with 
their American automaker competitors. For example, Japan’s Mazda has a joint 
venture with Iran’s private Bahman group to make a version of the Mazda and 
Mercedes-Benz has licensed assembly of two kinds of E-class Mercedes-Benz 
through IKCO. One of the main European automakers PSA is assembling several 
types of vehicles in Iran within IKCO and SAIPA, two state-owned car 
manufacturers. However, it is believed that the lack of competition between 
international automakers in the Iranian car industry has negatively affected the field. 
For example, the European and Asian automakers (business partners to the Iranian 
automakers) are leading the industry; sometimes these international partners ignore 
contracts and promises already agreed with the Iranian side. The Iranian auto industry 
is ranked (in 2008-2009) as the 16th largest vehicle manufacturer in the world.  
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2.3.  The state of the Iranian Auto Industry  
 
Table 3: The world’s top 30 automakers 
Rank Country 
Production % of 
difference 2007 2008 
1 Japan 11,596,327 11,563,629 -0,3 
2 China 8,882,456 9,345,101 5,2 
3 USA  10,780,729 8,705,239 -19,3 
4 Germany  6,213,460 6,040,582 -2,8 
5 S. Korea 4,086,308 3,806,682 -6,8 
6 Brazil 2,977,150 3,220,475 8,2 
7 France 3,015,854 2,568,978 -14,8 
8 Spain 2,889,703 2,541,644 -12 
9 India 2,253,729 2,314,662 2,7 
10 Mexico  2,095,245 2,191,230 4,6 
11 Canada 2,578,790 2,077,589 -19,4 
12 Russia 1,660,120 1,790,301 7,8 
13 England 1,750,253 1,649,515 -5,8 
14 Thailand 1,287,346 1,393,742 8,3 
15 Turkey  1,099,413 1,147,110 4,3 
16 Iran 997,240 1,051,430 5,4 
17 Italy 1,284,312 1,023,774 -20,3 
18 Poland 792,703 950,908 20 
19 Czech Re 937,648 945,822 0,9 
20 Belgium 834,403 724,498 -13,2 
21 Indonesia 411,638 600,844 46 
22 Argentina 544,647 597,086 9,6 
23 Slovakia  571,071 575,776 0,8 
24 S. Africa 534,490 562,965 5,3 
25 Malaysia 441,661 530,810 20,2 
26 Ukraine 402,127 423,127 5,1 
27 Hungary 292,027 346,055 18,5 
28 Australia  334,617 329,556 -1,5 
29 Sweden 366,020 309,034 -15,6 
30 Romania 241,712 245,308 1,5 
31 Others 1,946,218 1,694,903 -------- 
 73,266,061 70,526,531 -3,7  
                           OICA (2008) cited in Sanat-e Khodro SAPCO (2009 September, p.18)  
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Iranian carmakers are investing heavily in upgrading models, according to BMI’s 
(2009) latest report. In addition, Iranian automotive production reached 1,108,569 
units as of March 20, 2009, including 942,219 passenger cars. BMI’s forecast (2009) 
also shows a total automotive output of 1,130,713 units in Iran for the year ending 
March 20, 2010, meaning a growth in the number produced compared with the 
previous year. BMI (2009) expects Iran to become a significant supplier of passenger 
cars in the region of the Middle-East, the Persian Gulf, North of Africa and Central 
Asia, particularly to Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, Turkey and Azerbaijan. In addition, BMI 
(2009) believes that the new mass market models being built in Iran, notably Iran 
Khodro’s 206SD and the Samand models, fit the requirements and price range of less 
developed emerging markets.  
The latest news from Business Monitors Online (2009) showed that IKCO has made 
an agreement with French automaker Peugeot to produce Peugeot’s cars at IKCO’s 
facilities outside Iran. IKCO’s Director Javad Najmeddin stated that IKCO will build 
the Peugeot 206, Peugeot 207 and Peugeot Pars models at its plants in Venezuela, 
Senegal, Egypt and Syria. In addition, Business Monitors Online (2009) also believes 
that the Iranian market’s strength for all carmakers will depend deeply on exports and 
producing overseas and as such, they are seeking export opportunities both for CBUs 
and SKD kits supplied to assembly lines. The story of exporting overseas in the 
Iranian auto industry began in December 2006, when a number of Iranian and Syrian 
auto-part manufacturers made preliminary agreements to jointly manufacture 
automotive parts for the IKCO’s Samand assembly line in Syria. Thirty Iranian auto-
part firms were involved in the negotiations to set-up joint ventures to supply the 
Syrian plant. The Samand is initially being assembled from imported CKD parts, but 
the level of local content is set to increase in the year ahead (2009). The likelihood of 
a rise in CKD exports to new foreign plants part-owned by Iranian auto firms will 
also help raise auto exports over the forecast period.  Total automotive exports, 
including parts, are shown in Table 4. 
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Table 4: Iran Auto Sector Trade  
 
Activities 2007 2008 2009 forecast 
Autos exports  unit 50,000 45,881 23,692 
Autos exports $bn 0.75 0.69 0.36 
Autos imports unit 55,965 55,503 50,585 
Autos imports $bn 1.12 1.34 1.02 
Autos balance of trade  $mn -369 -644 -657 
(BMI, 2009, p.20) 
Besides the export issue, vehicle ownership is known as another main factor for auto 
industry growth. The ownership issue will be explored in the next section. The 
question will be posed here: does the market in Iran have enough demand for auto 
products?  
2.3.1. Vehicle Ownership 
The Iranian market offers great potential for vehicle ownership, with little more than 
2% of the population owning a car. High import tariff restriction has also made it 
difficult for foreign firms to sell CBUs in the Iranian market without a local partner. 
Piesing (2007) stated that the nation has a low car ownership ratio of 1 in 10. In 
addition, JAMA (2009), cited in Sanat-e Khodro SAPCO (2009 September, p.15), 
believed that “Iran with a lower range of auto ownership is a good place for 
international and local automakers to produce and sale cars”. Table 5 shows a 
comparison study of car ownership in 13 different counties.  
Table 5 below shows that compared with the top 9 countries, Iran shows great 
potential for the growth of car ownership, which gives more hope to automakers for 
their future success.  
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Table 5: Car ownership 
No Country 
Number of people 
per a vehicle  
Number of people 
per a passenger car  
Available cars  (Million cars ) 
Total car Passenger Car 
1 USA  1,2 2,2 44 135 
2 Italy 1,5 1,7 9,8 35,2 
3 Australia  1,5 1,8 3,8 11,1 
4 Germany  1,7 1,8 9,7 46,5 
5 Canada 1,7 2,6 9,5 12,4 
6 France 1,7 2 6,7 30,4 
7 Japan 1,7 2,2 5,8 57,5 
8 England 1,7 2 5,1 30,9 
9 S. Korea 3 4,1 5,8 11,6 
10 Iran 7 9 9 7,1 
11 Turkey  8 11,8 9 6,1 
12 China 36,6 50 6 26 
13 India  66,5 95,7 6,8 11,7 
Sanat-e Khodro SAPCO (2009 September, p.15)  
 
2.3.2. Suppliers issues 
BMI (2009, p.26) argued that “firms and suppliers across the Iranian manufacturing 
sector are struggling with rising levels of debt, with many being effectively insolvent 
and unable to pay their workforce. Despite the government’s aim of achieving greater 
self-sufficiency in automotive parts, the Society of Automotive Spare Parts 
Manufacturers claimed that by mid-2008, parts producers were owed unpaid debts of 
around US$1bn by vehicle manufacturers”. 
BMI (2009) believed that the financial problems of parts manufacturers in Iran have 
had a major impact on the Iranian automotive industry and its ability to grow and 
compete in the global market. BMI (2009) argued that suppliers need to develop and 
improve the parts’ quality in order to reduce faults in the finished products. The next 
section will explore the environmental regulation within the country.  
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2.3.3. Regulation and Competitive Environment in the Industry  
The government has made significant efforts to reduce import tariffs, cutting them to 
a maximum of 90% on passenger cars and 20% on buses. Nevertheless, tariffs are 
still high, and foreign investors are still required to seek local partners to start up 
assembly plants. There is also the problem of the excessive red tape that constrains 
the private sector, combined with the fact that state-owned firms continue to dominate 
the auto sector. There is little in the way of competition in the Iranian market and 
importers are forced to participate in an arcane and lengthy application-procedure to 
bring CBUs into the country. The government is opposed to allowing any serious 
foreign challenge to its indigenous auto industry (BMI, 2009).  
For example, in April 2003, Ali Mohammad Namazi, a member of the Iranian 
Parliament’s Education and Research Committee, said publicly that if the import of 
CBUs was to be allowed, “the importers should scrap two dilapidated vehicles for 
each imported foreign car”. In addition, the government’s position was confirmed in 
November 2004, when Minister of Commerce Mohammad Shariatmadari, said that 
automobile imports by businesses registered in Iran would be permitted with a 130% 
import tariff rate, reduced to 125% in 2006 and 90% in 2009. At the time, officials in 
Iran’s auto industry warned that this tariff cut would result in a 30% loss in domestic 
car output with a corresponding loss of 30% of the workforce in the auto sector (BMI, 
2009, p.50). However, the Minister commented, “we are confident that the domestic 
conditions for car imports are ready, we will not allow foreign car imports”. The 
Minister added that more than 15,000 workshops and factories were engaged in car 
part manufacturing, there were 450,000 people in the industry, and their preservation 
was the government’s duty. Therefore, they would not risk their existence by 
importing foreign made cars. He also called for technology transfer as a future 
condition to granting import licences (BMI, 2009, p.50).  
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Now it is believed that the aim behind this regulation was to give more opportunities 
to local automakers to produce more cars, as this would guarantee the local 
automakers’ market—even if there were auto imports from outside the country. 
However, besides this support, Minister of Mines and Metals, Eshagh Jahangiri 
declared that, “he will encourage and force the Iranian auto industry to increase its 
quality and decrease its price. He said, he will continue his policies and not permit the 
excessive import of foreign cars, yet the industry also needs to reach a high quality 
standard as soon as possible” (Iranian International Magazine, 2003, p.1).  
A vital factor behind the development of the Iranian auto industry is the steady 
increase in the involvement of foreign original equipment manufacturers (OEM). For 
example, “PSA Peugeot Citroen, Kia Motors, Proton of Malaysia, Nissan Motor and 
Mazda Motor from Japan, Mercedes-Benz from Germany as well as GAZ from 
Russia, have entered the Iranian market through local partners. Recently, China’s 
Chery, SangYong Motor from Korea and TaTa Motor from India have announced 
plans to open assembly lines through JVs in the immediate future” (BMI, 2009, p.51).  
BMI (2009) mentioned that, in the current market, for example, the Japanese have 
focused their market presence on high-end, low-volume vehicles much against local 
hopes for the build-up of stronger links and this is one of the main reasons why the 
Japanese are seen as ‘ideal partners’ for Iranian manufacturers. In the words of Amir 
Albadvi, an Executive of Iran Khodro, “we want Japanese partners rather than 
European ones because the demand structure in Iran is more similar to Japan’s and 
we want to learn about productivity and technical skills” (BMI, 2009, p.51).  
However, European automakers have not hidden their interest in the Iranian auto 
market. In addition, PSA (2008) maintains that, with 13 vehicle manufacturers and 
automakers, over 1,200 parts suppliers and over 15,000 workshops and 450,000–
500,000 direct employees, the auto industry is one of Iran’s key business sectors. Iran 
is set to remain the largest car-producing country in the Middle East, according to the 
36 | P a g e  
 
BMI (2009) report. At the same time, Turkey (the world’s 15th automaker), earns an 
advantage from its stronger trading ties with Europe (zone), and presents itself as a 
cheap manufacturing hub for auto majors. Iran’s leading carmaker, Iran Khodro 
(IKCO), is making strides in the developing world. For instance, “in the year 2006, 
IKCO opened assembly lines for its Samand in Azerbaijan, Belarus, Venezuela, 
China, Syria and Senegal with a total maximum capacity of 263,000 units. The 
assembly line manufacturing Iran Khodro’s affordable Samand ‘world car’ model 
was launched in Minsk, Belarus, in August 2006, marking the Iranian auto 
manufacturer’s first production line in Europe and the revival of the Belarusian car 
industry” (BMI, 2009, p.41). 
BMI (2007) argued that Iranian carmakers remain dependent on the country’s 
domestic market—a market that is determined by the price of oil; essentially, the 
motor of the Iranian economy. In contrast, the Turkish and South African car 
industries are more export-oriented: Turkey is integrating with the EU economy and 
does not suffer from the domestic and international pressures facing Iran. It is 
believed that the industry is protected and supported by the government, and it will be 
difficult for international carmakers to enter the Iranian market and compete with 
local automakers without having a local partner. The protection plan has the aim of 
forcing international automakers to transfer their technology to the local industry. 
This protected environment ensures that there will be neither a high risk nor a high 
level of competition for the local based industry in the market in the next few years. 
However, these local automakers are being forced by the government to increase the 
quality of their products by using their business partners’ experience, expertise and 
technologies. In the following section, 2.3.4, the Iranian auto sector, the Iranian 
political environment, and the Iranian economic and business environments are 
briefly analysed (SWOT) to give a clear view of the current situations within the 
country.   
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2.3.4. Iran Business Environment PEST Analysis  
2.3.4.1. Political factors  
BMI (2010, p.7) argued that one strength was that, “s ince 1979 there has been some 
decrease in the level of political corruption. Wealth distribution has improved 
marginally and the political activities strongly supported by the Supreme Leader”. 
However, international and national political conflicts are the main weaknesses in the 
government’s activities that cause the state to plan its business preparations in 
advance. An opportunity was “the parliament strongly supporting the government’s 
programme in most of the areas; however, a threat was the continuing nuclear 
tensions increasing the prospect of further US and UN Security Council sanctions and 
high youth unemployment” (BMI, 2010, p.7). In addition, Market Research (2014, 
p.1) argued that “improvement in relations with the West bode well for Iran’s 
economy”. In conclusion and based on Lakshmanan (2013) argument, recent (2013) 
international political activities such as nuclear deal between Iran and West  will open 
a new door for the Iranian auto industry to start its collaboration with the World’s 
automakers. BMI (2014, p.8) argued that “ Iran and the 5+1 powers clinched a 
landmark interim deal on the Iran’s nuclear programme on November 24 2013, 
paving the way for partial easing of sanctions. However, BMI cautions that progress 
towards a more permanent agreement will face substantial difficulties”.  
2.3.4.2. Economical factors   
As its strengths, “Iran has the world’s second largest proven oil reserve after Saudi 
Arabia and the world’s second largest proven natural gas reserves after Russia” (BMI, 
2014, p.15). In addition, BMI (2014) also argued that besides the oil and gas industry, 
Iran has a strong agricultural sector. As its weaknesses, local consumption of 
hydrocarbons is rising rapidly and this, coupled with ageing technology in the oil and 
gas sector, will have a negative impact on its oil and gas-exporting capacity. 
International sanctions will keep-out foreign companies to bring much needed 
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technical knowledge and equipment to maintain industries. As its opportunities, the 
gas and oil sectors remain underdeveloped and there is considerable room to 
maximise this source of revenue. In addition, BMI (2014) also argued that a growing 
population, combined with a shortage of housing, provide opportunities for 
investment in residential construction. The potential threats are that a further 
deterioration in Iran’s relations with the international community over its nuclear 
programme could result in the imposition of more extensive economic measures by 
the UN Security Council or the US (BMI, 2014).  
2.3.4.3. Social factors 
Iran ended 2012 with a population of 76,424,443 people which represents an increase 
of 1,000,158 people compared to 2011. Iran is number 17th among the world’s 
countries in terms of country population. Male population is greater than female 
50.37% compared to 49.62% women. In addition, Iran shows a moderate population 
density, with 44 people per square km (CountryEconomy, 2014; World Bank, 2014). 
In addition, a study by Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade (2014, p.59) has suggested that “Iran’s young population will influence the 
future of the country’s business environment. Young population will stimulate 
demand for foods, housing, education, and information and communication 
technology and on the other hand, pressure to localise employment will grow as the 
number of local workforce entrants swells”. BMI (2014, p.12) has reported that based 
on “UN figures, around 45% of population is younger than 25. UNESCO (2010, 
p.14) argued that these young people create pressures for social system and thus for 
human opportunities in various sectors. This is reflected in the increased demand for 
high quality education, high quality health system, work opportunities, life options, 
and empowerment of both men and women”. In conclusion, UNESCO (2010, p.14) 
believes that Iran has made “significant progress in human development since the 
1990’s. The country’s Human Development Index (HDI) has been rising rapidly, 
especially due to growth in per capital income and to improved health conditions 
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contributing to increased life expectancy. Iran remains highly dependent on its one 
major industry oil-gas which accounts for 10-20% of GDP and 80% of Iran’s export 
income”.  
2.3.4.4. Technological factors 
Since 1979 the US sanctions aimed to weaken the Iran’s economic and technologic 
power. Yet “these sanctions and a very enthusiastic national demand for being 
independent to the Western or Eastern super power, has led to very remarkable 
advances in technological fields. Iran has invested considerable resources in hi-tech 
industries such as aerospace, automotive industry, peaceful nuclear energy and 
biotechnology. However, the majority of these industries are state-owned and many 
of them are over staffed and unprofitable and run on low productivities rates, and if 
they are profitable they enjoy of the extensive subsidies that government pay them” 
(Rahmati, 2012,p.13).  
 
BMI (2010) believe that, the strengths of the Iranian auto industry are that it is the 
largest car-producing market in the Middle East and holding over 50% of Iran’s auto 
market. Iranian auto industry also has tie-ups with foreign carmakers and the range of 
models produced by Iranian auto firms has been expanded and updated. However, the 
weaknesses of the industry are the heavily protected domestic market and the US 
trade embargoes, which have cut the country off from investment by US-based 
manufacturers. Besides this, local parts and components manufacturers face capacity 
constraints, which will mean greater reliance on foreign imports in car assembly. 
Finally, IKCO is suffering financial difficulties and is being bailed out by the 
government. The opportunities are that a limited relaxation on car imports will lead to 
a rise in inbound shipments and as Iran’s car sector grows, it will increasingly rely on 
outsourcing for parts and components. Finally, the US$1bn scrappage plan for 
commercial vehicles should boost heavy vehicle sales. BMI (2010, p.6) argued that 
“the threats are that Iran could be subjec ted to an international trade embargo over its 
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nuclear programme, which would affect the importation of parts, the future of joint 
ventures with foreign firms and Iran’s export market in the Middle East. It is worth 
mentioning that political instability is a key concern for the whole Iranian economy”.  
The Iranian government has been planning to make the Iranian business and 
industrial environment including the automotive sector attractive to all investors 
(domestic and overseas investors). However, most western business and marketing 
researchers, such as MBI, report that Iran’s political risk rating is low, which may 
affect businesses, for instance. For example, BMI (2009, 2010) mentioned that Iran’s 
political risk rating is at a low rate of 2 out of 10. However, the Iranian government is 
seeking to provide full protection and guarantees against all possible risks. In 
addition, Investment Iran (2008) reported that all possible risks are usually insured by 
the expert credit and investment insurance and in addition, the Iranian government 
welcomes most possible foreign investments in all areas excluding the military, 
ammunition and security sections, which are closed to foreign investment. Table 6 
shows the number of foreign activities and the total foreign investment in Iran. 
 
Table 6: Foreign investments under FIPPA from 1993–2007 (000$) 
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 (Investment Iran, 2008, p.1)  
 
The term, ‘foreign investor’ is defined by the Iranian government as natural persons 
and legal entities, as well as Iranian nationals and companies, residing either in Iran 
or abroad. Foreign investors will enjoy the same and equal treatment as accorded to 
local investors (Investment Iran, 2008). A governmental organisation called FIPPA 
provides information about investment in all areas of economic activities in Iran 
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except areas related to arms, ammunition and security, which are closed to foreign 
investment. In 2007, the government lowered the automotive import tariff levels from 
100% to 90% for lightweight vehicles; since then, the number of vehicles being 
imported into Iran has increased (Research and Markets, 2008).  
This interesting domestic policy decided by the Iranian government and parliament of 
a high tariff level for automotive imports (passenger cars) is encouraging foreign auto 
industries to set-up their IJVs with the local automakers in Iran, as locally made 
vehicles are 90% cheaper than imported cars. It is the government’s long-term plan to 
drop the percentage of tariffs for imported passenger vehicles in the next 10 years; 
however, since 2007, the import tariff for passenger cars has remained at 90%. High 
tariff levels for passenger vehicles will positively encourage (force) the local 
automakers to improve the quality of their vehicles, reduce the costs of their products 
and consider IJVs with foreign partners. It is obvious that, in ten years’ time, there 
will be a highly competitive auto market in Iran, which will create more opportunities 
for international carmakers to hold a greater share of the auto market in Iran and the 
local automakers need to reach a better level of auto standard in the next ten years. As 
threats, the Iran business environment will be affected by the UN, US and EU 
sanctions, which pose a significant threat to the participation of foreign firms in 
Iranian business (Iran Daily, 2010; BMI, 2009, 2010; Payvand, 2009).  
The importance of the automotive industry in the global economy is widely 
recognised, and it is also accepted that one of the most important and fastest growing 
industries in Iran is the automotive industry (Automotive Intelligence News, 2004; 
BBC News, 2005). The world auto industry is now over 120 years old, and the 
production of automobiles has reached 58 million units per annum. There are about 
100 million people involved in this industry, either directly or indirectly, and the total 
worldwide sales by the automotive industry has reached $1.3 trillion—$32 billion of 
which was net profit. This $1.3 trillion constituted 7.3% of the overall gross 
international productivity or 12% of the developed countries’ gross national 
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productivity. The number of cars running worldwide is almost at 700 million units, 
raising the auto industry to second place in the industrial manufacturing sector and 
third place in world economic activities following banking and oil (Iran International 
Magazine, 2003b). Owing to the importance of the industry, the Iranian government 
has designated the automobile industry as one of the pillars for its future economic 
growth and development (Omidvar, 2005). As Table 7 clearly shows, there was 
growth in passenger vehicle production in the Iranian car market during the period 
1997–2009.  
Table 7: Passenger vehicles production in Iran 
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     (Omidvar, 2005; BMI, 2007, 2009, OICA, 2006)  
The importance of the auto industry for Iran is clear. For example, AtiehBahar (2008, 
p.1) reported that, “Iran’s automotive sector is the second most active trade of the 
country, after its oil /gas industry. Iran has become the largest vehicle producer in the 
region by producing 46 percent of all cars produced in the region and its 
neighbouring countries. In addition and during the past decade Iran’s automotive 
industry has had an increasing trend”. Moreover, Peimani (2003, p.2) also reported 
that, “car production in Iran has increased 445 percent between 1997 to 2009 and 
many new automotive manufacturing companies have been established as well as a 
relaxation of the Iranian government’s protective policies”. Being mainly in private 
hands before 1979, it is now almost run as a state-owned industry.  Furthermore, PSA 
(Peugeot and Citroen) (2008), the world’s third- largest automaker, strongly believes 
that, with 13 main vehicle manufacturers, over 1,200 parts suppliers and 450,000 
direct employees, the automotive industry is one of Iran’s key business sectors after 
oil/gas production. Based on the country’s automotive stand, Peugeot Citroen entered 
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the market by assembling vehicles under licence with Iran Khodro (IKCO) and 
SAIPA, both state-own firms in Iran. The recent data showed Iran as PSA’s third 
main market in the world (Table 8): 
 
          Table 8: PSA production line around world 
N
o 
Country 
Manufactured 
(units) 
1 France 1,348,866 
2 Spain 554,632 
3 Iran 301,152 
4 Brazil 266,110 
5 Slovakia 186,142 
6 China 171,814 
7 
Czech 
Republic 
171,814 
8 Argentina 132,132 
9 Italy 110,551 
1
0 
Turkey 65,061 
                                   (Sanat-e Khodro SAPCO, 2009 Shahriver, p.14)  
 
PSA (2008) also believes that these results are in line with the Iranian economy’s 
robust growth, which is being led by the automotive industry, amongst others. Strong 
domestic demand has resulted in a significant increase in imports of intermediate 
products and capital goods. In addition, an auto industry overview by AtiehBahar 
(2008) showed that, in 2008, there were 7.17 people per car produced, whilst in 2001 
this figure showed 16.8 people per car production in Iran. This increase in car 
production is mostly attributed to the strong demand in the local market because of 
population growth, urbanisation, Iran’s emerging youth population as well as the 
increased presence of women in the society (many women drive in Iran). The Iranian 
manufacturers currently produce six different types of vehicle, including passenger 
cars, 4WD, buses, minibuses, pickups and trucks. According to the latest statistics 
provided by the Ministry of Industries and Mines, there are exactly 9,965,734 
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vehicles in the country. The sector directly employs about 450,000 people and many 
more in related industries (Ministry of Industry and Mines, 2009). The growth in 
Iran’s car exports reached $1 billion by the end of the Iranian calendar year (March 
20). Maps of Iran can be seen on the subsequent pages. 
Iran Location 
 
                 
 
                                               Iran Railway Network 
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                                                        Iran Airports  
 
                             (ISRAJ, 2013)  
 
 
                                          Iran highways, roads and ports   
 
                              (ISRAJ, 2013) 
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Iran is known in many ways as a brilliant place for investment and running b usiness 
activities. Guide to Invest in Iran (2013, pp.5–7) argued that, “a unique geographical 
location at the heart of a cross-roads connecting the Middle-East, Asia and Europe, 
empowered by many inter and trans-regional trade, customs, tax and investment 
arrangements which are making the Iranian market more attractive for all foreign 
investors. A market with a population of over 75 million growing steadily as well as 
quick access to neighbouring markets with approximately 300 million inhabitants are 
other key reasons for investors to choose Iran as a potential market for their future 
growth. Furthermore, there is a large pool of trained and efficient manpower at a very 
competitive cost in a diversified economy with an extensive industrial base and 
service sector. Moreover, a developing network in the area of telecommunication, 
roads, railways and airports across the country and the low price of energy (compared 
to the neighbouring countries) are other important factors for long-term investments. 
Reserves of natural resources ranging from oil and gas to metallic and non-metallic 
species reflect the country’s accessibility to readily available raw materials. As a final 
point a four-season climatic endowment is an advantage to agricultural activities 
throughout the country and throughout all seasons”.  
2.3.5. Key Players of the Industry 
Table 9: Iranian Automakers 
No Automaker  No Automaker  No Automaker  
1 Iran Khodro  (IKCO)  9 Fath Khodro 17 Modiran Pars 
2 Saipa Khodro  10 Bam Khodro  18 Rakhsh Khodro 
3 Morattab Khodro 11 Aghab Khodro 19 Saipa Diesel 
4 Zamyad  12 Karizan Khodro 20 Iran Khodro Diesel 
5 Shahab Khodro 13 Marizam Khodro 21 Zarin Khodro 
6 Rayan Khodro 14 Hepco 22 Kavir Khodro 
7 Bahman Khodro  15 Tractorsazi 23 Oghab Khodro 
8 Zagros Khodro 16 Kish Khodro   
( Iran Khodro Internal sources, 2010)  
Table 9 categorises 23 Iranian active automakers. IKCO is the largest passenger car 
producer, which plans to manufacture 1 million passenger cars annually at the end of 
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its 10-year expansion programme. However, the industry is dominated by two state-
owned carmakers: Iran Khodro (IKCO) and SAIPA. Iran’s domestic vehicle 
production comprises 64 models throughout all segments. Eight companies, 
constituting 95% of the domestic market, are listed on the Tehran Stock Exchange.  
The national auto-part manufacturing industry produces some 95% of the components 
for the Peugeot 405 and Samand models, nearly 70% of the parts for the Peugeot 206 
and 100% of the Pride and the phased-out Paykan. However, after-sales service 
remains poor due to the low quality of locally produced cars. The quality issue within 
the industry will be explored in the following sections. Table 10 compares IKCO & 
SAIPA, two main carmakers in Iran. 
Table 10: IKCO & SAIPA 
 
 IKCO SAIPA 
Founded 1962 1966 
Employees  58,000 18,500 
Type State-owned State-owned  
Sales revenue US$8.0bn (2007)  n/a 
Net profit US$534mn (2007) n/a 
Turnover n/a US$4.3bn  
Unit cars 566,200 (2008) 591,529 (2008)  
Market share n/a n/a  
                        (BMI, 2009; Aftab, 2006) 
 
2.3.5.1. SAIPA profile: 
BMI (2009) mentioned that SAIPA Khodro is IKCO’s most important domestic 
competitor within Iran. SAIPA was established in 1966 as the French Citroen 
Production Association and started to manufacture the famous Citroen Dyana in 
1968. Later on, in 1977, SAIPA started to produce the Renault 5 followed by the 
Nissan Junior in1985. In 1993, SAIPA added Renault 21 production to its product 
basket as a mid-range passenger car, and then SAIPA signed an agreement with Kia 
Motors to manufacture the Pride in four models. Subsequently, in 1999, SAIPA made 
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an agreement with PSA Peugeot Citroen to produce the Xantia. The Iranian 
government is controlling the company via IDRO, an agency of the Ministry of 
Industry and Mines. For the first time in 1998, Saipa was listed on Tehran Stock 
Exchange as a first step towards privatisation. It is worth mentioning that exports 
represent a small part of the company’s income. SAIPA exports its products to 
countries such as Azerbaijan, Iraq, Egypt, Syria and Sudan.  
2.3.6. Key Issues in the Industry 
Financial factors, the government’s new fuel project, quality control, trade sanctions 
and privatisation have all affected the Iranian auto industry. However, as a result of 
the research interest, the product quality issue will be explored in this study. BMI 
(2009, pp.28–29) reported that quality control remains a key issue in the Iranian 
automotive sector. The Iranian Standards and Quality Control Company (ISQCC) 
raised a common alarm about the level of faults in Iranian manufactured cars back in 
December 2005, when it found that models with a high level of locally sourced 
control had a far higher number of faults than those assembled from imported CKD 
or semi-Knocked-Down Kits (SKDs). 
For example, the Samand had over 300 faults per car on average, whilst the Kia Price 
and the Peugeot RD had more than 500 faults. Previously, Minister of Mines and 
Metals, Eshag Jahangiri declared that he would exert his utmost effort to enhance the 
Iranian auto industry, increase its quality and decrease its price. He said that he would 
continue his policies and that he would not permit the excessive import of foreign 
automobiles, which would be a gross disregard of their immense domestic 
capabilities. This would also jeopardise the future of the auto industry’s 450,000 
(direct) employees. “With the policies we have implemented, Iran will become the 
region’s pole of auto manufacturing in the near future”, he said (Iran International 
Magazine, 2003, p.2). However, BMI (2009, p.29) reported that the problem of poor 
quality arose again in September 2007, when the Ministry of Industry and Mines set 
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up a committee to investigate the problem of highly dangerous fires caused by 
engines installed in Iranian-manufactured Peugeot models.  
BMI (2009) reported that in the first six months of the Iranian calendar in 2008, 
almost 150 people were killed as a result of their vehicle’s engine fire, mostly in the 
405 models. The Iranian Parliament’s Industrial Commission blamed Peugeot for the 
exploding vehicles, and demanded compensation from the French company after 
IKCO claimed that a problem in the fuel systems of the cars was the cause. BMI did 
not believe the safety problems were the responsibility of Peugeot since the problems 
were reported in other Iranian-manufactured models, and globally the French firm’s 
safety record is comparable with other international automakers.   
BMI (2009), as one of the international market research companies actively 
monitoring the Iranian auto industry, argued that Iran’s automotive qua lity is 
becoming a major issue for the industry. In BMI’s (2009) report, it highlighted that 
some of the Iranian automotives/ models had scored very badly on quality, and it 
found that those models that used locally manufactured parts were of the lowest 
quality. BMI (2009, p.29) reported that “the poor-quality Pride and the Samand 
source 80% and 95% of their parts and components from local manufacturers, 
respectively, whereas the relatively high-quality Peugeot 206 is comprised of just 
60% locally manufactured parts. But the problem is not solely related to local parts 
producers. Quality is also determined by the technologies used in production, 
adequate training of technicians and the efficiency and performance of company 
management. Greater attention is being paid to quality control for models marketed 
abroad, seemingly at the expense of those destined for the domestic market”.  
2.3.6.1. Quality of new auto products in the Iranian auto industry  
There is a high demand for vehicles in Iran. Estimates indicate a requirement for 
around one million vehicles, which currently cannot be met due to a lack of capacity 
in the country's closed car market. Around 25% of the vehicle population in Iran is 
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over 25 years old, and the country's vehicle density is relatively low (Automotive 
Intelligence, 2004); on the other hand, the Iranian auto industry is facing several key 
challenges, such as the poor quality of its new products, which is the key interest area 
of this research. Table 29 shows the quality league table of different auto productions 
in Iran. The domestic percentages show how much of each vehicle (components) is 
manufactured in Iran. The table also contains a point column that emphasises car 
quality as whole, with the Benz E200 being at the top (–47.5) as the best quality car, 
and the Pajan GLV being at the very bottom of the column as a very poor quality 
vehicle. These data were obtained from the Ministry of Industry and Mines, Iranian 
Standard and Quality Inspection, the Department of Vehicle Inspection (Table 11): 
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Table 11: The Iranian automotive production quality league table (2012) 
 
Quality Rank Car’s name 
Makers’ 
Name  
Khodro  
IJVs  
Component  
domestic 
make % 
Pollution 
standard 
Final product 
quality 
(-) N  
Point 
Very 
Good 
Quality 
1 Benz E280 Tap Ger n/a EURO II Very Good 47.5 
2 Benz E200 Tap Ger n/a EURO II Very Good 50.0 
3 Nisan maxima Pars Jap 14,12 EURO II Very Good 75.0 
 
4 Grand Nitra IKCO Jap n/a EURO II Very Good 78.1 
5 Mazda 3 Bahman Jap n/a EURO II Very Good 83.4 
6 Megan Pars Fra n/a EURO II Very Good 84.1 
7 Citroen Xantia Saipa Fre 48,81 EURO II Very Good 87.0 
8 Peugeot 206 SD IKCO Fra n/a EURO II Very Good 89.2 
9 Peugeot 206 IKCO Fra 75 EURO II Very Good 89.6 
10 Nissan Roniz Pars Jap 16,71 EURO II Very Good 99.2 
11 Hyundai Onte Rayn Kor n/a EURO II Very Good 110.1 
12 Rio Saipa Kor 21,83 EURO II Good 110.4 
13 L90  Saipa Pars Fra n/a EURO II Good 124.1 
14 Hyundai Vernay Rayn Kor 19,20 EURO II Good 129.8 
15 L90  IKCO IKCO Fra n/a EURO II Good 131.9 
16 Volkswagen Gol Bam Ger 14,30 EURO II Good 134.7 
17 Peugeot Pars IKCO Kh Iran 90,46 EURO II Good 178.1 
18 Peugeot Pars IKCO Iran 90,46 EURO II Good 183.0 
19 Peugeot  405 IKCO Kh Iran 93,35 EURO II Good 184.3 
20 Samand IKCO Iran 90,73 EURO II Good 186.3 
21 Peugeot  405 IKCO Iran 93,35 EURO II Good 190.2 
22 MVM 110 Modiran Iran n/a EURO II Good 190.6 
23 Peugeot  Roa IKCO Iran n/a EURO II Less Acceptable 271.5 
24 Pride Saba Saipa Iran 87,73 EURO II Less Acceptable 276.7 
25 Saipa 132 Saipa Iran n/a EURO II Less Acceptable 289.1 
26 
Pride Pars 
Khodro 
Pars Iran 87,73 EURO II Less Acceptable 290.2 
27 Saipa 141 Pars Iran 87,73 EURO II Less Acceptable 333.1 
Very 
Low 
Quality 
28 Naron Bahman Iran n/a EURO II Unacceptable 
29 Proton Vyara Zagros Iran 35,85 EURO II Unacceptable 
30 Pajan  GLV Martab Iran n/a EURO II Unacceptable 
(Iran ian standard & quality inspection Report, 2012, p.1) 
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Table 12: Explanation of (-) N point: (Negative point) 
Year Period 
Quality 
Very Good 
Quality  
Good 
Quality  
Acceptable  
Quality  
Less acceptable 
2007 
first 6 months 0 ≤ N ≤160 160<N≤450 450<N≤600 600<N≤800 
2
nd
 6 months 0≤ N ≤140 140<N≤380 380<N≤550 550<N≤750 
2008 
first 6 months 0≤ N ≤135 135<N≤320 320<N≤460 460<N≤650 
2
nd
 6 months 0≤ N ≤130 130<N≤270 270<N≤380 380<N≤580 
2009 
first 6 months 0≤ N ≤125 125<N≤230 230<N≤300 300<N≤480 
2
nd
 6 months 0≤ N ≤120 120<N≤200 200<N≤270 270<N≤410 
(Iran ian standard & quality inspection, 2009) 
 
Table 12 shows the calculation of how the very good, good, acceptable, and less 
acceptable range of vehicles have been categorised by the Ministry. In order to value 
such points (-N), the Ministry takes into account three main areas: customer 
satisfaction, environmental inspection and final part quality inspection. For customer 
satisfaction, focus is directed towards international and national standards. 
Environmental inspection is focused on international standards, such as EURO II, 
EURO III, whilst the final part is centred on quality inspection, which controls the 
quality of the car as it comes off the production line. This system of ranking gives 0 
for the best quality car, which means there is no fault in the current market, and it 
gives –333.1 or even less for the lowest quality car. This means that the car has 
earned –333.1 negative points (issues and faults) during the inspection process. Table 
13 provides an example of how the calculation (-N point) is carried out for a vehicle. 
Table 13: Explanation of the way the N (-) point is calculated: 
Negative point : The  -N  points 
Negative 
point 
(-N) 
 
Car 
Name 
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QX 5 issues 10 issues  15 issues 
10 
issues 
25 
issues 
0     
issues 
0 
issues 
7 
issues 
3 
issues 
-75 
(Iran ian standard & quality inspection, 2009) 
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2.3.6.2. Iranian Standard and Quality Inspection (ISQI): 
ISQI was founded in 1989 with the aim of establishing and developing a quality 
management system in the production and service enterprises of Iran and it had the 
ultimate goal of improving the quality of local industrial products. The company acts 
as a lever of the Ministry of Industries and Mines, implementing its quality-related 
policies. The company was established by the Industrial Development and 
Renovation Organisation of Iran (IDRO) its primary investor and initiator. ISQI’s 
activities started with the inspection of steam boilers; this led on to the inspection of 
automotive vehicles. In the course of the company’s development, by 1996, 
consultation and quality management were added to the company’s activities. Along 
with a change in strategy and the necessity of using up-to-date technologies, the 
company has, since 1996, assumed the following specialised missions:  
 
 Active participation in drawing up national standards; 
 Offering training programmes on quality systems, organisational excellence 
models and inspections; 
 Offering consultation, contributing to the establishment of quality systems 
and the design of required up-to-date models;  
 Conducting safe technical inspections and engineering tasks in industries at 
the national level, including: assessment of automotive vehicles.  
1- Specific Missions  
Promoting the organisation towards excellence up to the level of attaining 
international credit in the relevant fields to function as a knowledgeable trust with 
professional ethics whilst protecting stakeholder interests.  
1- Designing improvement, consultation and training programs for quality 
system and business excellence 
2- Type approval and production conformance of automotives  
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3- Monitoring and control of industrial emissions 
4- Inspecting imported/exported goods 
5- Monitoring automotive after-sales service 
6- Dealing with customer complaints.  
The company is a certified quality inspection company and ISO 9001-2000 quality 
management certified for all company departments.  
1-1. Vehicle Audit Section  
Type approval:  
Type approval is an approval granted for vehicles and separate technical units in 
standard conditions that comply with related standard requirements. The aim of type 
approval is to ensure that vehicles meet safety, environmental and performance 
requirements in design and manufacturing. Type approval involves testing, verifying 
and analysing documentation, and also conducting periodical inspections.  
Background of type approval efforts and records: 
1. Establishing type approval procedures in collaboration with technical experts  
2. Verifying and analysing documentation and test results  
3. Checking up product lines 
4. Conducting training seminars related to type approval 
5. Compiling 55 EEC directives (national standard)  
6. Inspection of final product (audit)  
 
Authorised by the Ministry of Industry & Mines, the Vehicle Audit Section at ISQI 
Co. assumes responsibility for auditing vehicles manufactured all over the country. 
The types of audit are A, B & C. 
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Audit A: The A & B audits are approved by the government. Daily sampling and 
evaluation are applied by the auditors. In this way all cars are delivered without any 
important defects. Meanwhile the list of known defects is given to the producer for 
improvement. This control, done by masterly experts, covers about 100,000 cars per 
year.  
Audit B: This checking is carried out in order to establish functional and safety 
defects during approximately 200 km of running in specific conditions.  
Audit C: In this type of audit, the vehicle is driven 20,000 km, and is tested in 
various environmental and road conditions.  
1-2. Vehicle Pollution Control Department  
The department has the mission of technically inspecting locally manufactured 
vehicles in in respect of exhaust emission levels. To this end, it has compiled 
emission standards by surveying local and foreign sources. The department fulfils its 
mission of monitoring and controlling vehicle emissions in three different arenas, 
namely passenger vehicles, commercial vehicles and motorcycles.  
Below is a short list of the department’s current activities  
1- Categorising and ranking of locally manufactured vehicles on the basis of 
their technology level and the percentage of localized parts to meet emission 
standard levels. 
2- Conducting technical inspections of technical documents, of all locally 
manufactured vehicles. 
3- Supervision and continuous checking of vehicle production lines to verify 
compliance with the required technical documents and standards.  
4- Vehicle sampling from the production line for emission tests in the TA and 
COP phases.  
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5- Technical supervision of emission and fuel consumption tests, according to 
standards, in various steps of the tests.  
6- Analysing and reporting the final state of vehicle emissions and fuel 
consumption to the authorities concerned.  
1-3. Vehicle Parts and Components Inspection Department  
The department is engaged in the provision of a technical/engineering service to 
maintain quality levels by technically inspecting vehicle parts and components.  
1- The department provides interested companies, upon request, with parts and 
components specifications.  
2- Specifications of parts and components lacking technical standards are also 
identified and information about them is provided upon request.  
3- Surveying of the assembly line processes and tests, and specifying the other 
party’s control stations, contractual documents, tools, gauges, and control 
fixtures required by the inspection department.  
4- Drawing up technical and quality specifications for parts and components 
lacking technical specifications and standards. 
5- Drawing up procedures and designing control forms along with acceptable 
quantities and specified tolerances as well as dispatching related reports.  
6- Supervising all destructive and non-destructive tests, making all required 
cheeks, and reporting the results to the client after inspection.  
7- Performing a complete audit process, SQFE and product audit, developing 
SQA. 
Major projects implemented for various clients: 
1. Inspection of 170 of Iran Khodro’s vehicle parts and components  
2. Inspection of engines and axles of Pars Khodro’s vehicle  
3. Inspection of over 150 of SAIPA’s vehicles parts and components  
57 | P a g e  
 
4. Inspection of passenger wagon parts and components, drawing up a quality 
specification record for locally made parts, and performing required 
destructive and non-destructive tests on the parts. 
5. Process auditing based on VDA standard: evaluation and inspection of 
manufactured axles.  
6. Inspection of 15 parts and components of Pride.  
1-4.  Department of After-sales Service and Customer Feedback Inspection 
 Engineering  
The Department of After-sales Service and Customer Feedback Inspection 
engineering has in its possession a wealth of useful experience gained through 
inspection operations, ISQI, and is capable of providing the following services:  
1. Drawing up practical procedures for the measurement of customer satisfaction 
in accordance with international standards 
2. Measuring customers’ satisfaction with the products of the automotive industry 
(international standard) 
3. Conducting customer satisfaction polls and customer satisfaction measurement 
projects for other public sector production and/or service enterprises  
4. Conducting after-sales service inspections of all production and service sectors  
5. Drawing up codified programmes with a view to improving the after-sales 
service performance of authorised repair shops and/or agencies, and providing 
guidance with respect to quality improvement in compliance with approved 
Ministry of Industries and Mines directives  
6. Investigating accidents and using the expertise of experienced inspectors  
7. Conducting technical inspections to pinpoint automobile defects  
8. Preparing technical reports concerning vehicle performance 
9. Compiling information on procedures and/or instructions with regard to both 
producer and consumer rights in an attempt to familiarise themselves with 
relevant policies, rules and regulations. 
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1.5.  Iranian Centre for Research and Automotive Emission Tests  
The centre was established in 2003 with the aim of conducting research and emission 
tests on both locally manufactured and imported vehicles. The centre is authorised to 
issue type approval, as well as the conformity of product certificates based on quality 
standards approved by ISQI. The establishment of the centre which operates under 
the supervision of ISQI and the Department of the Environment has made it possible 
to conduct emission tests on both internal combustion and diesel vehicle and 
motorcycles based on the highest environmental standards. Having a nominal 
capacity of conducting 1,200 tests per year, the centre started operating on an 
experimental basis in 2004, dealing with light vehicles. It was officially inaugurated 
in 2005, assuming the mission of enhancing vehicle quality and reducing vehicle 
emissions, thus contributing to environmental protection. The centre is now able to 
deal with both light and heavy vehicles.  
It is worth mentioning that all of the top 11 models (Table 11) are produced under 
IJV projects. Table 14 shows the quality comparison between different products, 
manufactured from IJV projects and domestic projects within three different major 
Iranian automakers. 
Table 14: Quality comparison between different cars  
Auto makers 
Product from 
IJVs project 
N (-) 
point 
Product 
from 
domestic 
project 
N (-) 
point 
Difference 
1) Pars Khodro  Maxima -75.0 141 model  -333.1  - 258.1  
2) Iran Khodro Suzuki Vitara  -78.1 Roa  -271.5 -193.4  
3) Saipa Khodro  Citroen Xantia  -87 131 model  -289.1  - 202.1 
          (Iranian standard & quality inspection Report, 2012, p.1) 
 
The above table shows that there is a difference in quality of cars produced in IJV 
projects which are very good quality cars (within Pars Khodro, Maxima –75) 
compared to the very poor quality cars (within Pars Khodro the 141 model –333.1) 
59 | P a g e  
 
produced from domestic projects in the Iranian auto industry. For example, within the 
Pars Khodro Co, the Maxima project was managed under Nissan and Pars Khodro as 
an IJV plan, whilst the model 141 project was controlled by a domestic Iranian 
management team. Maxima, made through an international joint venture project, is 
top of the table (the best quality car), whilst the product (model 141) from the Iranian 
domestic project within Pars Khodro is bottom of the table as the lowest quality car. 
The above- mentioned evidence shows that a foreign partner’s involvement in an IJV 
project makes a difference to the quality of products (Maxima IJVs project, –75) and 
(model 141 domestic Project, –33.1) even within the same company. Inside the 
company, the experience, knowledge and expertise of the foreign partner from the 
IJV project have had no influence on improving the domestic production project 
within the same company. 
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2.4.  The Case Study: Iran Khodro Company (IKCO)  
2.4.1. Brief Historical Overview of Development 
“Official name of the case study is Iran Khodro Company (IKCO)”(An Introduction 
to Iran Khodro Group, 2013, p.4).  
IKCO’s headquarters are located at 14 km on the Jadeh-Makhsus Karaj Road in 
Tehran. The factory is the main place of its manufacturing activities and spans an area 
of over 3,375,612 metres square, of which, 1,356,000 metres square has been 
allocated to built-up sites including enclosures installations and office buildings. The 
IKCO ‘Iran National’, prior to the Islamic revolution, was founded in 1962 by two 
brothers, Ahmad and Mohammad Khayyami, and came into operation on March 19, 
1963. IKCO is now Iran’s largest industrial corporation and not only the largest 
automobile producer in Iran, but also in the Middle East, Central Asian and North 
African regions.  
Until 1979, IKCO was assembling the Hillman Hunter in its passenger section. 
However, in 1979, the production of the British Hillman Hunter stopped in the UK, 
and Peugeot Citroen - as the main owner of the Hillman Hunter in the UK - started to 
talk with IKCO to transfer the rights of the company and the production plant from 
the UK to IKCO, Finally in 1985 the negotiations came to a conclusion and the rights 
of production and the plant from Linwood in Scotland transferred to IKCO in Iran. 
IKCO named the Hillman Hunter the Paykan (meaning arrow), and aimed to produce 
a more advanced version. However, the Islamic revolution changed those plans and 
Paykan continued to be Iran Khodro’s flagship passenger car until the its production 
finally stopped in March, 2005.  
For more than 30 years, IKCO produced the Paykan, a vehicle evolved from the 
Hillman Hunter. A pick-up version is still in production, and the Samand has taken on 
the role of the nation’s flagship car. In the current situation, IKCO’s production lines 
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have mainly been engaged in the production of the Peugeot 405 in a number of 
versions: the Peugeot Pars, a new facelift of the 405; the Peugeot 206 in several 
variants; the Peugeot 207i; and finally the locally developed vehicle, the Samand. The 
405 became IKCO’s flagship and has already replaced the famous Paykan. According 
to the latest report by Iranian Standard & Quality Inspection (2012) and BMI (2009), 
the 405 has almost 95% local parts integration whilst the 206 is still around 70%. 
IKCO also produces the ROA, a 405 body fitted with the Paykan’s engine.  
Table 15 gives a summary of the events that have taken place since 1966, and the 
achievements of the company during these years are  categorised, and presented as 
IKCO’s summary of events (2013). It is worth mentioning that, “Iran Khodro 
Company (Group) is employing around 53,000 people” (Industrial Management 
Association, 2012, p.5). 
2.4.2. Timeline of Key NPD Activities and Knowledge Management 
Development in IKCO 
Table 15 briefly highlights IKCO’s production and NPD activities since its 
establishment in 1962 up until 2012. 
Table 15: Events that have taken place from 1966 to 2013 in IKCO 
 
1966 
In 1966, Iran Khodro signed a contract with the English company Rootes to make a 
sedan named 'Paykan'. A year later the car making company 'Iran Nat ional' was 
established with capital of 40 thousand dollars, benefiting from land for a factory, 
new and old machinery and bank cred it to assemble 10 passenger cars and 7 buses 
and trucks on a daily basis. 
1967-78 
From 1967 to 1978, the Paykan was assembled in d ifferent models: basic, deluxe, 
sport, station and pick-up; and buses were made as the urban 302, rural and super 
deluxe. Minibuses and ambulances were also made by the then 'Iran National'. 
Production increased from the very start and it amounted to 98000 un its of Paykan in 
1977. 
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1973 
In 1973, localizat ion of car parts and self-sufficiency was set as the main goal and 
strategy of the company, based on which the companies of Ball bearing, Piston, 
Tabriz IDEM, Mashad Reza and a casting factory were built.  
1974 
In 1974, simultaneous with the increasing price of oil and exchange revenues, 'Iran 
National' chose to assemble Peugeot cars. It was in the same year that the company's 
shares were introduced to the Tehran Stock Exchange, and 45 percent of the shares 
were g iven up to the public.  
1977 
In late 1977, the company held talks with France's Peugeot to replace the Paykan - 
which had passed its time - with the Peugeot 305. By the end of the next year, the 
Islamic revolution of Iran took place and the new government took hold of all 
industries. According to the Islamic Revolution Council law of Iran Industries 
Protection and Development rat ified in 1980, 'Iran National' due to its nature as an 
industrial company was sheltered by the National Industries Organization and 
managed by Ministry of Industries. This was when Iraq started the imposed war 
against Iran and the trend of foreign exchange and economical setbacks such as the 
lack of raw material imports, the low quality of products, delayed supply and worn -
out machinery in the company extended up to 1982. 
 
1983 
1983 can be recalled as a productive year with no specific barriers to the process of 
production. This came about as the Ministry of Industry was in good shape regarding 
the acquired strategies and stable foreign exchange condition. Meanwhile, this 
production growth could be seen in other industries as well.  
1983-85 
Unlike 1983, 1985 started with a limp in foreign exchange earnings and signs of 
industrial, economical and production crisis could be seen everywhere, putting the 
company at risk of shutting down in early 1986.  
1988 
Two years later, in 1988, the Iran-Iraq war ended. This was when a three-year 
contract for the production of the Peugeot 405 sedan was inked under the supervision 
of IDRO (Iran's Industries Development and Renovation Organization) and the 
Ministry of Industries. 
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1989 
In 1989, simultaneous with Iran's government’s emphasis on the production of public 
vehicles, two major developments took place. First, the Peugeot shop in Iran Khodro 
was converted in order to produce 6000 sets of buses in two working shifts in a year. 
Second, in search of a replacement for the Paykan powertrain, as Iran Khodro rolled 
Paykan off the production line concurrent with Talbot Company being closed, the 
Peugeot 504 engine was mounted on Paykan, which was then named 'Paykageot' and 
finally the 'Paykan1800'.  
 
1991 
In 1991, Paykan was back on the production line and SAPCO (Supplying Automotive 
Parts Company of Iran Khodro) was founded. 
 
 
 
 
1994 
1994 was the year of big developments as Iran Khodro set down a 7-year p rogramme 
and the annual production of 300,000 sets. One of the strategic goals, considered in 
the 7-year programme, was constant quality improvement fo llowed by a ISO 9000 
standard project, processed in the company. Different production units in Iran Khodro 
could meet ISO 9000 requirements by 1998. A Qualitative and quantitative boost in 
the production of domestic automotive parts was also achieved when SAPCO was 
established. And finally, the Iran Khodro research and development centre, built with 
noticeable capital investment can be counted as another development, resulting in the 
creation of the Samand sedan. 
 
 
 
2002 
In 2002, Iran Khodro compiled a 10-year programme directed at globalization and for 
this its strategic goals were quality improvement, and product diversity (especially for 
the Samand models), a Paykan phase-out, price consistency, competitiveness and 
inward technology transfer. Cost reduction, a strong presence in domestic market and 
export development can also be considered as other objectives that were followed 
seriously. Also in this year, the mass production of the Samand as the national car 
started. 
 
2003 
In 2003, the Pars and Samand models of the year and the Peugeot 206 sedan were put 
into production. 
2004 
In 2004, Iran Khodro started to practise use of the SAP software as an enterprise 
resource planning system in order to improve productivity and planning to acquire a 
better control over its final operations. It was in this year that the two sedans of the 
Pars ELX and the Samand Lx were introduced to the market. 
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2005 
 
 
The Paykan phase-out in 2005 is regarded as a turning point in the company's history 
technology-wise, as it was a sign that the company was working towards better 
customer satisfaction. The Peugeot 206 sedan, the Roa sedan enjoying an optimized 
OHV engine and the Samand Sarir limo were also marketed this year. In the 
meantime, Iran Khodro designed its CNG-based engine and targeted global markets. 
 
2006 
In 2006, the national engine production line and Samand sedan production lines in 
Azerbaijan, Belarus and Syria were put into production. Meanwhile, the Tondar 90 
sedan (Renault Logan) joined the Iran Khodro cars; thereby the product portfolio was 
no longer limited to Peugeot cars. The Samand project in Venezuela also commenced 
this year. Iran Khodro received the EFQM Award in 2007. The production lines in 
Tabriz, Senegal and Venezuela were inaugurated in the same year and as a new car, 
the company introduced the Samand Soren to the market.  
2008 
In 2008, IKCO designed the Runna. This was the same year that the company was 
elected as the Top Exporter and received the Export National Award and a crystal 
trophy for Iran's Best Research and development Sector.  
2009 
The role of IKCO in boosting car production volume in the country was quite 
tangible in 2009. Focus on global sales led to a 40% growth in IKCO car exports 
through the IKCO network. Meanwhile, Iran Khodro designed and prototyped a car 
that enjoyed nanotechnology. 
2010 
Production of 755,555 cars in 2010 was a new record for IKCO in the reg ion, which 
counted for almost a 50% share of the market. Moreover, Iran's Industrial 
Management Organization marked IKCO as the best company under the titles of:  
o First rank in Sale  
o First rank in job creat ion 
o Second rank in profitability 
o Best industrial group in Iran's car making companies  
o Best of all p ioneer companies in Iran  
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2011 
 
 
A growth in the company's stock value, 40% improvement in IDRO qualitative 
figures for IKCO, cash flow management, better production chain supply by SAPCO 
and a two to five percent price reduction in 65 cars concurrent with the first phase of 
government's rationalization of subsidies plan can be also regarded as other 
accomplishments in 2010. Reconsidering export strategies based on Iran's Supreme 
Leader recommendations and exporting 40 thousand cars through the IKCO export 
network in 2010 with the main emphasis on sending IKCO brand cars to the Islamic 
countries' markets were put on the agenda. This led to the global sale of 30% of 
IKCO cars (national car) in 2010. The Dena, as IKCO's latest car enjoys world -class 
standards regarding technology and design. The process of design and prototyping of 
this car took less than a year. This sedan was unveiled on April 2011.  
2013  The Dena, now called the RUNNA entered IKCO’s sales network  
IKCO’s summary of events (2013, p.1)  
 
The information provided above clearly shows that IKCO has a long-term connection 
with several international auto makers, such as Peugeot. IKCO is assembling a 
mixture of different models of Peugeots under licence. Besides passenger cars, IKCO 
also makes trucks and buses under licence from Mercedes-Benz (see photos and 
organisation photos at the end of the thesis, referred to as IKCO’s productions).  
Iran Khodro was assigned a new leader in April, 2010. The Minister replaced 
Managing Director Manoucher Manteghi, who controlled the automaker for over six 
years alongside Javad Najmuddin. Based on the above table (Table 33), the life of the 
Iranian automotive industry can be divided into four main periods.  
A): The first period spanned 1969–1979, during which time the government tried to 
encourage private sectors and industries to import vehicles or assemble vehicles 
(CKD) within Iran. 
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B): The second period is the period of survival from 1979 to 1989, when the 
automotive industry was affected by the 1979 revolution, oil revenues, the shortage of 
income in the country from the oil export, and finally the Iraqi war against Iran.  
C): The third period was 1990–1993, when the import custom (tax) was frozen for 
three years, and overseas cars were imported to the country. The figure shows that 
164,000 vehicles, with a value of US$2 billion, were imported to Iran. This policy 
affected job opportunities in the automotive industry, and also ensured the future of 
the spare parts market for foreign carmakers.  
D): The fourth period in the automotive industry lifecycle spanned 1994 up until the 
present. This period can be referred to as the new birth of the industry. During this 
period, the regulations related to the automotive industry have been developed and a 
number of major investments have occurred. Parts manufacturing, after-sales 
networks and IJV projects have all been developed. IKCO, spanning the past five 
decades, has spent the vast majority of its time both before the revolution and in war-
time being involved in the assembly of vehicles. Gradually, from 1990 onwards, 
IKCO started parts manufacturing, localisation, and from 1995 onwards it became an 
automotive maker, producing an independent brand (SAMAND), and design and 
product development. From 2001 to 2006, IKCO planned to take steps towards 
globalisation and during this period, high-tech lines, high levels of automation, 
robotic body lines, press, painting design & complementary collection of vehicle 
production, integration capabilities, and a global network and international marketing 
capability of the company were created. The production of almost three million 
vehicles during 2002–2007 is the result of the effort and production of IKCO; more 
than the total production over the preceding 36 years since its establishment.. In 
addition, the diversity of vehicles produced was enhanced from 7 to 10 products and 
from 12 to 50 variants according to customers’ needs. As mentioned previously, the 
actual position of Iranian automotive production in the world rankings is 16th.  
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Figure 1 shows the general structure of the IKCO Group and the updated list of 
IKCO’s shareholders and their percentage shares is illustrated in Table 16. Finally, 
Table 17 shows IKCO’s investments in the shares of other companies.  
 
Table 16: Composition of IKCO’s Shareholders by 19th March 2009-2010 
Name of shareholder  Number of shares in 2009 %  in 2009 %  in 2008 
Iran Industrial Development and 
Renovation Organisation (IDRO) 
2,457,000,000 %39 %40 
Social Security Investment Company 551,789,778 %8.76 %8.76 
Rena Industrial Group Investment  519,613,045 %8.25 %8.50 
Civil Retirement Fund  375,486,980 %5.96 %1.70 
Civil Retirement Fund Investment  227,676,761 %3.61 %3.61 
Samand Investment Company  457,105,156 %7.26 %5.33 
Tadbir Investment Company  112,637,018 %1.79 %2.79 
Persons and legal entities   1,598,691,262 %25.37 %29.31  
Total  6,300,000,000 100 100 
(IKCO Internal finance report, 2011) 
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                                Figure 1: IKCO Group Structure  
                                An Introduction to Iran Khodro Group (2013, p.4)  
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Table 17: Investments in shares of other companies (IKCO Internal Source)  
 
Description 
Number of 
shares  
Investment 
% 
Cost of investment M.$  
2008 
IKIDO 1,188,160,000 79 125.07 
Tolid Mehvar Khodro  90,000,000 30 9.53 
Iran Khodro Diesel  374,896,890 23,43 45 
Ahangari & Teractor Sazi Iran  5,999,999 15 3.64 
Mehrcam Pars  120,621 - 0.02 
SAPCO 150,000,000 100 192 
Iran Khodro Khorasan  400,000,000 100 42.11 
ISEICO 300,000,000 100 31.58 
TAM 250,000,000 100 26.32 
ISACO 22,000,000 100 40,53 
Iran Khodro Engine Researches  89,400,000 100 9.41 
Tosee Khodro Car  80,000,000 100 8.42 
Iran Bearing & Bushing  65,000,000 100 11,17 
Auto Integrated Parts Dubai  - 75.5 1.94 
Saniran Auto - 60 3.20 
Iran Khodro Tabriz 230,000,000 51 24.21 
Iran IT Communication Development  280,000 50 2.95 
Bank Melli Leasing  49,999,800 49.9 5.26 
Samand Investment 639,000,000 42,6 67,26 
SIAMCO - 40 6.98 
Azmoon Jaddehei 1,050,000 35 1.11 
Iran Khodro Fars  116,995,000 34 12.26 
Shang Dang Young Man  - 30 5.46 
Tosee Sanaye Khodro  301,522,000 26 31.74 
Iranian Leasing  334,000,000 33.4 73.83 
Varagh Khodro  81,900,000 23 8.62 
IDEM 46,125,000 22.5 4.86 
Ghalebhayeh Sanati Iran Khodro  515,680 16.5 8.06 
Other Investments    64.69 
Total other companies    683.97 
Total    $867,021,000 
 (IKCO Internal finance report, 2011) 
 
As highlighted previously, IKCO employs 53,000 personnel in total, meaning 22,000 
employees are active only in the passenger car section in rundown plants in a massive 
complex. IKCO makes the Paykan’s replacement, the Samand, as well as several 
Peugeot models. The plant is a city within a city and has its own postal code, train 
station, apartment blocks, schools, hospital, police station, post office, fire station and 
a college. “Production at plants was recently upgraded to three shifts, running at 95% 
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capacity and breaking only for religious holidays and the June anniversary of Ayat-
Allah-Ozma Khomeini’s 1989 death” (Ellis, 2006, p.1).  
It is the biggest automaker in the country, the Middle-East, North Africa and Central 
Asia, and employs over 22,000 people in its passenger section. Moreover, it and plays 
a very important role in the country’s auto market and economy. In addition, IKCO 
holds almost 50% of the domestic market in Iran in terms of units and is also known 
to be the world’s 21st largest automaker (in terms of units) in the latest world 
rankings. As of 2013, IKCO produces 12 different models of cars. However, only 
three models that it produces, which are manufactured under IJVs, have achieved a 
very good quality ranking in the country’s auto quality league table; there is a big gap 
in terms of quality between its locally managed and IJV managed products. Iran 
Khodro’s historical background gives the opportunity for this research study to 
challenge the research objectives within IKCO. Tables 18– 22 on the following pages 
provide a brief insight into the IKCO’s HR.  
 
Table 18: IKCO Passenger vehicle production line employees only (2011) 
 
 2009 2010 2011 
1-Secondary School  1,841 1,593 1,565 
2-High School  13,160 13,717 13,467 
3-College Degree 2,683 2,765 2,744 
4-BSc & BA  2,879 2,594 2,568 
5-MSc & MA  636 620 616 
6-PHD  56 57 57 
Total number of employees  21,255 21,346 21,073 
(Iran Khodro HR internal report, 2011) 
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Table 19: The number of employees in the R&D in IKCO (Design and NPD)  
 IKCO   
(Employees) 
Contract 
(Employees) 
1-Secondary School Degree  25 2 
2-High School Degree  82 0 
3-College Degree (2 years College) 84 0 
4-BSc & BA  225 0 
5-MSc & MA  115 1 
6-PHD  5 0 
7- MSc / MA students  0 0 
8- MSc / MA students  0 0 
9-PhD students  2 0 
Total number of employees  538 3 
(Iran Khodro HR internal report, 2011) 
 
Table 20: The IKCO’s personnel break down from 2006-2010 
Description  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Permanent 7.768 5.857 6.010 6.439 6.146 
Contract 10.880 13.145 12.983 14.816 15.200 
Total 18.648 19.002 18.993 21.255 21.346 
(Iran Khodro HR internal report, 2011) 
 
 
Table 21: The IKCO’s personnel break down in passenger car section  
 
Under 5 
years 
5-10 
years  
10-20 
years  
20-30 
years  
30 years 
and above  
Total  
President’s Office  359 243 143 29 3 777 
VP Production  4,277 8,939 3,163 147 4 16,530 
VP Strategy  431 536 365 68 12 1,412 
VP Finance  93 80 86 23 0 282 
VP Product and Quality  99 602 402 39 1 1,143 
Other  305 370 447 76 4 1,202 
Total 5,564 10,770 4,606 382 24 21,346 
(Iran Khodro HR internal report, 2011) 
 
Table 22: The IKCO’s organisational levels 
Description  Old  New 2011  
Vice-President  6 4 
Deputy  20 16 
Director  79 58 
Manager  237 0 
Head  394 216 
Administrator  491 357 
Foreman  480 0 
Group leader  0 521 
Total  1707 1172 
(Iran Khodro HR internal report, 2011) 
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A comparison study by BMI (2009b) showed that, interestingly, the Korean Hyundai 
Motor Company was established in the same year as IKCO, 1967. However, these 
two companies’ profiles show a gap in terms of their car quality and production. 
BMI’s (2009b) statistics show that IKCO is far behind Hyundai at the present time. In 
terms of units, for example, Hyundai has cited its product mix and an ability to 
diversify its overseas market as prominent factors in the 6.8% growth in its global 
sales in 2008. It sold a total of 2,796,370 units during the year, comprising 1,668,745 
units produced in South Korea and 1,127,625 units produced overseas. Revenues 
were also up 5.1% Year-Over-Year (Y-O-Y) to KRW32.19trn. Performance in the 
first half of 2009 was excellent according to BMI (2009b), even in the middle of the 
global economic downturn. The company grabbed a 5% global market share for the 
first time and generated an excellent Q209 net profit of US$650mn, a rise of 48% 
Year-Over-Year. This came despite a 15% decline in the global demand for autos in 
H109, according to the company’s own estimates. Mirzaei of Iran Khodro laments 
that, “Iran’s stagnation as an auto power contrasts with the rise of Korea. In the 
1970s, Koreans regarded IKCO as a developing-world model for their own new car 
industry. He mentioned that now IKCO and Iran are following Korean. He believes 
that if Iran did not have problems with the US, it could have a car industry at least 
like Korea” (Ellis, 2006, p.2). Even the gap between these two corporations in terms 
of car quality is wider. In addition, Sanat-e Khodro (2009, Shahriver) stated that an 
international car quality inspector (J.D. Power) said in 2009, that Hyundai could 
improve its cars’ quality stand in the world car quality league table. Hyundai could 
improve 9 steps and could take Toyota’s place in the rankings and become one of the 
top 4 auto manufacturers in the world in regard to its car quality. J.D. Power also 
mentioned that Hyundai had achieved the highest mark and success in terms of 
quality in middle-class car models. These aforementioned stories show a significant 
opportunity to work within and research the IKCO to establish the reasons behind 
these issues. However, IKCO is seeking to become an international automaker by 
setting-up networks in the neighbouring countries. Table 23 shows IKCO’s sales 
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network in the global markets whilst Table 24 highlights IKCO’s production sites in 
other countries. 
Table 23: IKCO’s sales network in global markets  
MENA EU/ America  Africa  Asia  CIS  
Lebanon Bosnia  Senegal  Afghanistan  Armenia  
Jordan  Bulgaria  Algeria   Azerbaijan  
Iraq France  Egypt   Belarus 
Saudi  Italy  Sudan   Georgia  
Syria  Brazil Tunisia  Kazakhstan  
UAE Venezuela    Russia 
 Turkey    Tajikistan  
    Turkmenistan  
    Ukraine 
    Uzbekistan  
                (Iran Khodro Annual Report, 2011) 
 
Table 24: IKCO’s Production sites overseas  
No Country Activi ties 
1 Azerbaijan  Samand Production ( 6,000 units)  
2 Belarus  Samand Production (8,500 units) 
3 Syria  Samand Production (30,000 units)  
4 Egypt Peugeot Pars Production ( 5,000 units) 
5 Senegal Samand Production (15,000 units) 
6 Venezuela  Peugeot Pars Production (16,500 units)  
                (Iran Khodro Annual Report, 2011) 
 
Since 2000, IKCO has been trying to gain access to the auto markets in the region 
and overseas by setting up sales, after sales and production sites in nearly 30 different 
countries on different continents. Iran Khodro’s product basket includes the models 
mentioned in Figure 2. For more visual information, please see the photo chapter at 
the end of the thesis.  
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Figure 2: Iran Khodro's available passenger products 
     
 
Paykan  
(Phased out) 
Samand ROA L90 E Class Vitara 
Pick-Up Soren PARS    
 Serrier 206SD    
 LX 405    
 Runna 206    
  207i    
  405LX    
(Iran Khodro Annual Report, 2011) 
 
Table 25 and 26 provide more detailed specific information about IKCO’s products 
within the Ministry’s league table.  
 
Table 25: IKCO's productions in the quality league table (2009) 
 productions IJV 
N (-) 
point 
Domestic 
components % 
 
1 Suzuki Grand  Suzuki  -78.1 n/a Very good 
2 Peugeot 206 SD Peugeot  -89.2 n/a Very good 
3 Peugeot 206 Peugeot  -89.6 61.74% Very good 
4 L90 Renault  -131.9 n/a Good  
5 Peugeot Pars (Khorasan site ) * -178.1 90.46% Good  
6 Peugeot Pars (Tehran site)  * -183.0 90.46% Good  
7 Peugeot 405   (Khorasan site) * -184.3 93.35% Good  
8 Samand  * -186.3 90.73% Good  
9 Peugeot 405 (Tehran site)  * -190.2 93.35% Good  
10 Peugeot Roa  * -271.5 100%  Less acceptable  
11 Peugeot 207i  Peugeot n/a New n/a New   n/a New 
  (Iranian standard & quality inspection, 2009, p.1) 
Table 26: Explanation of N (-) point: 
Year Period 
Quality 
Very Good 
Quality  
Good 
Quality  
Acceptable  
Quality  
Less acceptable 
2007 
first 6 months 0 ≤ N ≤160 160<N≤450 450<N≤600 600<N≤800 
2
nd
 6 months 0≤ N ≤140 140<N≤380 380<N≤550 550<N≤750 
2008 
first 6 months 0≤ N ≤135 135<N≤320 320<N≤460 460<N≤650 
2
nd
 6 months 0≤ N ≤130 130<N≤270 270<N≤380 380<N≤580 
2009 
first 6 months 0≤ N ≤125 125<N≤230 230<N≤300 300<N≤480 
2
nd
 6 months 0≤ N ≤120 120<N≤200 200<N≤270 270<N≤410 
(Iran ian standard & quality inspection, 2009, p.2) 
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2.5. Conclusion 
It has been stated that the automotive industry is one of the fastest growing industries 
within the global economy, and there are fewer places where this is more apparent 
than Iran. As a consequence of this, the Iranian government has identified the 
industry as one of its key pillars for economic growth and development, primarily by 
making the sector attractive to both local and overseas investors. However, results 
from Iran’s automotive industries league table reveal that there is a distinct lack of 
effective knowledge/technology transfer techniques between domestic and 
international partners within the same organisation. In terms of car quality, foreign 
partners’ experience, knowledge and expertise have had no influence (or not enough 
influence) on the improvement of the quality of local manufacturing production in 
IKCO. There is not enough knowledge sharing among the IJVs. It is important to 
establish how Iran’s domestic automotive industry transfers its foreign partners’ 
knowledge and experience effectively to its own local production line; therefore, the 
roles of prior knowledge, absorptive capacity and knowledge transfer in the new 
product development process will be the main areas of study in this research.  
A review of Iran’s auto industry background clearly shows that it has developed 
significantly from the import of a single vehicle from Belgium in 1920 to the 
numerous brands and models of different vehicles found in the market today. 
However, the results and outcomes of different research on the industry’s 
performance show that the industry has spent time and money assembling other 
countries’ vehicles without aiming to transfer its foreign business partners’ 
technology and knowledge to local projects effectively; however, several other 
factors, such as political issues, product quality and privatisation, are also key 
elements that have affected the outcome of the industry. In 2000, Iran Khodro 
introduced the first national brand to the market; however, the main difficulty and 
issue across the industry is the quality of newly launched products. Although IKCO 
has forged many business partnerships with well-known automakers, such as 
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Mercedes-Benz, Talbot, Renault, Peugeot and Suzuki, over the past 50 years, it 
continues to experience difficulties in launching a reasonable vehicle to the market in 
terms of new product quality when compared with the products made within its IJV 
projects.  
The evidence shows that IKCO has not been very successful in terms of introducing a 
reasonable good quality locally made vehicle and in this stage IKCO needs to 
improve its reputation by introducing high-quality products and services to the target 
market (locally or internationally). In order to be a global player IKCO needs to focus 
on quality improvement, customer satisfaction, managerial commitment and 
personnel participation. As mentioned previously, the attitude of the country towards 
the automotive industry indicates that there is a great opportunity for growth and 
improvement for auto makers in Iran.   
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CHAPTER THREE: LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1.  Introduction 
This chapter reviews the knowledge-based view of the firm and discusses the 
importance of knowledge management and some of its elements in the new product 
development process. This chapter will explore studies on knowledge-sharing within 
new product development processes, and will progress to identify the key 
mechanisms of knowledge-sharing in the existing literature. The potential 
contribution and outcome of this research is centred on investigating knowledge-
sharing in the new product development process.  
Companies often have a range of product lines and successively introd uce new 
products over time. New products are consumer and industrial offerings made for the 
first time, but how many of these offerings are not really new. Ettlie (2006, p.365) 
believes that, “most new products are really not new to the world, sometimes they 
are copies of existing products, with only slight changes from the existing products. 
In most cases, these new products are not completely new for a company, both in 
terms of technologies and market concepts”.  
Successful new product development, therefore, depends at least partly on the ability 
to understand technological and market knowledge embodied in existing products, 
and on adopting this knowledge to support new product development (Insiti & Clark, 
1994). In addition, Clark & Fujimoto (1991) argued that sometimes a fast product 
development cycle has become a critical foundation of competitiveness in industries 
such as automobile manufacturing. Under such circumstances, retaining and quickly 
utilising knowledge across generations of projects and learning from past 
development activities may become important both for avoiding unnecessary 
problem-solving and also in the discovery of new solutions to problems in the field 
of new product development. The capability to mobilise and create knowledge for 
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new product development has been stated as being critical for competitive advantage 
(Helfat & Raubitschek, 2000).  
3.2.  Knowledge Management  
There are many definitions of knowledge management in the existing literature. For 
example, Quintas et al., (1997, p.387) define knowledge management as “the process 
of critically managing knowledge to meet existing needs and to identify and exploit 
existing and acquired knowledge assets and to develop new opportunities”. In 
comparison, Nonaka (1991) argues that knowledge management covers a series of 
practices used within an organisation to identify, create, represent, distribute and 
enable acceptance of insights and experience. Such insights and experiences 
comprise knowledge, either embodied in individuals or embedded in organisational 
processes or practice. According to Barclay & Murray (1997), knowledge 
management makes a direct connection between an organisation’s intellectual assets  
explicit (recorded) or tacit (personal know-how) and business results. 
In addition, Gloet & Terziovski (2004) describe knowledge management as the 
formalisation and way into experience, knowledge and expertise that creates new 
capabilities, and supports innovation and the new product development process, 
which develops customer value. Most importantly, Darroch & McNaughton (2002) 
point out that knowledge management is a management function that creates or 
establishes knowledge, manages the flow of knowledge, and certifies that knowledge 
is used successfully and efficiently for the long-term benefit of the organisation and 
companies.  
To comment on the importance of knowledge management, Alavi & Leidner (2001, 
p.112), in their paper, mentioned the results of two different surveys in an effort to 
highlight the importance of knowledge and knowledge management for 
organisations. “A survey found that almost half of the companies reported having 
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suffered a significant setback from losing key staff with 43% experiencing impaired 
client or supplier relations and 13% facing a loss of income because of the departure 
of single employee. The Second survey showed that much of the knowledge the 
organisation needed existed inside the firm, but identifying that it existed, finding it, 
and leveraging it remained problematic. Such problems maintaining, locating and 
applying knowledge have led to systematic attempts to manage knowledge”. 
According to Davenport & Prusak (1998), most knowledge management projects 
have one of three aims. Knowledge management helps to make knowledge 
noticeable, firstly by showing the role of knowledge within an organisation, mainly 
through knowledge maps, yellow pages or the development of a knowledge- intensive 
culture, by encouraging and combining behaviours, such as knowledge-sharing 
(transferring knowledge among members); secondly, by proactively seeking and 
offering knowledge; and finally, by building a knowledge communications system 
not only one that is technical in nature, but one delivering a web of connections 
amongst people for interaction and collaboration. 
This thesis adopts the view that knowledge management is a process of capturing an 
organisation’s collective expertise, whether it resides in databases, on paper, or in 
people’s minds, and accordingly distributing it to wherever it can help produce the 
greater benefit (Hibbard, 1997). In addition, the thesis also views knowledge 
management as a process that helps to get the right knowledge to the right people at 
the right time so that they can make the best decision (Petrash, 1996). These 
knowledge management processes can be subdivided into creating knowledge within 
an organisation and transferring knowledge from either outside or within an 
organisation (Teece, 1998). The next sections will explore some key factors that 
could affect knowledge management process elements.  
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3.2.1. The Origin and Significance of the Knowledge-based View 
In order to better understand the knowledge-based view, it would be helpful to 
understand the resource-based view, as the knowledge-based view is considered an 
extension of the resource-based view (Curado & Bontis, 2006). The resource-based 
view argues that firms with valuable, rare and unique resources have the potential to 
achieve better performance. These resources are inputs into a firm’s production 
process (Barney, 1991). In addition, Wernerfelt (1995) believed that strategies that 
are not resource-based are unlikely to achieve a successful business environment.  
A firm’s resources, at a given time, could be defined as those physical and intangible 
assets, such as brand name, in-house knowledge of technology, employment of 
skilled personnel, trade contacts, machinery, efficient procedures and capital 
(Wernerfelt, 1984). Firm resources include all assets, capabilities, organisational 
processes, firm attributes, information, and knowledge controlled by a firm that 
enable the firm to conceive of and implement strategies centred on improving its 
efficiency and effectiveness (Daft, 1983; Barney, 1991). As has been stated, “the 
fundamental principle of the resource-based view is that the basis for a competitive 
advantage of a firm lies primarily in the application of the collection of valuable 
resources at the firm’s body” (Wernerfelt, 1984, p.172). 
Barney (1991, p.105) argued that, “to transform a short-run competitive advantage 
into a sustained competitive advantage requires that these resources are mixed in 
nature and not perfectly mobile”; in essence, “this translates into resources that are 
neither perfectly imitable nor substitutable without great effort” (Barney, 1991, 
p.117). The resource-based view explains that a firm’s sustainable competitive 
advantage is reached by exclusive resources, with such resources encompassing the 
description of being rare, valuable, inimitable, non-tradable, non-substitutable and 
firm-specific (Barney, 2001). In addition, Grant (1996a, p.110) argued that “the 
resource-based view perceives the firm as a unique bundle of individual resources 
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and capabilities where the primary task of management is to maximise value through 
the optimal deployment of existing resources and capabilities, while developing the 
firm’s resource base for the future”. With this taken into account, a firm may reach a 
sustainable competitive advantage through the exclusive resources it holds; these 
resources cannot be easily bought, transferred or copied, and at the same time add 
value to a firm whilst being rare.  
The main question that arises here is: how could organisations transform these 
valuable resources to benefit their performance? As Galunic & Rodan (1998) argued, 
the knowledge-based theory explores the ways in which firms combine and 
transform these valuable unique input resources into the final performance. In 
addition, Hitt et al., (2008) also mentioned that knowledge has the most capacity of 
all resources because knowledge allows the firm to expect more precisely the nature 
and business-related potential of changes in the environment, and the appropriateness 
of strategic and tactical actions (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Without such 
knowledge, an organisation is less capable of realising and taking advantage of new 
opportunities (Wiklund & Shepherd, 2003). This thesis is framed within the 
knowledge-based view of the firm to identify the ways in which firms combine and 
exchange different kinds of knowledge particularly knowledge about new product 
development - into their final performance and actions. The knowledge-based view 
of the firm argues that knowledge is the most exclusive and unique resource, 
allowing an organisation to merge and manage the resources available to all in new 
ways, providing more value for its customers than its competitors (Kogut & Zander, 
1992; Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997). 
In addition, Foss, et al., (2006) argued that the knowledge-based view may help to 
understand issues related to the boundaries in the internal organisation of the firm. 
The knowledge-based view of the firm directs special emphasis to the interactions 
amongst individuals and groups of knowledge-sharing and knowledge creation (like 
the development of routines), and finally the conclusion of such interactions for 
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competitive advantage (Grant, 1996). Developing a knowledge-based view of the 
firm raises the issue: what is knowledge? (Grant, 1996).   
3.2.2. Types of Organisational Knowledge  
Knowledge has been defined as an organisational asset with exclusivity and 
originality (Al-Alawi, et al., 2007; Cabrera & Cabrera, 2002; Nonaka, 1994; Grant, 
1996). In addition, Hislop (2005) and Bohn (1994) also identified a useful way of 
understanding knowledge, which can be achieved by differentiating it from what it is 
not. These two authors argued that one of the most important distinctions to be made 
in the current knowledge of literature is between knowledge, information and data. 
They identified data as raw numbers, images, words and sounds derived from study 
or measurement. This data could be the raw numbers and replies from a marketing 
survey of an organisation’s clients. Information, in comparison, represents data 
arranged in a meaningful pattern; in other words, data where some intellectual input 
has been added, for example, where the raw data from the marketing survey has been 
analysed using a specific statistical technique in order to produce structured results.  
Moreover, knowledge is more complicated than information. Lee & Yang (2000) 
argue that knowledge is the consequence and outcome of interpreting information 
based on personnel’s understanding, which in turn is influenced by the personality of 
its holder since it is based on judgment and feeling, attitude and behaviour. 
Information is data organised into meaningful patterns. Information is transformed 
into knowledge when a person reads, understands, interprets, and applies the 
information to a specific work function. “Knowledge becomes visible when 
experienced persons put into practice lessons learned over time” (Lee & Yang, 2000, 
p.1). 
In addition, Machlup (1982) believed that one person’s knowledge could be another 
person’s information. If a person cannot understand and apply the information to 
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anything, it remains just information. However, another individual can take that same 
information, understand it and adapt it in the context of previous experience, and 
apply the newly acquired knowledge to make business decisions or redefine a 
laboratory practice. However, a third person may take the same pieces of information 
and, through his/her unique experiences or lessons learned, apply knowledge in ways 
that the second person may never have considered. Nonaka (1994, p.15) concluded 
that “information is a flow of messages, while knowledge is created and organised by 
the very flow of information, anchored on the commitment and beliefs of its holder”.  
Knowledge becomes embedded in people’s minds overtime; it is demonstrated 
through their actions and behaviours (Al-Alawi et al., 2007). In a practical sense, 
knowledge can be measured as ‘actionable information’, which allows the 
organisation to make better judgments and provide an effective input to the new 
product development activity within organisations. Importantly, this happens by 
providing information in the right place, at the right time and in the appropriate 
format (Tiwana, 2000).  
Explicit knowledge is knowledge that can be codified and documented (e.g., 
processes, checklists), whilst tacit knowledge is defined by Polanyi (1996) as 
knowledge that cannot be articulated or verbalised. It is embedded in the background 
and experience of an individual/personnel or a group. In addition, Spender (1996a) 
suggested that tacit knowledge could be understood best as knowledge that has not 
yet abstracted from practice.  
Nonaka (1994) and Szulanski (1996) also explained that tacit knowledge exists either 
in the minds of individuals or a collective body, and has been acquired through 
experience. On the other hand, explicit knowledge is knowledge that is transmittable 
in formal, systematic language. It may include explicit facts, axiomatic proposition 
and symbols (Kogut & Zander, 1992), and can be codified or articulated in manuals, 
computer programs and training tools (Inkpen & Dinur, 1998).  
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As highlighted by Inkpen & Dinur (1998, p.456), “knowledge types, therefore, must 
be classified on a continuum that ranges from explicit knowledge embodied in 
specific products and processes to tacit knowledge acquired through experience and 
use and embodied in individual cognition and organisation routines”. Knowledge that 
is tacit and highly personal has a slight value until it can be converted into explicit 
knowledge that other organisational members can share and use; however, such a 
conversion process exposes knowledge to the danger of imitation by other firms and 
competitors.  
According to the aforementioned literature, the thesis has recognised tacit knowledge 
as unarticulated, intuitive, non-verbalisable, and always derived from personal 
experience. Moreover, it is subjective and difficult to formalise (Nonaka et al., 
2000), and is often learned via shared experiences. Furthermore, it is believed that 
learning knowledge that is tacit in nature requires participation and doing (Nonaka & 
Takeuchi, 1995). According to Polanyi (1966) and Pablos (2004), explicit knowledge 
is articulated either verbally or in writing. It can exist either individually or 
collectively, is documented, and can be transferred in a formal and efficient way 
through rules, policies and procedures. Explicit or codified knowledge is easier to 
use within an organisation as it can be easily transferred and shared within members 
and organisations. 
A number of scholars have used the concept of explicit and tacit knowledge to 
categorise different forms of knowledge (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995), and a number 
of other scholars, such as Hansen (1999), have categorised knowledge into codified 
and non-codified knowledge. Hansen (1999) believed that codified knowledge is 
available in the form of written documents and procedures. However, Hansen (1999) 
argued that the main issue here is the level of codification; in other words, the level 
to which knowledge is fully documented or articulated in writing at the time of 
transfer between a sub-unit. Hansen (1999, p.87) argued that “knowledge with low 
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codification corresponds to notion of tacit knowledge is hard to articulate and can 
only be acquired through experience”.  
3.2.3. The Knowledge Management Process  
Knowledge creation has been widely recognised as strategically important for 
organisational learning and innovation. Nonaka & Takeuchi’s (1995) book The 
Knowledge Creating Company highlighted the complexity of knowledge creation, 
and its importance for an organisation’s long-term success. They believed that 
knowledge is created only by individuals and that an organisation cannot create 
knowledge without individuals. However, the organisation could support creative 
individuals or provide contexts for them to create knowledge. Von Krogh (1998, 
p.133) argued that “the rapid creation and diffusion of knowledge within and 
between companies has become a top priority on managers’ agendas”. Nonaka et al., 
(2006, p.1179) believed that organisational knowledge creation “is the process of 
making available and amplifying knowledge created by individuals as well as 
crystallising and connecting it with an organisation’s knowledge system. In other 
words, what individuals come to know in their (work) life benefits their colleagues”.  
Nonaka (1994), Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995) and Spender (1996) have mentioned 
knowledge-creation in their work. Knowledge-creation is defined as “the capability 
of a company as a whole to create new knowledge, disseminate it throughout the 
organisation and embody it in products or services and systems” (Nonaka & 
Takeuchi, 1995, p.93). Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995) have suggested that knowledge is 
created through conversions between tacit and explicit knowledge; they proposed 
their well-known knowledge-creation model known as SECI (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 
1995).  
Nowadays, knowledge and the capacity to create and operate knowledge are 
considered to be the most important source of a firm’s sustainable competitive 
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advantage (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). Nonaka’s (1994, p.14) theory of organisation 
knowledge-creation holds that “organisational knowledge is created through a 
continuous dialogue between tacit and explicit knowledge. Focusing on knowledge-
transferring through the interaction between tacit and explicit knowledge identifies 
four modes: socialisation (tacit to tacit) represents the interaction between individuals 
through mechanisms such as observation, imitation or apprenticeships; combination 
(explicit to explicit) involves combining explicit knowledge through meeting and 
conversation or using information systems; internalisation (explicit to tacit) converts 
explicit knowledge into tacit knowledge; whereas externalisation (tacit to explicit) 
converts tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge”. Figure 3 and Table 27 show 
categorisations of these above-mentioned elements:  
 
                                                
 
Dialogue 
 
Field Building                                                                                    
Socialisation 
(Tacit to Tacit ) 
Externalisation 
(Tacit to Explicit) Linking explicit 
knowledge Internalisation 
(Explicit and Tacit ) 
Combination 
(Explicit to Explicit) 
 Learning by Doing  
 
Figure 3: Model of Knowledge Creation 
                                                      (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995, p.71) 
  
     
Table 27: Knowledge creation modes 
Knowledge creation 
Degree of socialisation, externalisation, combination, and 
internalisation 
Socialisation 
Degree of tacit knowledge accumulation, extra-firm social 
information collection, intra-firm social information gathering, and 
transfer of tacit knowledge  
Externalisation 
Degree of creative dialogue, deductive and inductive thinking, use of 
metaphors, and exchanges ideas  
Combination 
Degree of acquisition and integration, synthesis and processing and 
dissemination  
Internalisation  Degree of personal experiences, simulation, and experimentation 
      (Lee & Chio, 2003)   
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To examine the knowledge-creation process, this study will adopt socialisation, 
externalisation, combination and internalisation for two reasons. Firstly, these four 
models contain not only knowledge-transfer but also knowledge creation. Existing 
knowledge-transfer and new knowledge-creation are very significant in knowledge 
management (Tsai & Li, 2007). Secondly, the four above-mentioned models have 
been used widely in the context of organisational learning and new product 
development. Internalisation and externalisation modes of knowledge conversion 
relate to patterns of conversion involving both tacit and explicit knowledge. Such 
models show that tacit and explicit knowledge are complementary and can expand 
over time through a process of mutual interaction (Lee & Choi, 2003). In addition, 
Marwick (2001) believes that these processes do not happen in isolation, but work 
together in different combinations in typical business situations. Table 28 shows 
some examples of technology that may apply to facilitate knowledge creation 
processes (Marwick, 2001): 
Table 28: Knowledge creation facilitators  
Tacit to Tacit: 
 E-meetings 
 Synchronous collaboration (Chat) 
Tacit to Explicit: 
 Answering question 
 Annotation 
Explicit  to Tacit: 
 Visualisation 
 Brows able video/audio of presentations 
Explicit  to Explicit: 
 Text search 
 Document categorisation 
              Marwick (2001, p.816) 
 
Szulanski (1996) believes that knowledge-transfer is important both within a firm 
and between different firms as the success of many organisations can be based on 
their ability to transfer the knowledge embodied in organisational routines from one 
organisation unit to another, as well as to improve their capabilities by assimilating 
new technology. 
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In addition, Ford (2001) believes that the knowledge management field covers 
several areas, the most commonly discussed of which is knowledge-transfer. 
Knowledge-transfer within and between organisations gives opportunities to 
departments and members of the organisation to learn from other parts of the 
organisation (McElroy, 2003; Edmondson, et al., 2003). Gupta & Govindarajan 
(2000) defined knowledge-transfer as the transfer of skills, technologies, business 
practices and data between organisational subunits. They believed knowledge flows 
to be the transfer of know-how, which can be composed of expertise or developing 
and transferring knowledge effectively, which is a major and key challenge for all 
businesses. In addition, Schulz (2001) also recognised knowledge-transfer as the 
joint volume of know-how and information-transmitted per unit of time. Moreover, 
Kalling (2003) identified knowledge-transfer as a process by which an organisation 
makes knowledge routines available to its members. Valuable ideas can arrive from 
inside or outside the company, and can then be used in the market. This transaction 
of ideas is one of the key elements of operating a successful new product 
development process. Cohen & Levinthal (1990) showed that knowledge-transfer is a 
key factor for a firm, and is necessary to rapidly respond to changes, innovate and 
achieve competitive success. With these definitions, this study intends to capture the 
overall amount of know-how and information transmitted between subunits in all 
kinds of ways, including via telephone, e-mail, regular mail, meeting and shared 
technology. Knowledge-transfer needs an individual or a group to work together with 
others to transfer knowledge, achieve common benefits and learn from each other 
(Syed- lkhsan & Rowland, 2004). However, it is important to assure employees that 
they will have access to all of the necessary information that they might need (Jones, 
2007). ‘Knowledge-transfer is viewed as the process through which one unit is 
affected by the experience of another’ (Argote & Ingram, 2000, p.151). The basic 
question is: what steps can organisations take to make knowledge-transfer a more 
effective process? Each organisation is different, and there are many practical tools 
for transferring knowledge across different teams and departments (Jones, 2007). For 
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example, the transfer of technological know-how is facilitated by communication, 
visits and meetings (Bresman et al., 1999). 
In addition, Bornemann & Sammer (2003) argued that knowledge can boost and 
increase its value when transferred to and shared with others; the basic notion is that 
the transfer of viable knowledge should assist with collaborative problem-solving 
between people, directly and indirectly, supported by networks and tools. 
Transferring knowledge between units and people can create significant learning 
benefits. When an individual is willing to help out as well as to learn from others in 
the development of new competencies, to ‘learn’ means to digest, to absorb, and to 
apply (Senge, 1998), which can be referred to as the level of absorptive capacity. 
Modern information and telecommunication technology is available to support such 
exchanges across time and distance barriers. Organisations investing in this type of 
technology often face difficulties in terms of encouraging their employees to use the 
system to transfer and share their ideas (Cabrera & Cabrera, 2002). For long-term 
success, organisations should always be able to learn, benefit from the knowledge 
they attain, apply it to reality, and increase their knowledge about developing a new 
product, which is the result of a successful knowledge-transfer (Liedtka, 1999).  
In the existing literature, knowledge-transfer occurs at various levels: between 
individuals; from individuals to explicit sources; from individuals to groups; within 
groups; between groups; and finally, from a group to the whole organisation (Alavi 
& Leidner, 2001). Moreover, Wakefield (2005) believes that the transferring of 
knowledge between individuals and departments in an organisation is considered a 
key process of learning. In addition, Ardichvili et al., (2003) point out that this 
knowledge can either be generated within firms (intra) or accessed externally (inter). 
It has been argued that the transfer of tacit knowledge is more difficult to accomplish 
than the transfer of more articulated knowledge (explicit knowledge). Inside a 
multiunit organisation, units can learn from each other and benefit from new 
knowledge developed by other units. Knowledge-transfer amongst organisational 
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units provides these opportunities for mutual learning and inter-unit cooperation that 
motivate the creation of new knowledge, whilst at the same time giving 
organisational units the ability to innovate (Tsai & Choshal, 1998). 
Empirical research by Foos et al., (2006, p.1) showed the way in which the 
organisation can measure the success of its tacit knowledge-transfer. “A qualitative 
research based on 13 interviews was designed with various individual representing 
three companies. The research suggested that trust, early involvement and due 
diligence influence the extent of meeting technology transfer expectations and tac it 
knowledge-transfer expectation”. In addition, Szulanski (2003) found that most 
difficulties in transferring largely tacit knowledge are a result of the recipients 
lacking the experience to make effective use of the new ideas and having relationship 
between the source and recipient. Moreover, Dayasindhu (2002) added that there are 
difficulties associated with identifying the specific original tacit knowledge that 
needs to be transferred. Smith et al. (2007) showed that the most knowledge-transfer 
takes place informally between individuals. Since much important organisational 
knowledge resides in tacit form, the individual is central to any effort to improve this 
type of knowledge-transfer (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). Bock et al., (2005) believe 
that it is necessary to understand tacit knowledge-transfer from an individual’s point 
of view in order to plan and put into practice knowledge management programmes 
that will effectively meet the organisation’s knowledge management.  
“Knowledge-transfer is viewed as dyadic exchanges of organisational knowledge 
between a source and a recipient unit in which the identity of the recipient matters ” 
(Szulanski, 1996, p.28), or “knowledge-transfer is viewed as the process through 
which one unit is affected by the experience of another” (Argote & Ingram, 2000, 
p.151). Finally, knowledge-transfer happens only when the adopter uses the shared 
knowledge (Darr & Kuzberg, 2000). In such cases, knowledge-transfer is essentially 
built on the source and recipient. Most organisations are interested in particular types 
of tacit knowledge-transfer, which provide value to their organisations and members. 
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Whilst this list is not necessary comprehensive, it does cover the majority of tacit 
knowledge. Table 29 on the following page summarises these four models’ 
characteristics and introduces a simple explanation, including Best practice, 
Expertise, Experience and Innovation (Smith et al., 2007)  
Table 29: Categorisation of tacit knowledge transfer 
Best Practices 
 The goal with this type of knowledge transfer is to capture and 
leverage existing knowledge, not to generate new knowledge. This 
means reusing what others have already learned.  
 To enable this kind of t ransfer, organisations often produce detailed 
documents and templates to guide others in what to do and how to do  
 People do not want to take the time to write down what they have 
done, do not want to use the materials made available to them or do 
not want copy the work of others  
Expertise  
 Companies have only a small number of experts in a particu lar area 
and look for ways to grow others as rapidly as possible.  
 Expertise is the result of combin ing specific skills with experience in 
using them. Developing expertise requires practising the skills in a 
variety of situations and then being able to apply and adapt them 
appropriately to achieve successful outcomes.  
 Traditionally, expertise takes a long time to develop. 
 Clearly, companies could therefore benefit if they could find ways to 
develop expert ise more rap idly  
Experience 
 Experience is a mixture of lessons learned, cognitive assessments, 
relationship and preconceived ideas, which combined with 
intelligence, transform informat ion into usable knowledge.  
 Experience is considerably more than technical expert ise and is 
essential to understanding and correctly interpreting in formation 
coming into the organisation from the outside. 
 Access to managerial experience is critical  
 
Innovation 
 
 Companies not only want to stimulate the development of new ideas, 
they also want to motivate their people to become more responsive to 
change. 
 Facilitating this type of knowledge transfer is the biggest challenge 
for an organisation  
 Innovation is predicated on the ability to integrate new informat ion 
with existing knowledge to create something new. 
 It is difficult to transmit innovative ideas within organisations in 
ways that they can be understood and acted upon.  
(Smith et al., 2007)  
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Since the literature suggests that key features of knowledge-transfer are knowledge 
movement and the application of knowledge, this study captures both of these ideas 
by defining knowledge-transfer as the communication of knowledge from a source so 
that it is learned and applied by a recipient. The objective of this knowledge-transfer 
section is to establish and examine the way in which firms acquire tacit knowledge 
from partner firms, and how the extent of inter- firm tacit knowledge-transfer affects 
a firm’s innovation capability and performance. Schulz (2001) measured knowledge-
transfer with a multi- item instrument that asked informants to rate how much 
knowledge their subunit provided to other units; it was found that learning processes 
do affect knowledge-transfer. Cavusgil et al., (2003) found that tacit knowledge 
could be gained from partner firms through their interactions. Tacit knowledge-
transfer makes an important contribution to firms for developing innovation 
capability. Firms’ combined experience also plays an important role in tacit 
knowledge-transfer. Firms with greater mutual experience can benefit more from this 
tacit knowledge-transfer. The moderating role of firm size on that relationship was 
also explored. The higher the degree of tacitness of firm knowledge, the harder it was 
to transfer it from one firm to other. Some factors that could influence knowledge-
transfer are mentioned and categorised in Table 30. 
Table 30: Factors influenced knowledge transfer 
Innovation performance  
Measured by three items. They measure if the innovation project has 
succeeded in achieving its main objectives; financial and ROI  
Innovation capability  
Measured by five items. They use frequency of innovation, order of 
market entry, and simultaneous entry into mult iple markets. The ability to 
penetrate new markets to tap the various facts of innovation capability.  
Extent of tacit knowledge 
Transfer   
Measured by four items. They are used to capture the Complexity, 
Codifiability, and Observability of the information transferred.  
Relationship strength 
Measured by three items. These are the frequency of in fractions, 
confidence in each other, and the desirability of maintain ing the 
relationship. 
Collaborative experience  
Measured by four items. Three items represent the overall experience on 
informat ion cooperation, contractual agreement, and consortia. One item 
measures the overall collaborative experience.  
Firm size Measured by annual sales volume and number of employees. 
(Cavusgil et al., 2003) 
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Cavusgil et al., (2003) showed that relationship strength considerably influences the 
level of tacit knowledge-transfer. The result also supported that inter-firm 
relationship strength affects tacit knowledge-transfer. The extent of tacit knowledge-
transfer positively affects firm innovation capability. According to the knowledge-
based view of a firm, an organisation’s capability to create knowledge is a 
foundation of competitive advantage (Kogut & Zander, 1992; Spender, 1996) and, as 
highlighted previously, knowledge-creation, as based on Nonaka’s model, is about 
continuous transfer, mixture and conversion of the different types of knowledge 
(tacit and explicit) where personnel practise and learn. However, Cook & Brown 
(1999, p.385) believe that “tacit knowledge cannot be turned into explicit, nor can 
explicit be turned into tacit”. Yet, Cook & Brown (1999) argue that using each type 
of knowledge can help the acquisition of the other type. Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995, 
p.59) describe individual tacit knowledge as the basis of organisational knowledge 
creation. “Knowledge is created only by individuals. An organisation cannot create 
knowledge without individuals. The organisation supports creative individuals or 
provides contexts for them to create knowledge. Organisational knowledge creation, 
therefore, should be understood as a process that organisationally amplifies the 
knowledge created by individuals and crystallises it as part of the knowledge 
network of the organisation”. Other scholars, such as Doz (1996); Crossan (1999); 
and Inkpen & Dinur (1998), have supported Nonaka & Takeuchi’s view, and 
provided development of the process. For example, Zollo & Winter (1999) 
mentioned that organisational knowledge-creation can be seen as a process that is 
dependent on the group and individuals building up new knowledge and experiences, 
sharing knowledge with others, and codifying knowledge so that it is accessible and 
useable by other organisational members and can be reserved in the organisational 
memory. However, Cook & Brown (1999, p.386) argued that, “individuals and 
groups each do epistemic work that the other cannot”. Cook & Brown (1999) also 
suggested that both tacit and explicit knowledge are shaped through a process of 
dynamic communication with the outside world.  
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3.2.4. Summary of Knowledge Management  
It has been clearly argued that knowledge can be considered the most exclusive, 
strategic and unique resource for an organisation. In addition, authors such as Kogut 
& Zander (1992), mentioned that the ability to obtain, combine, store and share, and 
apply ‘knowledge’ is the most important capability for building a successful final 
performance. Gupta & Govindarajan (2000) defined knowledge-transfer as the 
transfer of skills, technology, business practices and data between organisational 
subunits. The main objective of this research is to explore and clarify the problems 
and issues that might affect knowledge-creation and knowledge sharing /transfer 
(skills, knowledge, experience and data) between one location and other parts of an 
organisation. Nonaka (1994) argued that organisational knowledge is created through 
a continuous conversation between tacit and explicit knowledge. Nonaka et al., 
(2006) defined organisational knowledge-creation as a process of making available 
and amplifying knowledge created by an individual as well as crystallising and 
connecting it to the organisation’s knowledge system.  
3.2.5. From Knowledge to New Product Development   
According to Plessis (2007), the nature of global economic growth has been changed 
by the speed of new product development, which has been made possible by rapidly 
evolving technology, shorter product lifecycles, and a higher rate of new product 
development.  
Leiponen (2006, p.238) believed that “the growing literature on the knowledge-based 
view of the firm argues that a firm’s practices towards the generation of knowledge 
can have a substantial effect on their final performance”. In addition, Shani et al., 
(2003) mentioned that the fundamental nature of new product development is the 
creation, utilisation and exploitation of new knowledge and business sustainability, 
which is embedded in the firm’s ability to manage its new product development 
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process. In addition, Herkema (2003) argued that new product development is a 
process wherein knowledge is acquired, shared and taken on board, with the aim of 
creating new knowledge, which embodies products and services.  
In particular, Plessis (2007) defined the new product development process as the 
creation of new knowledge and ideas to facilitate new business outcomes, aimed at 
improving the internal business process and structures, and creating new market-
driven products and services. He argued that the first basic driver of knowledge 
management’s role in NPD in today’s business environment is to create, build and 
keep competitive advantage through the utilisation of knowledge through 
collaboration (JVs) practices.  
Cavusgil et al., (2003) indicate that building and sustaining a new product 
development process has, however, become increasingly complex due to changing 
customer needs, extensive competitive pressure and rapid technological change. 
Knowledge management and new product development process configuration 
determine the way in which a firm can capitalise on and create new knowledge, 
providing a context wherein new product development efforts are designed, 
developed and completed (Shani et al., 2003) 
3.3.  New Product Development as a Knowledge-creation Process  
Johne & Snelson (1988) believe that product development is very important for the 
future of firms who want to grow by internal or external means. Ansoff’s directional 
policy matrix (Table 31) introduces four important factors that play a central role in a 
business’s successful growth. The new product development strategy can be seen to 
be one of the main factors in the organisation’s growth and success in the Ansoff 
matrix.  
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Table 31: Ansoff matrix 
 Current products New products  
Current markets 1) Market penetration strategy 3) Product development strategy 
New markets 2) Market development strategy 4) Diversification strategy 
(Stone, 2001, p.51)  
Trott (2005) argued that almost all companies try to ensure that their products are 
able to compete with the competition by frequently improving and updating their 
existing products. Lovelace et al., (2001) believed that levels of competition that 
resulted from the globalisation of markets and repeatedly changing technologies, 
such as the internet - which lessens the effects of distance - have heightened the need 
for businesses to continually innovate products and processes, and increase the speed 
of their delivery to the market. Delivering a new product is thus a leading business 
challenge for most organisations (Tornatzky & Fleischer, 1990). 
New product development success is largely decided by the way in which a firm 
appreciates, develops and promotes a new product. Traditionally, the new product 
development process has been portrayed as proceeding in an orderly, logical fashion 
from product idea to launch. The success or failure of a new product has been found 
to be determined by the various steps and activities that characterise a new product 
project as it moves from the idea stage to a commercialised new product (Cooper, 
1983). NPD is a key area that has been identified in terms of understanding the way 
in which products are developed, and how they are ultimately brought to the 
marketplace (Lim et al., 2003).  
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3.3.1. NPD Process (Historical Development) 
Trott (2005, p.383) argued that, “new products are the outputs of the innovation 
process, where the new product development (NPD) process is a sub-process of 
innovation. The actual development of new products is the process of transforming a 
new business opportunity into a tangible new product” and transferring this business 
opportunity into the end performance is mainly integrated with knowledge  
management performance. Erez & Naveh (2004, p.1575) argued that, “there is new 
product development management under way all the time in organisations ; some fail, 
some work and only a few make history. In today’s competitive marketplace, 
companies that want to survive should produce and sustain high-quality products and 
service”.  
A successful innovation that ends in a successful new product is very important to 
maintain companies’ business and it is important to a growing new business 
(Chesbrough, 2003). In addition, Tidd et al., (2006) argued that being innovative has 
become one of the most important factors for organisations in terms of satisfying 
their competitiveness. The innovation process is concerned with the various activities 
that have to be undertaken in order to turn an innovation into a successful 
commercial new product or service, which consumers, individuals or firms will 
purchase. This section will explore the nature of this process and in particular the 
various activities involved in the exploitation of innovations to make them into 
commercially viable new products and services. 
Hart & Baker (1994) argued that the field of new product development (NPD) is 
widely researched in a variety of organisations, such as universities, consulting firms 
and manufacturing companies, and can be identified in a wide range of regulations, 
including technology management, business policy, marketing and engineering. In 
order to be successful in the new product development process, a firm should 
simultaneously meet two critical aims: maximising the fit with market knowledge or 
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customers’ needs, and minimising the time to market (fast knowledge creation and 
fast knowledge-transfer to the final output). Saren’s well-known taxonomy (1984), in 
which new product development process models are categorised, is a useful basis 
upon which the new product development process will be reviewed and examined.  
3.3.1.1. Departmental-stage model: 
The department stage model, as mentioned in Figure 4, shows that departments hold 
responsibility for the various responsibilities carried out. For example, in an 
industrial circumstance, the ideas are equipped and originate in the R&D department. 
The detailed design is then carried out by the design department. The engineering 
department will then make the prototype, after which production will become 
involved to work on the manufacturing problems, and finally marketing will become 
involved to plan and carry out the launch.  
 
 
 
Figure 4: Example of a department-stage model  
(Saren, 1984, p.13) 
 
A new idea moves from its concept as an idea through a variety of departments, one 
after another, until it finally emerges into the market as a newly developed product. 
In this model, there is a lack of feedback source from market knowledge: as Cooper 
(1984) believed, there is nothing in the way of market feedback, since marketing is 
presented with the product to market. Every department performs a specific task, 
through which an idea is developed into a concrete result. It moves from one 
department to the next until it emerges as a new product, which is then introduced in 
the market (Figure 4).  
   IDEA                                                              New Product        
    
                                                                                    
R&D 
department 
Design 
department 
Engineering 
department 
Production 
department 
Marketing 
department 
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3.3.1.2. Activity-stage model: 
Trott (2005) believed that activity-stage models (Figure 5) are similar to 
departmental-stage models, but because they stress the activities conducted they 
provide a better representation of reality. They also facilitate repetitio n of the 
activities through the use of feedback loops something that departmental stage 
models did not. Activity-stage models are also referred to as over-the-wall action. 
Over-the-wall models are the same as departmental-stage models, so called because 
departments would carry out their tasks before throwing the project over the wall to 
the next department. Figure 5 shows an activity-stage model: 
 
      
Idea generation Screening 
Commercial 
evaluation 
Technical-
development 
Testing commercialisation 
Figure 5: Activity-stages in the NPD process 
(Baker & McTavish, 1976; Booz, et al., 1982, cited in Jong, et al., 2007) 
 
In the activity-stage model (as mentioned in Figure 5), the NPD process includes six 
stages where in each some particular action is carried out. Step Three involves the 
application of commercial estimates regarding possible costs, prices and sales of the 
resulting new product. In Stage Four, a prototype is developed which is tested in 
Stage Five. The final stage comprises activities, such as development for production, 
test marketing, and launch. In this model, the basis for the identification of the 
different ‘stages’ is the type of activities involved in each. Activity-stage models are 
the most widely recognised models to describe NPD. Cooper (1984) and Saren 
(1984) focused on the actual development activities carried out to develop a new 
product. The NPD process is broken down into a number of activities co nducted 
sequentially. Various activity-stage models have been proposed, all of which focus 
on different types of activity that vary in the degree of time and effort spent on each 
stage.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
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The most famous activity-stage model, developed by Booz & Hamilton (1982), is 
shown in Figure 6. Most studies suggest a version of this model for NPD purposes 
(Johne & Storey, 1998). Activity-stage models present NPD as a gradual process of 
reducing uncertainty through a series of problem-solving stages, moving through the 
phases of scanning and selecting through to implementation (Figure 6). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Example of activity-stage model 
(Tidd et al., 2006) 
The main advantage of activity-stage models is that they specify the task needing to 
be conducted. However, the tasks are performed sequentially, which may lead to 
long development lead times, communication problems and increased costs. 
Integrating the various activities in the innovation process is a way of overcoming 
these problems. The various steps can overlap (Clark & Fujimoto, 1991). 
3.3.1.3. Decision-stage model: 
Hart & Baker (1994) argued that activity-stage models improve on departmental-
stage models in that they focus on the actual activities carried out, including various 
iterations of market testing. However, they have been criticised for continuing a 
pass-the-parcel approach to NPD since such activities are still seen to be the 
responsibility of separate departments or functions (Takeuchi & Nonaka, 1986). 
Cooper & Kleinschmidt (1986) and Kotler (1997) all argued that decision-stage 
models represent the new product development process as a series of decisions that 
need to be taken in order to progress the project. Much like activity-stage models, 
many of these models also facilitate iteration through the use of feedback loops. 
However, a criticism of these models (activity and decision) is that such feedback is 
implicit rather than explicit. The importance of the interaction between functions 
Outline concept Detailed design Testing Launch 
New 
Product  
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cannot be stressed enough and the use of feedback loops helps to emphasise this 
(Trott, 2005). Cooper (1983) and Ronkainen (1985) believed that decision-stage 
models represent the NPD process as a series of evaluation points, where the 
decision to carry on or abandon the project is made.  
3.3.1.4. Conversion-process model: 
Twiss (1980) viewed new product development processes as a ‘conversion process’, 
transforming inputs, such as raw materials, scientific knowledge and manpower, into 
outputs and new products. Conversion models provide a view of product 
development as the transformation of inputs (such as raw materials) into outputs 
(such a new product). Figure 7 shows the NPD conversion process. 
  
 
 
 
Figure 7: NPD process as a conversion process 
(Twiss, 1980; Saren, 1984) 
3.3.1.5. Response models:  
This model focuses on the individual’s, or organisation’s response to a new project 
proposal or new idea, or R&D project proposals in terms of acceptance or rejection 
of the idea or project. A number of factors influencing the decision to accept or reject 
the proposal are helpful in terms of the extent to which they provide a new angle on 
what might otherwise be called the screening stage of the NPD process. A response 
model is a model that accounts for the fact that organisations respond to changes in 
their environments, and place emphasis on stimuli from the environment that need to 
Knowledge  R & D  Design  
 
Manufacture  
New 
product  
Material  
Inputs  Conversion  Outputs  
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perceive a response that needs to be developed and then worked out (Hart & Baker, 
1994). 
3.3.1.6. Cross-Functional Teams (CFTs): 
Griffin (1997) argued that companies gradually rely on consisting of members from 
R&D, marketing, manufacturing and sales for the purpose of their business. 
Competitive forces have made cross- functional teams the method of choice through 
which high-technology organisations generate and deploy new products and 
processes (Keller, 2001). It is clear that cross-functional groups consist of members 
from different functional areas with different knowledge, such as various research 
disciplines, including electronic, metallurgy, engineering, manufacturing or 
marketing. Denison et al., (1996) pointed out that cross-functional teams are 
spreading rapidly in organisations as they attempt to improve coordination and 
integration (Ford & Randolph, 1992; Knight, 1976), and cut cycle times in new 
product development (Takeuchi & Nonaka, 1986). They bring together people from 
different disciplines and functions that have pertinent expertise regarding the 
proposed new developed product problem (Kanter, 1988). Such teams have a high 
absorptive capacity, as their members’ differing expertise allows them to tap into a 
broad collection of external information and new knowledge (Cohen & Levinthal, 
1990). It is clear that, in NPD process, a cross-functional team is a group of people 
with different non-practical/practical expertise working towards a common goal. 
Typically, it includes employees from all levels of an organisation. Members may 
also come from outside an organisation (in particular, from suppliers, key customers, 
or consultants. CFTs often function as self-directed teams responding to broad, but 
not specific directives.  
The advantages of CFTs are that a combination of individuals with different 
expertise can also facilitate creativity (Woodman et al., 1993). Marketing and 
manufacturing representatives in new product teams, for example, could facilitate 
product transfer or handoff of the newly developed product to manufacturing for 
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distribution (Griffin, 1997), where speed to market is likely to be increased 
(Lovelace et al., 2001). However, Ford & Randolph (1992, p.278) made a number of 
criticisms of the CFT model. They categorised their views into eight critical areas: 
1. “Violates single line of authority and authority equal to responsibility 
principles of organisation 
2.  Creates ambiguity over resources, technical issues, pay, and personnel 
assignments 
3. Creates organisational conflict between functional and project managers.  
4. Creates conflict among individuals who must work together but have very 
different backgrounds and perspectives on work, time horizons, and goals.  
5. Creates insecurity for functional managers and erodes their autonomy.  
6. More costly for organisation in terms of overheads and staff, more meetings, 
delayed decisions, and information processing  
7. More costly for individuals in terms of role ambiguity, conflict and stress  
8. Show response time to multinational issues” (Ford & Randolph, 1992, p.278). 
3.3.1.7. Network models 
Trott (2005) argued that network models suggest that NPD should be viewed as a 
knowledge-accumulation process that requires contributions from a wide range of 
sources. The network model in Figure 8 helps to highlight the accumulation of 
knowledge over time.  
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Figure 8: A network model of NPD 
(Trott, 2005, p.404) 
 
The next section will summarise all of the above-mentioned models in three simple 
categorisations of the NPD process, and will also highlight each model’s strengths 
and weaknesses, bridging the gap between knowledge management (KM) elements 
and the NPD processes. 
3.3.2. Types of NPD  
Hobday (2005, p.126) argued that, “each different NPD model captured the academic 
knowledge of the time and summarised perceptions of best practice. Each model 
served as a foundation for more sophisticated models allowing the incorporation of 
    Accumulation of 
knowledge over time 
Engineering and 
manufacturing  
Research and 
development  
 
Marketing and sales  
 
Finance 
External inputs:  
Competitors, suppliers, distributors, 
customers, university departments  
External inputs:  
Scientific and technological 
developments, Competitors, Suppliers, 
Customers, University departments  
External inputs:  
Societal needs, Competitors, supplier 
partnership, distributors, customers, 
strategic alliances   
External inputs:  
Competitors, Suppliers, distributors, 
customers  
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additional factors relevant to the NPD process. Each model creates useful insights 
and hypotheses into the nature of the NPD process and decision making requirement 
at the level of the firm, pointing to important links between the NPD process and 
other key process within the firm (e.g. marketing,  manufacturing, management) and 
external to the firm (e.g. the science and technology environment, universities and 
government policies)”. Most recently, McCarthy et al. (2006) acknowledged that 
NPD progresses through a series of stages, but with overlaps, feedback loops, and 
resulting behaviours that resist a linear analysis.  
3.3.2.1. The linear model of NPD process 
As McCarthy et al., (2006, p.439) argued, “the linear NPD process frameworks stem 
from traditional and logical project management methods tha t seek to deliver 
appropriate outputs on time and within cost”. They interpreted the process of new 
product development as a series of actions and performance, which are sequential 
and discrete in nature. In addition, Cooper & Kleinschmidt (1986) argued that these 
process of control and competence are based on the cooperation, coordination and 
communication of those involved in the NPD process. Muffatto & Roveda (2000) 
and Shepherd & Ahmed (2000) all argued that linear frameworks attempt to explain 
how process behaviour affects product quality, execution of key tasks, product 
development costs, product reliability, product variety and managerial complexity.  
The best-known framework based on the linear view is the stage-gate method 
(Cooper, 1990), which represents NPD as a sequential and ordered process of 4–5 
stages of activity and decision; these include concept development, product design, 
testing and validation and product launch. The inputs into the system are new ideas 
and market needs; the system elements are resources, such as engineers and 
marketers; and the outputs are the new products (Clark & Wheelwright, 1993).  
Between the stages are gates or checkpoints, where the movement and output of the 
previous NPD process stages are evaluated. McCarthy et al., (2006) believed that, 
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the advantage of this model is that it provides a simple and effective representation 
of the structural logic and flows, suited to incremental new product development 
process activity with relatively reliable market push or strong market pull forces. 
However, this model does not consider the dynamic behaviours and relationships 
associated with agency, freedom and resulting innovations. Soren’s departmental-
stage and activity-based models can be seen under a linear model, where carrying out 
similar characteristics. 
Under linear models, the NPD process can be seen as a series of activities, carried 
out one after another. Hobday (2005, p.128) believed that, “linear models 
underestimate the innovation process, especially in the early stages when a new 
concept is being generated and tested. Sometimes the model makes marketing and 
market research integral to the NPD process, for example, by pointing the 
importance of interaction between marketing and R&D”. However, much like the 
pure technology push models, they aim to ignore other important aspects of the 
innovation process, including the working relationship with customers, feedback 
loops from later or earlier stages and interaction with the science and technology 
environment. Most researchers have seen consumer (market) knowledge as an 
advantage, targeting many new product development processes (Wood & Lynch, 
2002). 
Knowledge-transfer between departments in linear models is not clearly identified; 
the departments are working in an isolated environment and passing their project to 
the next department without real communication. In the case of a linear model, it is 
difficult to say what is going on within each stage in the different departments. 
Knowledge-transfer from outside the unit is not important and is not recognised as a 
key factor. All R&D activities are processed internally, and feedback loops from 
later to earlier stages are not really recognised or identified. The concept of 
organisational learning does not generally develop, as there is no real knowledge-
transfer and knowledge creation process within the departments and individuals 
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inside the organisation during the NPD processes in a linear model. Individuals are 
working in a remote environment within their own department, passing their 
activities to the next department without feedback from their neighbours.  
3.3.2.2. The coupling model of NPD process 
The coupling model is a highly simplified but nevertheless more representative 
model of the NPD process. Unlike in linear models, the coupling model explicitly 
links the decision-making of firms to the science and technology community and to 
the marketplace. The “coupling model is non- linear with feedback loops. For 
example, in the 1980s, following observations of developing new products in 
Japanese automobile companies, integrated or parallel models began to be developed 
that involved significant functional overlaps between departments and/or activities. 
These models attempted to capture the high degree of cross functional integration 
within firms as well as their external integration with activities in other companies 
including suppliers, customers and, in some cases, universities and government 
agencies” (Hobday, 2005.p.125).  
The coupling model is a major improvement on earlier models, and explicitly and/or 
implicitly attempts to address some of their weaknesses, as outlined previously. 
Unlike earlier models, feedback from the different stages is recognised (e.g. research, 
technical evaluation, engineering development, market research, sales and 
distribution). Interaction between individuals and departments within the 
organisation during the new product development process is recognised ; however, 
the main criticism of this model is that it does not really deal sufficiently with 
environmental factors (e.g. science and technology and governmental regulations).  
Basic knowledge-transfer and knowledge creation models are common in the 
coupling model; mostly, these knowledge-transfer and knowledge creations are 
internal between departments and individuals and external knowledge and sources 
have no role in the coupling model of the NPD process.  
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3.3.2.3. The interactive model of NPD process 
Soren’s response models and network models have been categorised under 
interactive models. Forrest (1991, p.444) argued that, “the modern organisation 
(particularly the modern high technology firm) needs a model which integrates all 
the faces of the innovation process that should be recognised by those responsible for 
facilitating innovation within the firm. Such a model should be of use throughout the 
life of the organisation, from the young entrepreneurial firm in an infant industry to 
the highly integrated organisation in a mature industry, and should be applicable to 
both product and process development”.  
Interactive models emphasise the learning that goes on within and between firms. In 
interactive models of NPD, ‘time’ is one of the key elements and factors for the 
companies’ success. Being first in the market leads a company to adopt a position as 
a main player in the business field. In the interactive model, members of different 
functional areas work together (e.g. members of marketing, engineering, finance, 
R&D); this team has the advantages of the multiple sources of data, knowledge, 
experience and expertise of its members. However, communication between different 
departments and members is one of the main difficulties in this model. Most 
importantly, the interactive model emphasises the external linkage between CFT 
members and outside sources, such as knowledge and technology. Within the 
interactive model, internal and external sources adopt a very important role in NPD 
process success. Some characteristics of the new product development models are 
introduced in Table 32.  
 
 
 
109 | P a g e  
 
Table 32: Model of NPD process 
Models           Characteristics 
 
 
 
The linear model o f NPD 
process 
 Simple linear model, emphasis on internal R&D push. 
 The market will be forced to accept the result of the R&D. 
OR  
 Emphasis on market ing.  
 The market is the source of ideas and providing direction  
to R&D 
 There is no feedback loop 
 
 
 
The coupling model of NPD 
process 
 With feedback loops from later or earlier stages 
 Involves push or pull-push combination  
 R&D and market ing more balance  
 Emphasis is on integration at the R&D – market ing 
interface  
 Parallel development with integrated development teams  
 Emphasis on integration between R&D and manufacturing  
 Horizontal co llaboration including joint ventures and 
partnership  
 
 
 
The Interactive model of NPD 
process 
 Fully integrated parallel development supported by 
advanced I.T  
 Use of R&D expert  
 Horizontal linkages including joint ventures 
 Collaborative research grouping 
 Collaborative market ing arrangement  
 Emphasis on corporate flexibility and speed of development 
(time-based-strategy) first 
 Increased focus on quality and other non-price factors  
 
The Interactive model is a major improvement on its earlier models. In this model the 
adoption of information technology (IT) is recognised. However, there are negative 
features of IT, such as high costs, difficulties in learning, and unrealistic claims. In 
this latest model, knowledge-transfer between external knowledge and internal 
knowledge is as important as internal knowledge-transfer and internal sources. 
Knowledge-transfer between internal R&D and external R&D is recognised. The 
main characteristic of this latest model is that it recognises networks between 
departments and organisations and creates effective knowledge-transfer and 
knowledge creation between individuals and departments.  
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3.3.3. R&D as the Hub of Knowledge-sharing in the NPD Process  
“Research and development knowledge is created via a process by which information 
and know-how are shared and combined through various exchanges” (Henard & 
McFadyen, 2006, p.41). R&D members are the knowledge- intensive and expert 
group in an organisation; their knowledge and expertise is very important to new 
product development, and their ability is the major strength of the product 
development strategy (Henard & McFadyen, 2006). In addition, Jokinen (1998) 
argued that R&D’s work is dependent on the skills, knowledge and experiences of 
the team and R&D team members can learn from each other and apply their past 
experiences and skills to solve new issues (Zhuge, 2002).  
The R&D centre can be seen as a hub that gathers all possible and useful knowledge 
(from internal or external sources and tacit and explicit knowledge) in an effort to 
facilitate the new product development process within an organisation. Nevertheless, 
the question is posed: how can this knowledge collected from different sources 
within the R&D centre be kept for further use?  
Nonaka (1991) argued that knowledge management activities cover a series of 
practices used within an organisation, centred on identifying, creating, storing, 
representing, distributing and enabling the adoption of insights and experience. Such 
insights and experience cover knowledge both embodied in individuals and 
embedded in organisational processes or practices. In an attempt to understand 
organisational knowledge better, a distinction between tacit and explicit knowledge 
is useful. Tacit knowledge was defined by Polanyi (1962) as knowledge that is non-
verbalisable, intuitive and unarticulated. Nonaka (1994) also argued that tacit 
knowledge is highly context specific and has a personal quality, which makes it 
difficult to formalise and communicate. On the other hand, Kogut & Zander (1992) 
defined explicit knowledge as knowledge that is transmittable in formal, systematic 
language and may include explicit facts, axiomatic propositions and symbols. It is 
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important to identify how an organisation can store and gather such different forms 
of knowledge. 
Walsh & Ungson (1991) identified organisational memory as stored information, 
data and knowledge from an organisation’s. This information and knowledge is 
stored via the individual’s recollections and shared understanding, which appear as a 
result of applying specific decisions. For example, information about customers is a 
knowledge repository of customers’ backgrounds, and a group of skilled people is a 
knowledge repository of tacit knowledge. Jashapara (2004, p.116) also identified a 
knowledge repository as a “data warehouse that holds a vast amount of information 
from a wide variety of sources. The data warehouse needs to serve as neutral data 
storage that can be used for a variety of analytical tools”. 
However, Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995) argued that a key challenge for organisations 
is the conversion of tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge. Knowledge that is tacit 
and highly personal has little value until it can be converted into explicit knowledge 
that organisational members can share and use. Spender (1996) argued that 
individuals have knowledge that is practical, and organisations have knowledge that 
constitutes the socialisation and social activities of the individuals within them. 
Individuals always gain knowledge, share it with their organisational community, 
and thus increase the collective store of knowledge, while maintaining a common 
individual knowledge with their co-workers. Spender believes that explicit 
knowledge stored in knowledge repositories - standard operating procedures, 
manuals and so on - is referred to as objectified knowledge.  
Besides knowledge-sharing, knowledge re-coding and categorisation within the 
repository has also become recognised as important. For example, “when asking a 
question to an expert, a customer service or admin operator tries to classify the 
customer query into one of X different categories for which experts are available, or 
similarly a question on the web (Yahoo answer) can be automatically forwarded to a 
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restricted group of people with a specific expertise”. Knowledge can be obtained 
from different sources and can be structured, unstructured, labelled and unlabelled by 
Yahoo and Wikipedia, as rapidly growing datasets hold articles organised by titles, 
subjects, writers, years” (Gupta & Ratinov, 2008, p.842). 
Now the main function of the R&D is to generate new knowledge by recombining 
existing tacit and explicit knowledge (Kogut & Zander, 1992); this kind of 
knowledge recombination can be from inside, outside or across organisation. 
However, Santos et al., (2012, p.27) argued that, “there are always knowledge-
sharing barriers in the context of R&D projects. Knowledge-sharing barriers in such 
contexts include codification, inadequate IT to support knowledge-sharing, lack of 
initiative and strategy by the workers, lack of time and suitable resources, 
communication barriers, and the interdependence of knowledge and skills between 
partners and participants”. All of these affect knowledge-sharing within the 
organisation and departments. Jashapara (2004, p.185) believes that “the failure of 
many knowledge management systems is often as a result of cultural factors rather 
than technological”.  
Nonaka (1994, p.16) argued that, in the literature, “little attention has been paid to 
how knowledge is created and how the knowledge creation process can be 
managed”. Now we know the difference between tacit and explicit knowledge, and 
as Polanyi (1966, p.4) argued, “we can know more than we can tell”. Polanyi 
categorised human knowledge into two groups. He categorised the first group as 
explicit or codified knowledge that is transmittable in formal, systematic language, 
and the second group he named tacit knowledge, which has a personal quality that 
makes it difficult to formalise and communicate. Nonaka (1994, p.16) argued that, 
“tacit knowledge is deeply rooted in action, commitment, and involvement in a 
specific context”. It is better to recall Nonaka’s (1994) four knowledge conversion 
models and to apply these within the R&D knowledge repository. As mentioned 
previously, within R&D there are existing experts, skills (tacit), documents, maps  
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and manuals (explicit), all of which help R&D to create new knowledge. Nonaka 
(1994, p.18) argues that, “the assumption that knowledge is created through 
conversion between tacit and explicit knowledge allows researchers to suggest four 
different models of knowledge conversion: 
 
A) From tacit knowledge to tacit knowledge (Socialisation)  
B) From explicit knowledge to explicit knowledge (Combination)  
C) From tacit knowledge to explicit knowledge (Externalisation)  
D) From explicit knowledge to tacit knowledge (Internalisation)”.  
As already mentioned, socialisation (tacit to tacit) is sharing knowledge in both 
official and unofficial ways, and there is the possibility of face-to-face meetings, 
immediate communication, emails, chats, collaboration elements and social network 
applications. Internalisation (explicit to tacit) is the sharing and allocation of 
knowledge within the organisation. In this model, every member of the organisation 
can access the information on the internet or knowledge repositories and, as Nonaka 
& Takeuchi (1995) mentioned, it is closely related to learning by doing.  
Combination (explicit to explicit) is the easiest form of knowledge conversion, and it 
can be achieved through the use of emails, collaboration tools and knowledge 
databases. Finally, externalisation (tacit to explicit) is the process whereby tacit 
knowledge is transformed into explicit forms. Nonaka (1994, pp.19–20) argued that, 
“metaphor plays an important role in the externalisation process and ‘action’ is 
deeply related to the internalisation process. Externalisation mode is triggered by 
successive rounds of meaningful ‘dialogue’. In this dialogue, the sophisticated use of 
metaphors can be used to enable team members to articulate their own perspectives, 
and thereby reveal hidden tacit knowledge that is otherwise hard to communicate. 
Concepts formed by teams can be combined with existing data and external 
knowledge in search of more concrete and sharable specifications”. 
114 | P a g e  
 
Moreover, as noted by Jashapara (2004, p.201), “Externalisation involves the 
articulation of tacit into explicit knowledge. This conversion normally occurs 
through dialogue and use of figurative language, metaphors, narratives, images and 
creative inference. The main characteristic of this artefact is dialogue where 
individuals share their mental models and their own understanding”.  
In terms of explicit knowledge-sharing and the role of IT as a main facilitator, APQC 
carried out a benchmarking study in 1997, for some 28 organisations, on the use of 
IT to support knowledge management activities. APQC (1997, p.6) believed that, “it 
is no coincidence that information technology for easily connecting people and 
information has blossomed at the same time that knowledge is becoming recognised 
as the most valuable of firm’s assets. As information technology (IT) has become our 
personal desktop tool and our link to each other, we grow to covet even more access 
to information and people’s knowledge. In turn, we demand even better IT tools, 
ones that become part of the way we work”.  
Borghoff & Pareschi (1997) and Davenport & Prusak (1998) also believed that 
information technology supports knowledge management activities effectively. 
Information and communication technologies, such as the internet, intranet, and 
software and hardware, are all instrumental in terms of improving the knowledge 
management activities in organisations. In addition, Dougherty (1999) believed that 
IT could also be seen as a tool to help the process of knowledge management in 
organisations. Egtbu & Botterill (2002, p.134) concluded that, “IT can be essential 
for the storage of explicit knowledge in databases and repositories but also as a 
communication device, through e-mail systems and groupware. The empirical 
evidence suggests that IT is used to a certain extent within organisations”.  
Davenport et al., (1998) and Gourlay (2001) argued that the concept of knowledge 
management has been effectively controlled by information technology, and that the 
role of individuals in the knowledge management processes is also growing rapidly 
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(Earl, 2001; Stenmark, 2001). Active communication means that a number of people 
exchange information and knowledge about the experiences they have gained in the 
past from their job, and other colleagues can learn from these experiences. However, 
converting tacit knowledge to explicit knowledge is often time-consuming and 
problematic (Davenport & Prusak, 1998). In addition, Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995) 
argued that explicit knowledge is less important for competitive advantage because 
technological improvements allow competitors to quickly replicate such data. 
O’Hagen & Green (2002, p.50) argued that, “today, explicit knowledge can move 
across the world quickly and cheaply, and technologies such as the internet allow 
people to access explicit knowledge around the world instantaneously”. However, as 
already mentioned tacit knowledge is highly personal and can be transferred through 
face-to-face contact. 
There are a number of elements, such as cultural, technological and organisational 
factors, that affect knowledge-transfer within and between organisations. Mudambi 
& Navarra (2004, p.385) argued that, as a cultural issue related to knowledge-
sharing, “having valuable and unique knowledge gives power to the knowledge 
holders and can be used as a powerful tool within the organisation when there is a 
need for bargaining and negotiations within and between departments and 
organisations”. The knowledge holder will aim to keep his/her knowledge for further 
use rather than share it with other organisational members and share his/her own 
power with others. Bacon (2011, p.6) described knowledge as a power for the 
knowledge holder, and stated that, “power at work is the same as power in a battery; 
more voltage, more impact and your knowledge represents what you know and what 
you can do. It embodies your talent, skills, abilities, wisdom and accomplishments”.  
At an organisational level, Yan & Gray (1994) argued that knowledge of the local 
business is usually a key resource of local partners and a key source of bargaining 
power, as it makes the foreign partner dependent on the local partner. However, as a 
foreign partner increases its knowledge of the local market, instability of the 
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partnership/IJV becomes possible; the reason for this is that the foreign partner 
captures the local partner’s knowledge and decreases the ir level of dependency on 
the local partner’s knowledge, thus gaining bargaining power. On the other hand, 
Inkpen & Beamish (1997, p.188) also argued that the “local partner may acquire the 
skills and knowledge of its international partner, making the IJVs redundant, as the 
international partner’s skill and knowledge are no longer needed”.  
The concept of trust between organisations and within members becomes important 
when knowledge is going to be shared. Renzl (2008, p.206) argued that, ‘the 
influence of interpersonal trust in general and trust in management in particular on 
knowledge-sharing is evident. Trust in management increases knowledge-sharing 
through reducing fear of losing one’s unique value and improving willingness to 
document knowledge”, whilst McEvily et al., (2003, pp.92–93) argued that, “trust 
makes decision making more efficient by simplifying the acquisition and 
interpretation of information and also guides action by suggesting behaviour and 
routines that are most viable and beneficial under the assumption that the trusted 
counterpart will not exploit one’s weakness”. 
Cook & Wall (1980, p.39) identified trust as “the extent to which one is willing to 
ascribe good intentions to and have confidence in the words and actions of the 
people”, and Mayer et al., (1995, p.710) highlighted a need for “developing mutual 
trust in order to enable members of an organisation to work together more 
effectively”.   
Levin et al., (2002, p.2) clearly categorised two specific types of trust involved in the 
knowledge-sharing process within an organisation as “benevolence-based and 
competence-based trust; when most people think about trust, they are typically 
thinking of its benevolence-based form in which an individual will not intentionally 
harm another when given the opportunity to do so. However, the second type of trust 
that plays an important role in knowledge-sharing is competence-based trust which 
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describes a relationship in which an individual believes that another person or other 
party is knowledgeable about a given subject area and either type of trust can exist 
independently within an organisation”. Moreover, Argote et al., (2003, p.576) argued 
that “the fit between properties of knowledge, properties of work group, and 
properties of relationships between work groups are crucial for knowledge-sharing”, 
whilst McEvily et al., (2003) mentioned that the level of trust between members or 
two organisations influences the level of knowledge-sharing. Referring back to 
Nonaka’s model (1994), and the issues and highlighted by different scholars 
surrounding the knowledge-sharing process, it has been seen that the role of top 
management support (TMS) in both tacit and explicit knowledge-sharing within the 
organisation is evident. How to make a connection between individuals within the 
organisations has been recognised as one of the key elements in terms of successfully 
managing knowledge (McDermott, 1999).  
“Top management engages in behaviours such as becoming involved in decisions 
about project issues, monitoring project progress, facilitating information and 
knowledge flows to the project and generally showing supportive behaviour” (Green, 
1995, p.223).  
Factors such as motivation, reward, encouragement and organisations ’ regulations on 
storing and sharing knowledge play a central role in the top management support 
factor. For example, Rajan (1998), cited in Scarborough et al., (1999), explained that 
the need for rewards is a personnel need among members, which could be decided by 
top managers. In addition, Marisa & Yusof (2011) also believed that managers, as 
the key staff, have an important role to play in terms of maintaining personnel’s 
performance. Motivation is embodied in the psychological processes of asking for 
direction, giving direction, and increasing the behaviour to do something in order to 
achieve goals (Mitchell, 1982).  
118 | P a g e  
 
Desouza (2003, p.86) argued that, “top management support needs to be present and 
vocal. Two crucial reasons why organisations are unable to effectively leverage 
knowledge are because of a lack of commitment of top management to sharing 
organisational knowledge and the absence of role models who exhibit the desired 
behaviour. The Top manager must act as a catalyst or enabler through setting 
examples, engendering trust, instilling a cohesive and creative culture and 
establishing a vision”.  
 3.3.3.1. Vertical and horizontal knowledge-sharing: 
Referring back to the historical development of the NPD process mentioned earlier, 
knowledge-sharing can be seen in two main forms during these processes : firstly, 
vertical knowledge-sharing can be seen across different levels within a single 
department such as exchanging knowledge between R&D members; and secondly, 
horizontal knowledge-sharing can be seen between different departments, such as 
knowledge exchange between the R&D and Marketing departments.  
3.3.4. Inter-organisational Knowledge-sharing  
Lane et al., (2001) argued that international joint ventures have become a widespread 
type of entry into foreign markets. International joint ventures are a way for overseas 
businesses to enter a new market faster but with lower risks. Learning has always 
been recognised as one of the main motivations of joint venture establishment, and 
scholars such as Lane et al., (2001), Khanna et al., (1998), Simonin (2004) and 
Chrysostome et al., (2013, p.88) have argued in the past that, “joint ventures permit 
acquisition of new know-how and consequently present a good setting for the 
development of strategic competencies”. Nevertheless, joint ventures are not always 
a perfect answer to tacit knowledge acquisition. On the one hand, joint ventures are 
an exceptional setting for successful learning; however, on the other hand, expected 
learning may not take place, and the collaboration between the joint venture partners 
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may result in several conflicts relating to power, cultural differences or personal 
interests (Beamish, 1988). 
Lewis (1990) and Makino et al., (2007) argued that the failure rate of JVs is far 
higher than the success rate and, in addition, learning within IJVs remains a difficult 
adventure owing to cultural, institutional and geographical distances. However, 
nowadays, organisations are developing more complex networks of communication 
with their partners. Organisations must have a good strategy to retain, develop, 
organise, transfer and utilise their resources; this requires systematic knowledge 
management, which has a significant influence on a firm’s strategy formulation and 
performance (Grant, 1996; Zander & Kogut, 1995). 
Vance & Eynon (1998) and Hansen et al., (2005) believed that knowledge-transfer 
occurs when an organisation wants to increase performance of knowledge creation, 
and Ahmad & Daghfous (2010, p.155) argued that, “knowledge-transfer happened 
when a unit of an organisation is impacted by the experience or the know-how of 
another unit and this Knowledge-transfer can be practised in two areas: externally or 
internally. Companies regularly engage themselves in external knowledge-transfer 
activities such as training sessions, workshops, seminars, consulting, research and 
development activities, university courses, conferences, trade shows, government 
extension programs, and consortiums”. On the other hand, Hansen et al., (2005) 
argued that companies also “engage themselves in internal activities of knowledge-
transfer such as in house training, mentoring and departmental reporting”. The 
variety of benefits accrued through joint ventures is categorised in Table 33. 
Table 33: Potential  benefits of Joint Venture  
1 Economies of scale  
2 Access to complementary assets  
3 Cost or risk sharing  
4 Shaping the scope and basis of competition 
(Koh & Venkatraman, 1991) 
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Inkpen (2008, p.448) showed how IJVs in the automotive industry in the USA could 
work well with positive feedback, by stating that, “a JV between GM and Toyota is 
an excellent case in which to study alliance learning and knowledge-transfer. The 
narrow scope of the alliance (vehicle assembly only) provided a manageable research 
site. The evidence of knowledge-transfer to GM is the improvement in 
manufacturing productivity and product quality at GM. In 2002, GM surpassed Ford 
for the first time in the 13-year history of the influential. Also in 2002, GM became 
the first US carmaker to rank in the top three of the J.D. Power and Associates’ 
annual Initial Quality Study, which measures customer complaints in the first 90 
days of ownership and a key factor in GM’s improved quality is knowledge-
transferred from Toyota to GM, according to Gary Cowger, GM VP. “The root of 
our improvement is the Toyota Production System [TPS]. We learned from them 
[Toyota] and we have got to give credit where credit is due”. 
However, as has been acknowledged previously, there is always the risk of losing 
one side of a JV, with Yan & Gray (1994) voicing the view that the local partner’s 
knowledge makes the foreign partner dependent on the local partner; however, as th 
foreign partner increases its knowledge of local market, the instability of the IJVs 
becomes possible. The reason for this is that the foreign partner captures the local 
partner’s knowledge and decreases the ir level of dependency on the local partner’s 
knowledge. On the other hand, Inkpen & Beamish (1997, p.188) argued that the local 
partner may acquire the skills and knowledge of its international partner, making the 
IJV redundant, as the international partner’s skill and knowledge are no longer 
needed. Table 34 categorises the factors influencing IJV performance.  
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Table 34: Factors influencing IJVs performance  
Background variables  
This group contains 
factors shaping the 
domain of the venture 
partners  
 Intra-partner characteristics  
 Inter-partner fit  
 International business experience  
 Trustworthiness credentials (relational history)  
 Affin ities conducive to cooperation   
 Adequate resources 
 Towards achieving common benefits  
Antecedent variables 
This group concerns the 
structure of IJV 
development  
 Venture demographics (The age parental status of the IJV)  
 Contractual elements (governing the formal IJV agreement )  
 Managerial characteristics (objective attributes of IJV managers)  
 Subjective qualit ies such as experiential knowledge &interpersonal skills  
Core variables 
This group contains 
strategic factors  
 R&D strategy  (technologically and commercially suitable, attention to 
R&D intensity) 
 Product Strategy  
 Market strategy  
 HR strategy  
 
External variables  
Variables over which 
executive have little  or no 
control  
 Industry characteristics  
 Regulatory environment  
Outcome variables  
 Financial assessment 
 IJV stability  
 Multidimensional assessment, where drives IJV performance facets 
(market and financial outcomes together with inputs and throughputs such 
as employee morale and knowledge acquisition 
 
     (Robson, et al., 2002, pp.395-697) 
 
Besides the above-mentioned factors, elements such as absorptive capacity, learning 
and organisational performance become important for running successful IJVs.  
Cohen & Levinthal (1990, p.128) argued that, “the ability of a firm to recognise the 
value of new, external information (in this case external information from foreign 
partner), assimilate it, and apply it to commercial ends is critical to innovative 
capabilities, which are labelled as a firm’s absorptive capacity and suggest that it is 
largely a function of the firm’s level of prior knowledge”. Lane et al., (2001, p.1139) 
argued that, based on Cohen & Levinthal (1990), “first, trust between an IJV’s 
parents and the IJV’s relative absorptive capacity with the foreign parent are 
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suggested to influence its ability to understand new knowledge held by foreign 
parents. Second, an IJV’s learning structures and processes are proposed to influence 
its ability to assimilate new knowledge from those parents and finally, the IJV’s 
strategy and training competence are suggested to shape its ability to apply the 
assimilated knowledge”. The final result of Lane et al.,’s (2001) studies suggested 
that trust and management support from foreign parents are associated with IJV 
performance but not with learning. 
3.3.4.1. Trust between partners, and the ability to understand the foreign 
partner’s knowledge 
Trust at an organisational level is a vital part of absorptive capacity as it encourages 
the ‘teacher’ organisation to actively support the ‘student’ organisation to understand 
the knowledge it is offering. This is  only likely to happen if the teacher is confident 
that its partners are dependable and will fulfil their duties (Johnson et al., 1996). In 
addition, Inkpen & Beamish (1997) argued that willingness to risk weakness is one 
of the dimensions of trust. In this case, the condition for using and sharing valuable 
and hidden information and tacit knowledge is a key factor. Barney & Hansen (1994) 
also mentioned the confidence that another party not under your control will refrain 
from exploiting your vulnerabilities. Chiles & McMackin (1996) argued that, the 
greater the trust in the relationship between the IJVs, the greater the inclination for 
the parties to share and exchange information that may make them vulnerable. Lane  
et al., (2001, p.1143) argued that, “most researchers on learning in IJVs and other 
learning collaborations have implicitly assumed that each organisation has a certain 
ability to learn from other organisations. However, evidence shows that an 
organisation’s capacity to learn is not absolute but rather varies with the learning 
context”. Parkhe (1993) found that differences in partner nationality and culture will 
negatively influence the success of the IJV, mainly in terms of the ability to benefit 
from the knowledge that can be transferred from the other partner.    
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3.4.  Knowledge Management Context  
It is better to recall Quintas et al.,’s (1997, p.387) definition of knowledge 
management as, “the process of critically managing knowledge to meet existing 
needs and to identify and exploit existing and acquired knowledge assets and to 
develop new opportunities”. In addition, Nonaka (1991) argued that knowledge 
management covers a series of practices used within an organisation to identify, 
create, represent, distribute and enable acceptance of insights and experience. Such 
insights and experiences comprise knowledge, either embodied in individuals or 
embedded in organisational processes or practice. According to Barclay & Murray 
(1997), knowledge management involves making a direct connection between an 
organisation’s intellectual assets explicit (recorded) or tacit (personal know-how) and 
the business results.  
3.4.1. Institutional/Macroeconomic and Organisational Contexts  
As North (1990) asserts, institutions provide society with a structure for human 
behaviour by imposing constraints on the range of acceptable conduct. This can be 
achieved directly and most visibly through the rule of law and property rights, but 
also indirectly through common codes of practice and informally agreed modes of 
behaviour. In other words, institutions establish the basis for individual and 
collective behaviour in society. A number of different institutions impact on society 
drawn from different spheres of interest and activity. North (1990) mentioned three 
main spheres: economic, political and social. Henisz & Delios (2002, p.340) 
provided clarification for these spheres, suggesting that the institutional environment, 
“includes political institutions such as the national structure of policy making, 
regulation and adjudication; economic institutions, such as the structure of the 
national factor markets and the terms of access to international factors or production; 
and socio-cultural institutions, such as information norms”. Likewise, Dacin et al., 
(2002) argued that the majority of market activities are arranged based on the 
124 | P a g e  
 
existing institutions, embedded in economic, political and cultural arrangements. 
Institutions in this sense provide the framing point for society establishing the norms 
of behaviour. 
Oliver (1997) pointed out that organisations and firms are just as subject to the 
influence of institutions as are individuals, and argued that, “from an institutional 
perspective, firms operate within a social framework of norms, values, and taken-for-
granted assumptions about what constitutes appropriate or acceptable economic 
behaviour” (1997, p.699). In a similar vein, Zucker (1987, p.443) also asserts that, 
“institutional theories of organisations provide a rich, complex view of organisations. 
In these theories, organisations are influenced by normative pressures, sometimes 
arising from external sources such as the state, and at other times arising from within 
the organisation itself, and under some conditions these pressures lead the 
organisation being guided by legitimated elements, from standard operating 
procedure to professional certification and state requirement, which often have the 
effect of directing attention away from task performance”. The organisation and the 
individual are influenced by the institutional spheres of the economic, the political 
and the social.. This is not to say that there is a simple one-way process at work from 
institutions to organisations; rather, there are complex two-way processes at work in 
which organisations (and individuals) are also able to influence the institutions 
themselves. However, this is likely to be a slow and evolving process (North, 1990).  
One implication of this is that the shape and influence of institutions will vary from 
country to country. This will promote varying norms of ‘acceptable’ behaviour.  
Some countries may need to change their institutional arrangements in order to 
compete effectively in a global market (Rondinelli & Behrman, 2000). Ferretti & 
Parmentola (2010, p.175), for example, have argued that, “governments can promote 
realisation of knowledge spill over only if they create the condition for improving the 
absorptive capacity of local firms and the connection between local firms and foreign 
investors. Moreover, in many emerging countries, governments are directly involved 
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in relationships with the foreign investors through state-owned companies and this 
can be seen the Iranian case studies clearly”. In addition, Cummings (2003, p.1) 
reasoned that, “the literature identified a number of primary contexts that can affect 
successful knowledge-sharing implementations, including the relationship between 
the source and the recipient, the form and location of the knowledge, the recipient’s 
learning predisposition, the source’s knowledge-sharing capability and the broad 
environment in which the sharing occurs”.   
Hillman et al., (1999) argued that political ties could help organisations to gain key 
regulatory resources. Political connections provide firms with essential access to 
policy and industrial information; Suchman (1995) argued that political ties develop 
an organisation’s political legitimacy. In addition, Sheng et al., (2011) believed that 
political legitimacy helps organisations to receive special governmental treatment. 
However, in emerging countries, such as Iran, political aspects can control state-
owned organisations very easily. Nevertheless, political exchanges in such a country 
could also cause policy changes, such as changes ushered in as a result of the Iranian 
Revolution. 
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3.5.  A Brief Review of Knowledge Management in Iran 
An empirical work by Akhavan and Jafari (2008) showed that in Iran, knowledge 
management is positively linked to organisational duty, which means that 
organisations with knowledge-based missions need knowledge management more. 
However, Abdolshah and Abdolshah, (2011, p.173) argued that, the “knowledge 
management concept in Iranian institutions is almost a new subject and this concept 
in Iran has grown slowly and as a result, the research findings showed that a 
significant number of organisations have never used it and this caused their 
inefficiency and ineffectiveness”. In addition, an empirical work by Soleimani et al., 
(2013, p.3487) showed that, the “knowledge management context has not been 
institutionalised in many Iranian organisations”.  
Hassan et al., (2013, p.427) believe that based on their empirical studies, “the 
influence of the key factors of knowledge management have an important role in the 
effectiveness and improvement of the implementation of knowledge management in 
the regional companies in the north of Iran”. Khammarnia and Ramandi (2013, 
p.265) believe that “knowledge management has a relatively desirable status among 
their Iranian case studies and within their case studies it will be helpful for the 
managers to develop strategies for successful implementation of management 
techniques and processes”.  
The final result of Khammarnia and Ramandi’s (2013) research showed that among 
their case studies, knowledge management elements such as knowledge acquisition 
and knowledge creation had received less attention among their participants. 
Abdolshah and Abdolshah, (2011, p.174) argued that Iranian companies “have not 
grown much in this regard and they have issues in the initial principles of 
implementing successful knowledge management”. In conclusion, as Abdolshah and 
Abdolshah, (2011) argued, there is not enough evidence or studies concerning the 
barriers to knowledge management in Iran. Therefore, the following sections will 
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aim to identify some of the key factors related to this study that effectively facilitate 
and influence the knowledge management elements  in Iranian institutions and 
industries.  
3.5.1. Information Technology and Iranian Knowledge Management  
As already stated, information technology effectively influences knowledge 
management factors such as knowledge creation or knowledge transfer and also 
permits people to access knowledge around the world easily (Davenport et al., 1998; 
Gourlay, 2001; O’Hagen and Green, 2002). Borghoff and Pareschi (1997); 
Davenport and Prusak (1998) argued that information technology enables knowledge 
management activities to be carried out effectively and in addition, the level of 
information and communication technology usage has a positive effect on knowledge 
sharing behaviour. However, research findings within the Iranian organisation 
showed that information technology has a limited role in knowledge management 
processes among Iranian firms.  
An empirical study by Akhavan and Jafari, (2008, p.19) showed that, “Iranian SMEs 
look at IT as a tool for facilitating some of their work and processes and not as an 
important enabler for knowledge management”. Yet, researchers such as Farhanghi 
et al., (2013) and Valaei and Aziz (2012) believe that within Iranian organisations 
information technology could have a direct and indirect impact on organisational 
performance and as a result, the lack of information technology within organisations 
could pose a risk to knowledge management processes (Davenport et al., 1998; 
Gourlay 2001).  
Iranian organisations are trying hard to develop their information technology stand. 
For example, “A report showed that Iran moved up considerably, 14 places, to rank 
78 in the ICT Development Index from 2002 up to 2007”. However, Gerami (2010, 
p.329) believes that “this improvement is not enough as compared to western and 
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other developing countries in the Index (e.g. 1.Sweden, 2. South Korea, 3.Denmark, 
4.Netherlands, 5.Iceland, 10.UK, 25.Estonia, 48.Chile, 72.Armenia, 76.Jordan, 
77.Oman and 78.Iran)”.  
However, the World Bank believes that information technology expenditure per 
capita in Iran has been increasing year-by-year since 2002 till 2009 (Trading 
Economics, 2013). In conclusion, the Iranian managers believed that the greatest 
advantage of IT is concerned with the reduction of human effort. 100% of the 
managers acknowledged the need for further promotion of their skills in a wide 
variety of IT issues” (Moghaddam et al., 2013, p220).  
3.5.2. Top Management Support and Iranian Knowledge Management  
Top management support is recognised as one of the important factors for knowledge 
management, and this is especially the case in organisations where management 
takes a more active and direct role in the business and decision making (Lyles and 
Salk, 2007). Sweeney and Hardaker (1994) believed that managers need to 
understand how the processes within their organisation can be better facilitated 
through their actions. Valaei and Aziz (2012, p.12) believe that, “the level of 
knowledge management awareness amongst Iranian firms is medium, in which some 
companies understand the principles of knowledge management but they observe 
some obstacles and difficulties in pursuing a knowledge management approach”. 
Valaei and Aziz (2012) argued that there was lack of training, a lack of employee 
participation, a lack of trust, a lack of rewards for knowledge sharing, as well as an 
unwillingness to share knowledge among their Iranian case studies.   
In addition, empirical work by Akhavan and Jafari (2008) showed that within the 
Iranian firms CEO support is one of the most important factors that can facilitate and 
enable the knowledge management elements within the Iranian firms.  Another 
empirical work within the Iranian banking industry showed how top managers’ 
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attitudes in leading their organisations can help companies to achieve organisational 
innovativeness through knowledge management. Bidmeshgipour et al., (2012, p.481) 
believe that, “employees, provided with appropriate training and mentoring 
opportunities to generate novel ideas, would create new services. The mindset of the 
managers about their human resources absorbs a diversity of opinions and provides 
equal opportunity for all employees to present ideas”.  
An empirical work by Arumugam et al., (2011) showed that within Iranian 
organisations knowledge managers have key roles in initiating processes of 
organisational change with the managers leading the innovation activities. It is clear 
that within Iranian firms there is a direct link between managers’ mindsets and the 
employees, and the organisations’ knowledge creation activities, and, as Jafari et al., 
(2007) argued, top managers’ support and commitment plays a very important role in 
knowledge management adoption within Iranian organisations.  
3.5.3. Political / Economical Factors and Iranian Knowledge Management  
The current economic and political environment of Iran is a source of uncertainty and 
risk for organisations and the international political situation and economic sanctions 
have produced instability within the market and organisations (BMI, 2009). These 
macro environmental factors directly affect organisations’ performance and 
managers’ behaviour and affect the motivation of managers, incentives and financial 
rewards, management behaviour and organisational policies in Iran (Yisa, et al., 
2000).   
Political factors can be seen as one of the elements that could also affect top 
management behaviour and the knowledge management process in Iranian 
organisations. A number of scholars have argued that the government could play a 
central role in facilitating knowledge management processes. For example, Ferretti 
and Parmentola (2010,p.175) argued that, the “government and its policies in many 
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emerging countries such as Iran are directly involved in the relationship with the 
international joint ventures and knowledge sharing through state-owned companies”. 
As Abdolshah and Abdolshah, (2011) believed, in developing countries such as Iran, 
the government has the key role in developing knowledge management.  
Iranian auto Industry analyst BMI (2009) have argued that how the role of top 
management within the Iranian automotive industry could be affected by national 
and international political factors. For example, The Financial Times (March 2012), 
showed that Peugeot had suspended its knowledge sharing/transfer activities with its 
local partner IKCO after expansion of the Iranian sanctions by the US government.  
The Financial Times (March 2012) reported that most of the French experts had left 
Iran until further notice and as a result of this, the process of knowledge 
transfer/sharing and knowledge creation between Iran and France, had not yet been 
completed.  
There is also evidence that national political factors could affect knowledge 
management elements within Iranian organisations. For example, IKCO’s former 
CEO mentioned that how the organisation’s long and short term plan in terms of 
knowledge transfer and technology transfer between IJVs and IKCO could easily 
have been affected as a result of government changes in Iran (Khabar Online, 2012).  
Lakshmanan (2013) believes that the recent nuclear deal between Iran and “3+3 
Group” (UK, USA, Germany, France, Russia and China) will open a new door for 
the Iranian auto industry to re-establish its collaboration with European automakers, 
as the political and economic sanctions against Iran suspended all knowledge and 
technology transfers from their IJVs. Hatami and Behsan (2012) have argued that 
Iranian economic and political conditions are considered as significant risks for 
Iranian managers and organisations.  
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3.5.4. Role of trust among Iranian organisations   
Scholars such as Chiles and McMackin (1996) believed that when the level of trust 
among organisational members and business partners increases, this also influences 
and increases the sharing and exchange of information among members and between 
organisations. However, Parkhe (1993) argued that differences in partners’ cultures 
will negatively influence this knowledge sharing. Al-Abrrow et al., (2013) argued 
that among their Iranian cases, the concept of trust had a significant impact on 
organisational performance.  
Khanifar et al., (2012, p.2698) conducted their empirical work among 300 employees 
of an Iranian national company and found that, a “low level of trust caused 
increasing stress, decreasing efficiency and a lack of creativity, and on the other 
hand, a high level of the trust caused increasing employee motivation, decreasing 
absence and increasing creativity of the organisation”. In addition, another empirical 
work by Mahdavi- fard et al., (2013) conducted within an Iranian case study found 
that organisational culture and organisational trust has impacts on organisational 
performance.  
Mahdavi- fard et al., (2013, p.166) found that, “within the Iranian organisation there 
is a relationship between organisational culture and its components and 
organisational trust of the employees. Culture plays an important role in every 
organisation because it fosters the interaction of individuals inside the organisation. 
Therefore, trust is under the influence of the main culture of the society (national 
culture) and the organisational culture”.  Rezaeian et al., (2013) believe that 
organisational trust has a positive effect on Iranian organisation performance.  
3.5.5. Knowledge sharing and acquisition in Iranian organisations   
Tohidian and Mosakhani (2010, p.611) argued that, ‘Organisational climate in Iran 
had a positive impact on knowledge sharing and the level of information and 
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communication technology usage reflected a positive effect on the organisational 
knowledge sharing”. Tohidian and Mosakhani (2010, p.619) found that among their 
Iranian case studies, “the employees who felt that by sharing their knowledge they 
would contribute to the achievement of desired outcomes were more likely to share 
their knowledge. This means that employees’ assumptions about their future 
relationships with other organisational members will improve their attitudes towards 
knowledge sharing”.  
In addition, Khohansal et al., (2013, p.293) also found that “there is a significant 
positive relationship between knowledge sharing and employee performance among 
their Iranian cases”. Tohidian and Mosakhani (2010) believed that since knowledge 
sharing is a very important behaviour, a successful reward system needs to be 
encouraging and goal oriented. The rewards systems that workforces do not notice as 
contingent or performance based might fail to support a knowledge-sharing attitude 
within the Iranian organisation.  Zohoori et al., (2013, p.726) conducted research 
among Iranian Electronic firms and, “investigated the effects of explicit knowledge 
sharing and tacit knowledge sharing on the quality and speed of innovation, and the 
findings indicated that effects are positive and significant”. The main contribution of 
this section was to provide empirical evidence for the role of knowledge 
management in Iran and among Iranian organisations.   
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3.6.  The Research Framework 
The Research Framework 
Research Focus 
Knowledge management in the NPD process  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: The research frame work 
 
Macro Environment: 
Political regimes/stability, legal issues (especially intellectual property rights), 
supply and demand, industry dynamism, technological, institutional framework  
Organisational Contexts: 
Top management support/management control, organisational structure, 
organisational culture, information technology, organisational culture, and 
organisational policies  
Knowledge-sharing 
through knowledge 
repository in R&D 
department         
(explicit knowledge) 
Knowledge-
sharing through 
interaction & 
socialisation  (tacit 
knowledge) 
Knowledge 
creation 
process 
Vertical 
Knowledge-
sharing along R&D 
reporting line 
 
Knowledge-sharing 
between R&D 
department & 
other departments  
 
Inter-organisational 
Knowledge acquisition 
(With international 
partners) 
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3.7.  Conclusion 
This study is a further step towards providing fresh insights into and expanding the 
body of writing on the NPD process. This literature review brings together a number 
of the key elements and issues from the knowledge management literature in order to 
develop a better understanding of the NPD process. Knowledge-transfer, knowledge-
creation, and organisational learning within the NPD process have been examined. 
Knowledge-based theory of the firm and the role of knowledge management and its 
elements in the new product development process have been reviewed. The role of 
knowledge-sharing and knowledge-transfer in the new product development process 
has been explored, and the potential contribution and outcome of the research have 
been highlighted as being to investigate the new product development process from 
the knowledge-based perspective, and accordingly to examine knowledge-sharing 
and the knowledge-transfer processes in the new product development process. It has 
been argued that new products are consumer and industrial products, offered for the 
first time. Successful new product development, therefore, at least partially depends 
on the ability to understand technological and market knowledge, and experience and 
expertise embodied in existing products and employees’ mind, and then adopt this 
knowledge to support new product development. 
The resource-based view argued that firms with valuable, rare and unique resources 
have the potential to achieve better performance. A firm’s resources, at a given time, 
could be defined as those tangible and intangible assets, such as brand name, in-
house knowledge of technology, and the employment of skilled personnel, as well as 
all assets, capabilities, processes, firm attributes, information and knowledge. The 
resource-based view explained that a firm’s sustainable competitive advantage is 
reached by virtue of unique resources, and in addition, the knowledge-based view of 
the firm explored the ways in which firms combined and transformed those valuable, 
unique input resources to the final performance.  
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It has been argued that organisational knowledge is an important collection of 
intangible resources that could be the source of sustainable competitive advantage. 
The knowledge-based view of the firm argued that knowledge is the most exclusive 
and unique resource, which allows a firm to combine and coordinate the resources 
available to all in new ways, thereby providing more value to its customers than its 
competitors. The literature showed that the knowledge-based view of the firm puts 
particular emphasis on the interaction amongst individuals, knowledge-sharing and 
knowledge-creation. Developing a knowledge-based view of the firm raised the 
issue: what is knowledge? 
Knowledge was identified as an organisational asset with uniqueness and originality, 
and the best way of understanding knowledge better is to identify differences 
between information, data and knowledge. Knowledge becomes visible when 
experienced persons put into practice lessons learned over time. In developing an 
understanding of knowledge within an organisation, a distinction between tacit and 
explicit knowledge was suggested. Explicit knowledge was identified as knowledge 
that can be codified and documented and tacit knowledge was identified as 
knowledge that cannot be articulated or verbalised. Tacit knowledge is embedded in 
the background and experience of an individual or a group. Tacit knowledge can be 
understood best as knowledge that has not yet been abstracted from practice; on the 
other hand, explicit knowledge or codified knowledge is easier to use within an 
organisation because of its transferability. However, it has been argued that tacit 
knowledge may offer more sustainable competitive advantage to the organisation.  
The main challenge of this thesis is to explore the conversion of tacit knowledge. It is 
argued that knowledge that is tacit and highly personal has little value until it can be 
converted into explicit knowledge that other members of the organisation can share. 
However, such conversion exposes the knowledge to the risk of imitation by other 
firms and competitors. 
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Knowledge management covers a series of practices adopted within an organisation 
to identify, create, represent, distribute and enable the adoption of insights and 
experience. Such insights and experiences comprise knowledge either embodied in 
individuals or embedded in organisational processes and practice.  Knowledge 
management has been described as the formalisation of and access to experience, 
knowledge and expertise that create new capabilities, enable superior performance, 
and encourage innovation and new product development processes. Knowledge 
management is making a direct connection between organisations’ intellectual assets 
- explicit (recorded) or tacit (personal know-how) - and the business results. These 
knowledge management processes can be subdivided into creating knowledge and 
transferring knowledge - from either outside or within the organisation. In addition, 
organisational learning has been introduced as a way in which firms build, 
supplement and organise knowledge and routines around their activities and within 
their cultures, and adapt and develop organisational efficiency by improving the use 
of the broad skills of their workforces. It has been argued that the main purpose of 
transferring knowledge within and between organisations is to learn from other parts. 
In addition, a number of knowledge management elements that have an impact on 
learning in the new product development process have been reviewed.  
The concept of knowledge-transfer, as one of the key elements of the knowledge-
based theory of the firm, was explored; it was argued that the main purpose of 
transferring knowledge within and between organisations is to learn from other parts 
of the organisation. Knowledge-transfer has been defined as the transfer of skills, 
technologies, business practices and data between organisational subunits. The main 
focus of knowledge-transfer in the thesis was how to transfer tacit knowledge 
effectively, and four different types of tacit knowledge-transfer were introduced to 
identify the ways in which organisations transfer their different tacit knowledge. This 
thesis seeks knowledge-transfer as the communication of knowledge from a source 
so that it is learned and applied by a recipient.  
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The last section of the knowledge-based theory of the firm ended with the 
knowledge-creation concept, which has been identified as the process of making 
available and amplifying knowledge created by individuals, as well as crystallising 
and connecting it with an organisation’s knowledge system; in other words, what 
individuals come to know in their work/life benefits their colleagues, organisational 
knowledge-creation theory explains. The research explored different knowledge 
creation models, and a number of knowledge-creation facilitators have been 
introduced.  
Another main challenge of this research was to identify the new product 
development process and accordingly to explore the relationship between the 
knowledge-based view’s elements and the new product development process. Based 
on this aim, the research has introduced the historical developments of the new 
product development process. Various NPD models have focused only on internal 
activities and internal R&D projects, and have ignored communication with outside 
their departments/organisations, and they have also ignored the use of external 
knowledge and external resources. Models such as the department stage and activity 
stage models work in a quite isolated and closed environment and this could be one 
of the main reasons why they have been named closed models. A lack of feedback 
from one market or from neighbouring departments or external organisations has 
been identified. One model directed attention specifically to individual and internal 
goals. Other models, such as the coupling model, the integrated model, the decision-
stage model, and the conversion-process model, directed attention towards the 
feedback source. They made quite reasonable internal linkages between departments 
and individuals, internal knowledge-transfer, and the knowledge-creation process 
between departments and individuals; however, some factors, such as external 
elements (government policy, regulations) and external R&D (knowledge-transfer 
from outside organisation), have been ignored during the new product development 
process. These models consist of members from different functional areas with 
differing knowledge, which have the advantage of providing multiple sources of 
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information from within an organisation. However, transferring new knowledge from 
outside the organisation has no role in such models.  
Finally, some other models, such as the response model, cross-functional team and 
NPD network model, emphasise the external linkages coupled with the internal 
activities. These models suggest that the new product development process should be 
viewed as the knowledge-accumulation process, which requires inputs from a wide 
variety of sources outside the organisation. It has been argued that each new product 
development process model captures the academic knowledge of the time and 
summarises perceptions of best practice. Each model generates a useful insight into 
the nature of the new product development process and decision-making requirement 
at the level of the firm, pointing to important links between the NPD process and 
other key processes both within the firm (marketing, manufacturing, management) 
and external to the firm (e.g. the science and technology environment and external 
R&D). Lately, researchers have introduced and classified three models of new 
product development process: 
 
 The linear model  
 The coupling model  
 The interactive model. 
The linear model represents NPD as a sequential and ordered process of four or five 
stages of activities and decisions. The linear model has been seen as an improved 
version of the coupling, departmental stage and activity stage models, which include 
concept development, product design, testing and validation, and product launch. 
The inputs into the system are new ideas and market needs. Under the linear model, 
the NPD process can be seen as a series of activities carried out one after another. 
Sometimes the model makes marketing and market research vital to the NPD 
process, and sometimes, much like the pure technology push models, it ignores other 
important aspects of the new product development processes, including the working 
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relationship with customers, and feedback loops from later or earlier stages. The 
coupling model is a highly simplified but nevertheless more representative model of 
the NPD process, and unlike the liner models, it explicitly links the decision-making 
of firms to the science and technology community and the marketplace. The coupling 
model is non- linear with feedback loops. Basic knowledge-transfer and internal 
knowledge-creation have been recognised. Reviewing the NPD process literature 
clearly identified that it is not necessary to have all knowledge management elements 
in a single model of the NPD process. For example, knowledge-transfer between 
departments in linear models is not clearly identified: the department is working in 
an isolated environment and passing its project to the next department without real 
communication or a feedback loop from the earlier or later stages. In the linear 
model, it is difficult to state what is going on at each stage in the different 
departments. Knowledge-transfer from outside the unit is not recognised. The 
interactive model is a major improvement on all earlier models, and explicitly and 
implicitly attempts to address most of the weaknesses outlined previously. Unlike 
earlier models, feedback loops from different stages are recognised. Environmental 
factors are recognised in this model. The interactive model mostly has all of the 
knowledge management elements, as highlighted previously in this thesis. Strong 
networks between departments and organisations, and effective knowledge-transfer 
and knowledge-creation between individuals and departments have been identified.  
Having the interactive model as a guide for this research gives the opportunity to 
examine and identify the research.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
 
4.1.  Introduction 
This chapter explains and justifies the methods used for collecting the data and 
information in this academic research in order to satisfy the research objectives posed 
and to answer the research questions. It is an explanation of the research strategy and 
the multi-stage process that was undertaken in order to answer the research questions 
and complete this research project.  In particular the choice of a qualitative research 
strategy is discussed and evaluated.  
Initially, the broad characteristics of business management research are discussed, 
and a variety of potential research strategies in the management field are explored in 
order to present a foundation to explain how the most suitable research strategy was 
chosen. The choice of a single embedded case study strategy for this research project 
is explained and justified. The research design, the sampling procedures adopted and 
the type of data collection employed are then discussed. As part of this discussion, the 
construction of the interview questions as the main research instrument is also 
explored. Finally, the chapter concludes with an account of the methodology used to 
analyse the data collected. Issues relating to the validity, reliability and 
generalisability of the research are also discussed.  
4.2.  Research Philosophy 
Before starting the research, it is important to justify the philosophical viewpoint and 
the position of the researcher. Research philosophy is a reflection of a researcher’s 
approach to understanding the world that he or she investigates (Kvale, 1996; 
Saunders et al., 2003). As such, it is important that the researcher is aware of the 
philosophical commitments that they make through their choice of research strategy 
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since this has significant impact not only on what the researcher does but also in 
understanding what they are going to investigate (Saunders et al., 2003; Johnson & 
Clark, 2006). It is also necessary for the researcher to be clear as to what is being 
researched and the manner in which knowledge is gained (Snap & Spencer, 2003).  
To begin this process of reflection and justification, the following section first 
explores the underlying broad research paradigms that are known to exist. The 
philosophy of each paradigm is set out and discussed before the researcher’s choice is 
established. Adopting a research philosophy means adopting important statements 
about the ways in which the researcher views the world of their research area. In the 
following sections, two of the main research philosophies are reviewed before the 
research philosophy for this thesis is settled and discussed.  
4.2.1. Interpretivist 
The interpretive approach views the environment not as an objective independent 
reality but rather as closely bound with the views and perceptions of the individual. 
Rather than objectivity, the interpretive approach argues that understanding complex 
human interaction requires interpretation based on the “the subjective states of the 
people acting in it” (Wellington & Szczerbinski, 2007, p.220). In the interpretive 
paradigm, the researcher is not assumed to be totally objective; rather, they (their 
thinking and principles) become part of the research process itself (Rowland, 2005). 
This seeks to recognise that the researcher is potentially “biased by their own 
background, knowledge and prejudices to see things in certain ways and not others” 
(Walsham, 2006, p.321). At heart, as Saunders et al., (2009) have argued, the 
interpretive approach is very important part of the positivist tradition, considering that 
the business and management globe is far too complex to lend itself to theorising 
definite ‘laws’ in the same way as the physical sciences. Furthermore, the interpretive 
approach argues that because the world is complex, if such complication was reduced 
entirely to a series of law-like generalisations, our understanding of reality would be 
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compromised and uninformed. If a researcher accepts such a view his or her research 
philosophy is likely to be closer to the interpretive approach. Unlike the positivist 
stance, physical- law-like generalisations are not the end product; rather, 
understanding through detailed descriptions is sought by answering questions such as 
what, why, and how (Walsham, 2006).  
Given that the central aim of this thesis is to study and explore knowledge-sharing in 
NPD processes, an interpretive approach would appear to be more suitable in terms of 
philosophical stance. This is because, as established in Chapter 3, knowledge is 
inherently rooted within the experience and expertise of individuals. The transfer of 
this knowledge between individuals requires the parties to this exchange to establish 
shared contexts and mental models. In other words, the perception of individuals as to 
how they relate to the world around them is important to the success of this study. 
Exploring these beliefs and perceptions would be difficult to achieve using a 
positivist approach since the subjectivity of the individual is a prime focus. As 
Saunders et al. (2003, p.84 ) noted, “it is therefore the role of the interpretivist to seek 
to understand the subjective reality of those that the researchers study in order to be 
able to make sense of and understand their motives, actions and intentions in a way 
that is meaningful for the research participants”.  
Accordingly, this study adopts an interpretive approach in an effort to explore the 
beliefs and motivations of individuals within the NPD process. It is important to 
mention that generalisation is not the aim of this study and the researcher is only 
going to focus on the Iranian Auto industry, specifically IKCO. The researcher should 
understand complex human interaction from different departments and managerial 
levels within the case study. In this study the researcher is not totally objective and 
participants’ thinking and opinions become part of the research process. It is clear 
that the researcher does not have any power over the case study environment and the 
participants are going to answer the questions freely based on their own background, 
opinions and will.  This study, as a piece of interpretive research, argues that data and 
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sources are linked with methodologies that highlight and focus on the experiences of 
the researched group or individual during their work.  
4.2.2. Research Approaches: Quantitative and Qualitative  
The quantitative study is based on quantitative information, such as numbers and 
figures, whilst qualitative studies are based on qualitative information, such as words, 
sentences and narratives. There are scholars who make a distinction between 
qualitative and quantitative research and others who show a strong preference for one 
or other type of study (Bryman & Bell, 2007). However, these predilections more 
likely reflect their own capabilities and experiences than a general idea about which 
type of research is more useful. As Cooper & Schindler (2008, p.192) noted, “in 
many social sciences, such as management studies, sociology, psychology, there is no 
such clear predominance of qualitative or quantitative studies”. It should be 
emphasised that neither qualitative nor quantitative studies are better than the other; 
essentially, what matters are the research questions under consideration and how they 
might be answered. 
For the purposes of this study, a mixed strategy is adopted that combines both a 
quantitative and qualitative approach. Given that the researcher is interested in 
knowledge flows within the NPD process, the context in which such knowledge 
flows within organisations is important. This means that quantitative information can 
be helpful in establishing the broad context within which organisations operate. Here, 
for example, market and organisational characteristics, such as the number of 
competitors, the size and growth companies, and the profitability of the organisation 
can be useful. However, by itself, such objective and standardised information is 
insufficient to allow the researcher to understand the motivations and behaviour of 
individual actors in the knowledge flow process because quantitative data seeks to 
iron out contextually sensitive information. As Dabbs (1982, p.32) cautions, 
“qualitative research refers to the meanings, concepts, definitions, characteristics, 
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metaphors, symbols and descriptions of things. In contrast, quantitative research 
refers to counts and measures of things”.  
For our purposes, qualitative information is flexible and more sensitive to differing 
contexts in which words, sentences and pictures are used to describe situations 
(Mason, 2002). Fundamentally, this research attempts to understand social 
phenomena through differing individual behaviour. In order to achieve this, the 
qualitative strategy relies on logical inference (Hinton et al., 2003) and is sensitive to 
the human situation as it involves dialogue with informants (Kvale, 1996). In general, 
the researcher collects large quantities of detailed evidence, which helps to achieve 
depth and a detailed insight (Blaxter et al., 1996; Snape & Spencer, 2003; Ticehurst 
& Veal, 2000). Furthermore, qualitative methods are useful when the researcher is 
seeking to focus on a dynamic process, such as knowledge flows, as this requires a 
deeper understanding of behaviour and the meaning and context of complex 
phenomena (Grunden, 2002; Snape & Spencer, 2003).  
Additionally, Saunders et al., (2003) argued that, when researchers explore the data 
produced by a qualitative study, they are able to draw some major distinctions from 
those that result from quantitative work. However, this requires attention and ability 
on the researcher’s part, and the ability to make a critical assessment of informants’ 
comments. It involves debating the reasons for adopting a course of action, and 
challenging and recognising the way in which decisions inform the research (Mason, 
2002). The strength of a qualitative approach is that issues can be clarified and 
justifications for behaviour can be exposed (Gillham, 2008).  
In adopting a qualitative approach, the researcher was able to get the inside 
experiences of individuals to verify how meanings are formed. The main benefit of 
the qualitative methods used in this research was the employment of open-ended 
questions, which provided participants with the opportunity to react in their own 
words rather than pushing and forcing them to decide from fixed and set responses, as 
145 | P a g e  
 
is the case with quantitative methods. Another benefit of using qualitative methods in 
this thesis was the flexibility that the researcher had to search the initial participant 
responses to ask why or how. The researcher could then pay attention to what 
participants said, and could engage with them according to their individual 
personalities, expertise, experience and styles.  
 4.3.  Research Strategies 
Having settled on an interpretive stance and having adopted a combined quantitative 
and qualitative approach, the next task was to choose an appropriate research 
strategy. There are a number of research strategies that can be applied in designing 
and running a research study. In general, a research strategy seeks to cover all phases 
of design, data collection, analysis and conclusion of the findings. A number of 
research strategies are in use in the management field including: experiments, 
surveys, histories, analyses of archival information and case studies. Yin (1994, p.1) 
argues that, “each of these strategies has its own advantages and disadvantages, 
depending on three conditions:  
1) The form of research questions posed; 
2) The extent of control a research has over actual behaviour;  
3) The degree of focus on contemporary as opposed to historical phenomena”.  
4.3.1. Alternative Research Strategies  
A research strategy is concerned with the high- level framework used to address the 
research questions (Saunders et al., 2009), and serves as a basis for confirming the 
validity of findings. Yin (1994) has categorised the five most commonly used 
research strategies, as set out in Table 35.  
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Table 35: Relevant situations for di fferent research strategies  
 
Research strategy 
Form of research 
questions 
Control over 
behavioral events 
Focuses on 
contemporary 
events 
Experiments  What , how , why Yes  Yes 
Surveys 
What, who, where, 
how many , how much  
No Yes 
Archival analysis 
What, who, where, 
how many, how much  
No Yes / No 
Histories What , how , why  No No 
Case studies What, how , why  No Yes 
(Yin, 1994, p.6) 
 
A basic form for research questions is: who, what, where, how or why. If a research 
question adopts a ‘what’ type of question, two possibilities are achievable. First, the 
‘what’ question could be exploratory; for example, what are the ways in which an IJV 
company operates? Exploratory questions like this can be used within any of the 
research strategies. The second ‘what’ question could be in terms of how many or 
how much; for example; what has been the result of investment on the marketing 
budget? The results of these kinds of question usually come from survey or archive 
analysis because they tend to be seeking closed rather than open-ended answers. In 
the same way, ‘who’ and ‘where’ questions are likely to favour a survey or archival 
analysis strategy. If a research study asks ‘how’ or ‘why’ types of questions - which 
are more explanatory in nature - then the use of experiments, histories or case studies 
are more appropriate. As Yin (1994, p.6) argued, “this is because such questions deal 
with operational links needing to be traced over time, rather than more frequencies or 
incidence”.  
In an experimental method, a researcher can control behaviour directly; this can either 
happen in a laboratory where an experiment may focus on one or two variables, or it 
can be achieved in field research where the researcher treats the subjects being 
investigated. Survey and archival analysis methods do not require any control over 
behavioural results. Histories focus on the past, and the investigator has no control 
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over or access to any behavioural events; instead, the focus is placed on documents, 
cultural and physical materials as the main sources of evidence. Similarly, the case 
study does not manipulate the behavioural elements being studied.  
Yin (2003) stresses that it is important to emphasise that no research strategy can be 
called better or poorer than any other. Much more fundamental is the selection of the 
most appropriate strategy, which would enable the researcher to answer his or her 
particular research questions and meet his or her objectives. It should be remembered 
that research strategies should not be thought of as being mutually exclusive: it is 
possible to employ the survey strategy as part of a case study (Saunders et al., 2009). 
Based on Yin’s categorisation in Table 10, this research will utilise the what, how and 
why type of questions. In addition and referring to Table 10 only experiments, 
histories or the case study strategy is suitable for this research since the researcher has 
no control over the behavioural events being investigated. Moreover, in exploring 
knowledge flows, this research examines not only the role played by individuals but 
also the surrounding personal context, perceptions and motivations. This research is 
based on a case study approach; it is important to identify the research design as well. 
Yin (1994, p.2) argued that, “a research design can be seen as a technical plan that 
attempts to link the beginning and the ending of a study. The research design role is 
to ensure that the evidence to be collected is pertinent to the study”. The research 
design is similar to an instruction that helps the researcher during his/her data 
collection and analysis to understand those data. At the end, he or she will come to 
their conclusion, and there will be the possibility of generating a theory or developing 
the current theories. 
Eisenhardt (1989) argued that case studies can be used to offer an explanation, to 
investigate theory or to create theory. In this case study, there is the potential for all 
three of the possibilities mentioned. In this single case study, most of Eisenhardt’s 
(1989) suggestions were followed. Steps such as the usage of qualitative and 
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quantitative data, the definition of research questions, focusing on a specific 
population, applying multiple data collection methods, and finally analysing data and 
comparison with the literature review were all applied. It is important to mention that 
the use of several investigators is not recommended for this single case study as it is 
believed that it should be carried out and undertaken individually. The data collection 
method is the next step after identifying the research strategy. It is important to 
establish how the researcher gathered his data from his case study. Thus, in the 
following section, the methods applied by the researcher to gather the data during the 
research will be discussed. 
4.3.2. Case Study  
Yin (2003, p.13) defined a case study as, “an empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real life context, when the gap between the 
phenomenon and the context are not clearly obvious, and in which multiple sources 
of evidence are used”. The intention here is that the case study is appropriate to 
probing type questions (what, how and why) in an effort to uncover the underlying 
processes at work. Since the focus is on understanding the phenomenon, multiple 
methods of data collection can be deployed. This is a strong advantage of the case 
study because the multiple methods of data collection enable the researcher to 
examine closely, in substantial detail, the phenomenon under focus (Gallier, 1992). 
Consequently, and as a result, no single method of data collection is associated with 
the case study approach (Gerring, 2007).  
The case study typically requires deep focus on the object being studied; this requires 
the researcher to accept the role of observer (Gerring, 2007). Typically, the case study 
is rooted within a naturally occurring, often contemporary, situation (Benbasat et al., 
1987). This makes the case study particularly suited to research that is exploratory in 
nature (Whelan & McGrath, 2001). The case study approach can also be deployed in 
explanatory or descriptive research (Cooper & Schindler, 2008).  
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The case study methodology is versatile in that it can be applied to a wide variety of 
contexts. Gillham (2008), for instance, argued that a case study can be on an 
individual or a group (such as a family, a class, an office or a hospital area) or it can 
include an association (for example, a school, children’s home or a factory). It can 
equally be on a major community, a town or an industry. The case study method is 
thus not restrictive and can either be applied as a single case or can incorporate 
multiple cases such as a number of single parents, several schools or two different 
professions.  
A case study can be used to validate existing theories whereby the researcher 
develops a theoretical conjecture from the evidence collected (Remenyi et al., 1998). 
However, the case study approach is also appropriate in conditions where a single 
explanation cannot present a full view of the research topic. It is appropriate to 
achieve an in-depth, holistic knowledge of broad, complex phenomena, and an 
understanding of interactive processes, relationships, political issues and influence 
tactics within specific contexts. Therefore, it offers greater depth of enquiry than 
other methods. Considering the focus of this thesis, the ability to intensively probe 
and investigate organisational processes and individual behaviour in a modern setting 
using a variety of data sources suggests that the case study approach is an appropriate 
choice for this research. Nonetheless, a major criticism of the case study approach is 
the problem of generalisability which is to be addressed later in this chapter. 
4.3.3. Embedded Case Study 
Yin (2003) argued that an embedded case study is a case study containing more than 
one sub-unit of analysis. Similar to a case study, an embedded case study 
methodology provides a means of integrating quantitative and qualitative techniques 
into a single research study. Moreover, the recognition of sub-units allows for a more 
detailed level of inquiry. The embedded case study is an empirical form of inquiry 
appropriate for descriptive studies, where the goal is to analyse the features, context, 
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and processes of an event (Scholz & Tietje, 2002; Yin, 2003). The chosen case study 
is the Iran Khodro Company (IKCO); this is the most important car manufacturer in 
Iran, the Middle East and North Africa, and currently (in 2011) employs over 53,000 
workers and holds over 50% of the local car market in Iran. IKCO is of interest 
because it acts as one of the main sites for Peugeot in the region, and exports 
passenger and commercial vehicles to over 30 different countries. IKCO plays a very 
important role in the country’s economy, and also influences other domestic 
industries. Government reports show that nearly a half a million people have a 
business relationship directly with IKCO in Iran. IKCO is one of the best cases to 
explore the research questions because the company jointly (IJVs, Peugeot) and 
independently produces a number of different brands of automotives. This 
characteristic of Iran Khodro (IKCO) provides opportunities to investigate the NPD 
process (within IKCO) in contrasting settings. Furthermore, IKCO’s NPD process has 
not been explored previously in the literature, and so this gives an opportunity to 
provide fresh insights into knowledge-transfer/storage in the NPD process, especially 
within the Iranian context. 
4.4.  Evaluation of the Research 
The main reason for setting up a good research design is to present the best possible 
logic that can make a connection between the collected data, questions and findings. 
It is the researcher’s responsibility to judge the quality of design on the basis of 
standard logical tests that are used in academic research in the business and 
management fields. Kidder (1981), cited in Yin (1994, pp.40–41), introduced four 
possible logical tests as follows:  
 “Construct validity: establishing correct operational measures for the 
concepts being studied.  
 Internal validity: establishing a causal relationship, whereby certain 
conditions are shown to lead to other conditions, as distinguished from 
spurious relationships. 
151 | P a g e  
 
 External validity (or generalisability): establishing the domain to which a 
study’s findings can be generalised.  
 Reliability: demonstrating that the operations of a study – such as the data 
collection procedures can be repeated, with the same results”.  
Table 36 shows the four tests and case study methods for dealing with them.  
Table 36: Tests of validity, generalisability and reliability 
 
Test Case-study tactics Phase of research 
Construct validity  
 Use multip le sources of evidence 
 Have key informants review draft case 
study report  
 Data collection  
 Composition 
Internal validity  
 Do pattern matching  
 Do explain ing building  
 Data analysis  
 Data analysis  
Generalisability  
 Use replication logic, as opposed to 
statistical logic, in multiple case studies  
 Research design   
Reliab ility  
 Use case study protocol  
 Develop case study data base 
 Data collection  
 Data collection  
 (Yin, 1994, p.33)  
 
The methods of evaluating the validity, reliability and generalisability of positivist 
research are regarded as being of relatively little significance by many qualitative 
researchers for judging the qualities of their interpretive investigations (Mason, 
2002).  
4.4.1. Generalisability 
Generalisability is concerned with how the findings generated in one setting can be 
applied to other settings (Yin, 2003). The extent to which case studies can be 
considered generalisable or not depends upon the number of case studies undertaken 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 1991). This is because a single case study can be subject to 
“several potential biases, such as the misjudgement of the representativeness of a 
single event, exaggeration of the salience of a datum because of its ready availability, 
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or biasing of estimates because of unconscious anchoring and multiple cases augment 
external validity and help guard against observer biases” (Leonard-Barton, 1990, 
p.250). However, statistical generalisability to a broad population is not necessarily 
the objective in qualitative research; rather, the main focus is directed towards 
ensuring appropriate demonstration of the study’s events as well as understanding the 
key issues under investigation. In such situations, Saunders et al., (2009) noted that 
the purpose of the research would not be to produce a theory that is generalisable to 
all populations, but more modestly to a particular context. They went on to argue that, 
“in short, as long as a researcher does not claim that their results, conclusions or 
theories can be generalised, then there is no problem” (Saunders et al., 2009, p.158). 
This research is set within a single company, and is specific to this context. As such 
the researcher recognises the limits of extending the findings from this study into a 
broader context. However, where situations can be identified as being identical in 
context, the findings from this study can also be extended (Sekaran & Bougie, 2010).  
Consequently, in this research there is no expectation of generalisability resulting 
from the single case study (embedded-case study). The aim of this research is to 
understand the knowledge flows occurring within Iran Khodro (IKCO). The results of 
the study are, at best, generalisable only to other situations and set tings sharing the 
same context as the case study; these are most likely to be other domestic car 
companies operating within the Iranian auto industry. There are only a limited 
number of automakers (25 auto makers) in Iran, and IKCO is known as the most 
important auto maker not only in Iran but also in the Middle-East, Central Asia and 
North Africa (to be discussed in Chapter Four).  
4.4.2. Validity  
Validity is a test of “how well an instrument that is developed measures the particular 
concept it is intended to measure. In other words, validity is concerned with whether 
we measure the right concept” (Sekaran & Bougie, 2010, p.157). From an 
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interpretivist perspective, validity refers to how well the research method investigates 
what it intends to (Mason, 2002), as well as the degree to which the researcher gained 
full access to informants knowledge and meanings (Remenyi et al., 1998). Validity is 
concerned with whether or not the findings are really about what they appear to be 
about (Saunders et al., 2009). The vital issue in qualitative research is achieving an 
equivalent of understanding between the informant and the researcher (Lewis & 
Ritchie, 2003), as well as ensuring that the research is reliable. This involves 
demonstrating that the research design accurately identifies and describes the 
phenomenon under investigation. A number of authors have suggested strategies to 
enhance the validity of qualitative studies. For example, Mason (2002) discussed the 
need to demonstrate the validity of data generation and the validity of the researcher’s 
explanations. Validity of data generation is concerned with how appropriate and 
suitable a specific research method is in terms of answering the research questions 
and providing explanations. On the other hand, Lewis & Ritchie (2003) suggested 
that it is also useful to consider the qualitative study’s internal and external validity. 
Internal validation is improved by adopting a constant comparative method and 
recognising the importance of unexpected cases when acquiring a greater 
understanding of theory development.  
This study, as mentioned earlier, utilises multiple sources of data collection including 
interview and documentary sources. The case study technique was used to validate 
existing theories whereby the researcher develops a theoretical assumption from the 
evidence collected (Remenyi et al., 1998). As discussed, the case study method is 
considered appropriate in situations where a single explanation cannot provide a 
complete view of the research topic. It is also suitable for researching in-depth, 
complex phenomena and understanding relationships, political issues and influence 
tactics within specific contexts. With reflection of validity in mind, this study adopted 
the use of semi-structured interviews to collect detailed descriptions and multiple 
informant views to be gathered on a reasonably consistent basis. Validity of 
interpretation is also concerned with how believable the data analysis process and the 
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researcher’s interpretations are; this is dependent on the validity of the research 
method especially the approaches taken in data analysis and the transparency of the 
researcher’s interpretation.  
It was impossible for the researcher to collect and analyse all of the data available to 
him as a result of time, money and access restrictions. Choosing the most appropriate 
case from a number of available cases helped to reduce the amount of data needed by 
considering only data from a subgroup rather than all possible cases or elements. A 
sample group of employees and managers was therefore chosen for interview 
(Saunders et al., 2009). Care was taken to ensure that the sample chosen was 
representative of the organisation. However, there was still the risk that relying too 
much on just a few key informants could pose problems in terms of the validity of the 
study if the candidates/interviewees presented a prejudiced picture of the case issues. 
To mitigate this risk, candidates were selected from different departments and from 
different managerial levels with a broad range of work experience. In addition, the 
semi structured interview style adopted enabled the researcher to explore in-depth 
specific areas of interest. Data triangulation with company documents was also used 
to evaluate the validity of the interviewees’ responses. In this study, the validity of 
interpretation was improved by taking considerable care in understanding the issues 
that were of concern to the informants, such as by focusing on the evidence supplied 
by them and by reflecting on the issues raised. Interpretation and arguments were 
supported by direct quotation from informants or reference to other evidence sources. 
The interview questions in this study were designed based on three sources:  
 Previous scholars’ research questions  
 Previous scholars’ research measurements  
 Reviewing the literature and applying the definitions to the interview 
questions. 
The concepts explored and discussed in the literature review were used to help inform 
the interview questions in this study. These concepts were drawn from the various 
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fields of knowledge-creation, knowledge-transfer, and prior knowledge, absorptive 
capacity and the NPD process. The interview questions were pre-tested in English 
and in Persian in the UK and Iran before conducting the field study. These tests 
helped the researcher to assess the validity of the questions.  
4.4.3. Reliability   
Bryman & Bell (2007) defined reliability as being concerned with the question of 
whether or not the results of the study are repeated easily. The term is commonly 
used in relation to the question of whether or not the measures that are devised for 
concepts in business and management, such as team-working, employee motivation 
and organisational effectiveness, are reliable. In addition, Kvale (1996), Mason 
(2002) and Yin (2003) also argued that reliability mostly concerns whether or not a 
piece of research is going to be repeatable in the future. Strauss & Corbin (1990) also 
argued that, in the context of qualitative research, it is difficult to reproduce results 
that have already been achieved at two different times and in two different situations. 
Strauss & Corbin (1990) believed that the circumstances and the environment of the 
case study where the evidence is gathered are not steady and that the same candidates 
in the same study but at different times and in different situations and circumstances 
in the future may not give similar answers to a similar question or to similar 
questions. The participants may improve their knowledge surrounding the key issues, 
and next time they may answer differently. Other authors, such as Lewis & Ritchie 
(2003), argued that a researcher is able to improve the reliability of his or her 
research, and that this can be reached by testing his/her understanding and through 
continuous field work, making sure that all candidates/participants have an adequate 
chance to talk about their knowledge and skills, and afterwards methodically 
analysing the data and providing supporting explanation of the evidence before 
finally providing a balanced viewpoint.  
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In this study, the above requirements were addressed and the data collected.  All of 
the research decisions have been recorded, giving the opportunity for transparency 
and allowing the research to be traced from the beginning to the end. Bryman & Bell 
(2007) agreed that reliability and validity are two important criteria when establishing 
and assessing the quality of research for quantitative research. However, there has 
been much debate about qualitative research. The issue of measurement validity for 
example, almost by definition seems to carry connotations of measurement; since 
measurement is not a major preoccupation among qualitative researchers, the issue of 
validity would seem to have little bearing on such studies. Saunders et al., (2003) 
pointed out that reducing the possibility of getting the answer wrong means that 
attention has to be directed to two particular emphases on research design: reliability 
and validity. Reliability can be assessed by posing the following three questions:  
1. Will the measures yield the same results on other occasions?  
2. Will similar observations be reached by other observers? 
3. Is there transparency in how sense was made from the raw data?  
4.5.  Sampling Procedures 
Sampling is used as it is rarely possible or practical to collect data from the entire 
population of interest. As Saunders et al., (2009) argued, a series of restrictions on the 
researcher, such as time, fiscal resources or access, forces consideration of some form 
of population sampling. Sekaran & Bougie (2010) went further and contended that, in 
some cases particularly involving multiple elements sampling could be seen as 
superior to assessing the whole population. In such cases, sampling has the advantage 
of avoiding unforced errors as a result of research fatigue. In terms of the present 
study, IKCO is the largest automaker out of 25 companies operating in the Iranian 
auto market. IKCO holds over 50% of the market in terms of value and units and 
based on the reports and figures (as will be illustrated in Chapter Four); there are a 
number of mutual issues among the Iranian automakers. This suggested that IKCO 
was the most likely candidate in terms of representation, for sampling in this study. 
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However, IKCO alone was too large (53,000 employees) to explore thoroughly on the 
grounds of practicality, cost and time. Therefore, it was decided to use sampling to 
select the most appropriate sub groups to study within IKCO given the research focus 
(Sekaran & Bougie, 2010). Generally, sampling techniques available to researchers 
can be divided into two types: probabilistic and non-probabilistic. Table 37 
categorises the sampling methods into two main areas.  
Table 37: Sampling techniques 
 
 Sampling  
Probability  Non-probability 
Simple random  Quota 
Systematic  Snowball  
Stratified random   Convenience  
Cluster  Self-selection 
 
 
Multi stage 
 Purposive 
Extreme case          Homogeneous 
Heterogeneous       Crit ical case  
Typical case 
 (Saunders, et al., 2009, p.213)    
 
From the array of possible sampling techniques illustrated in Table 37, this study 
chose to use purposive sampling. This allowed for the targeting within the case 
company of specific groups of individuals relevant to exploring the research 
questions. The sampling was restricted to specific types of people who could offer 
information, either because they were the only ones who had the knowledge or 
because they met the criteria set by the researcher. Purposive sampling technique can 
be divided into two main categories as follows:      
A: Judgment sampling    OR     B: Quota sampling 
In judgment sampling, those who have the best position to provide information are 
required. If, for example, our question is centred on investigating a finance matter in 
the finance department and women workers within an organisation, then first-hand 
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information could be given by women related to the finance department; however, 
this type of sampling calls for special effort to locate and gain access to the 
individuals with the necessary information. As a limitation, this sampling design is 
useful only for answering a particular type of research question (Sekaran & Bougie, 
2010). In contrast to quota sampling, the researcher seeks to ensure a more consistent 
representation across the organisation. Consequently, sampling quotas are constructed 
of sub groups that are weighted in proportion to their overall volume within the 
organisation (Sekaran & Bougie, 2010). Table 38 categorises the description, 
advantages and disadvantages of the two sampling methods.  
 
 
Table 38: Sampling Designs 
 
Sampling Designs Description Advantages Disadvantages 
 
Judgment  
Subjects selected on 
the basis of their 
expertise in the subject 
investigated 
Somet imes, the only 
meaningful way to 
investigate  
Generalisability is 
questionable; not 
generalisable to entire 
population 
 
Quota  
Subjects are 
conveniently chosen 
from targeted groups 
according to some 
predetermined number 
of quota. 
 
Very useful where 
minority participation 
in a study is critical 
 
Not easily 
generalisable 
(Sekaran & Bougie, 2010, p.280) 
 
The following organisational charts and the following two tables provide a clear view 
of the case study. This organisational chart clearly identifies each department’s 
members.  
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4.5.1. IKCO’s Organisational Structure and Key Players  
Figure 10: IKCO’s organisational chart 
Passenger car production line 
January 2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Directorate 
Chief Executive 
(CEO) 
2.1: Vice-Human Recourse  
Deputy of:  
 
3.1: Structure & system  
3.2: Strategy & planning 
3.3: Human recourse 
3.4: Legal action  
3.5: Inspection 
3.6: Marketing & Trade  
3.7: Customer relationship 
manager  
2.2: Vice-Products & Quality  
Deputy of:  
 
3.1: Design and NPD 
3.2: Production process 
3.3: Quality  
3.4: Representative of CE in 
the passenger line 
3.5: Engineers’ department  
2.3: Vice-Production   
Deputy of:  
 
3.1: General production system 
3.2: Passenger vehicle 
3.3: Engine 
3.4: Renault L90  
3.5: Vehicles’ parts  
  
2.4: Vice-Finance 
Deputy of finance:  
3.1: Accountancy of sale & service 
3.2: Accountancy of managers 
3.3: Accountancy of industry  
3.4: Accountancy of financial activities 
3.5: Accountancy of internal activities 
3.6: Accountancy of stockholders  
3.7: Accountancy of expenses 
3.8: Purse & investment  
3.9: Controlling of IKCO’s direct owned Co 
3.10: Research and evaluation 
3.11: Financial & business activities  
Deputy of Trade (Purchase)  
3.12: Accountancy of domestic purchases  
3.13: Accountancy of international purchases  
 
 
2.5: Deputy of 
international export   
2.6: Cast iron 
administration 
Level 
2 
Level 3 
Level 3 
Level 3 
Administration  
Level 3 
Level 
1 
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2-1. (3.3)  Deputy of Human Recourse 
4.2: Administration of:  
Training & support (Employees)  
 
4.1: Administration of:  
Education & development  
 
4.3: Administration of:  
Future planning & human capital  
 
5:4: Planning & evaluating of all 
programmes  
6.1: Human capital expert (BA)  
6.2: Finance expert (BA) 
6.3: Business expert (BA) 
6.4: Mechanic engineering expert (BA) 
6.5: Electronic & computer engineering expert (BSc) 
6.6: Polymer, chemistry, paint & environmental expert (BSc) 
6.7: Industrial engineering expert (BSc)  
 
Level 
4 
Level 
3 
Level 
4 
5.1: University relationship & 
Knowledge Development  
 
5.2: Manager Support 
education & training  
 
5.3: Educational Programme 
for employees  
 
5.5: Administration 
Education Programme   
 
Level 5 Level 5 
Level 6 
Level 5 
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2.2. (3.1)  Deputy of Design & NPD  
Administration of:  
Quality design  
Administration of:  
Development of Peugeot 206 platform  
Administration of:  
Development of Peugeot 405 platform  
Administration of:  
Development of Renault L90 platform  
Administration of:  
Development of Samand platform C/D 
Administration of:  
Development of Samand platform A/B 
Administration of:  
Technical support  
Administration of:  
System & Quality   
Administration of:  
Designing of 
collaborative system  
 
4.8 4.9 
Level 3 
4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 4.7 
Level 
4 
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The following two tables (39 and 40) clearly show the number of employees in 
IKCO’s passenger car section and the R&D centre.  
    
Table 39: IKCO’s Passenger production line employees (Feb 2011) 
 
 Full-time employees Contract employees 
1-Secondary School Degree  1,565 137 
2-High School Degree  13,467 773 
3-College Degree ( 2years College) 2,744 20 
4-BSc &  BA  2,568 57 
5-MSc & MA  616 4 
6-PHD  57 0 
7- BSc / BA students  12 0 
8- MSc / MA students  41 0 
9-PhD students  3 0 
Total number of employees  21,073 991 
         (IKCO’s internal HR report, 2011) 
 
Table 40: The number of employees in the R&D at IKCO 
 
Degree IKCO  (employees) Contract (Employees) 
1-Secondary School Degree  25 2 
2-High School Degree  82 0 
3-College Degree ( 2years College) 84 0 
4-BSc &  BA  225 0 
5-MSc & MA  115 1 
6-PHD  5 0 
7- BSc / MA students  0 0 
8- MSc / MA students  0 0 
9-PhD students  2 0 
 
Total number of employees  
 
538 3 
        (IKCO’s internal HR report, 2011)  
 
A group of participants were identified to be interviewed. Referring to Table 41 
(following page), these participants were drawn from their relation to the NPD 
process in IKCO. Candidates were selected according to the following criteria:  
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1. He / She must be involved in the NPD process  
2. He / She must have work experience of more than 2 years in IKCO 
3. He / She must have 1-year work experience in his/her current position.  
In addition, three products (vehicle brands) within the IKCO’s portfolio of products 
were targeted and the chosen candidates based on the above-mentioned criteria had to 
be active in the following production projects: 
 Peugeot SD (a joint venture developed brand between IKCO and Peugeot) which 
could give more opportunities to find out about the process of knowledge-
transfer/sharing between IJV and the domestic partner within the process of new 
product development in the IKCO.  
 Samand (a totally domestic developed brand that is being improved)  
 Peugeot Pars (a totally domestic developed brand not showing improvement)   
Table 41 details the list of participants for the first visit interview as a first draft. 
However, this list was changed after agreement between the researcher and IKCO. 
The final list for the first visit can be seen in Table 42.  
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Table 41: List of participants for first interview (first draft)  
Positions These Staff has  interviewed in 
Numb
er 
 
Vice-president 
Level ( 3 )  
1. Human Resource 
2. Product & Quality  
3. Production  
4. Marketing  
 
 
4 Staff  
 
 
 
 
Head of 
department 
 
Level (4 ) 
1. Marketing & Trade  
2. Customer relat ionship  
3. Design & NPD 
4. Quality  
5. Engineers’ department  
6. Peugeot  SD  
7. Peugeot Pars  
8. Samand 
 
 
 
 
8 Staff  
 
 
 
 
Managing Officer 
 
Level (5) 
1. Education & Development  
2. Train ing & Support  
3. Future Planning and HR cap ital  
4. Technical Support  
5. Design & NPD 
6. Development of SD  
7. Development of Samand  
8.  Development of Pars  
9. Quality design 
10. Marketing & Trade  
 
 
 
 
10 
Staff  
 
 
Administrators 
Engineers 
Technicians 
 
Level (6)  
 
1. Admin :  University Relationship  & Knowledge   
                 development  
2. Senior engineer  technical support  
3. Senior engineer  design & NPD  
4. Senior engineer  development Samand  
5. Senior engineer  development   SD 
6. Senior engineer  development   Pars  
7. Senior technicians  SD 
8. Senior technicians  Samand  
9. Senior technicians  Pars  
10.        Admin Marketing & Trade 
 
 
 
 
 
10 
Staff  
 
Coordinators and 
workers 
 
Level (7) 
 
1. Coordinators  SD  
2. Coordinators  Samand 
3. Coordinators   Pars  
4. Senior Workers  SD  
5. Senior Workers  Samand  
6. Senior Workers  Pars  
7. Marketing & Trade  
 
 
 
 
7 Staff  
Total number  
39 
Staff 
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After several negotiations between the researcher and the organisation, the following 
people (Table 42) were chosen to be interviewed during the first visit in June 2010.  
Table 42: The final list of participants for the first visit (IKCO/June 2010) 
Transcript 
No 
Candidate 
No 
Candidates’ job  
01A 1 Deputy Director of NPD Department  
N
P
D
 D
ep
a
rt
m
en
t 
 
02A 2 Prototyping Manager  
03A 3 Planning & Integration Class C/D Manager  
04A 4 Internal Accessories Mechanism Manager  
05A 5 Design & Development of Engine Manager  
06A 6 Adaption of Engine & Power Transmission Manager  
07A 7 Planning & Integration Class A/B Manager  
08A 8 Platform  X90 Manager  
09A 9 Deputy Director of Strategy Department  
S
tr
a
te
g
y
 D
e
p
a
r
tm
e
n
t 
 
10A 10 Relationship Between Peugeot France Senior Advisor  
11A 11 Relationship Between Peugeot France Manager  
12A 12 Technology Strategy Manager  
13A 13 Planning & Control Senior Advisor  
14A 14 Planning & Future Strategy Senior Advisor  
15A 15 Market Strategy Manager  
16A 16 Market Planning Senior Advisor  
17A 17 Deputy Director of Marketing Department  
18A 18 Deputy Director of Quality Control Department  
19A 19 Deputy Director of HR 
H
R
 20A 20 Research and Entrepreneurship Manager  
21A 21 Scientific Group of HR manager  
22A 22 IT Facilities Senior Advisor  
Class A/B: (206, SD, Roa, and Pick-up)     Class C/D: (L90, Samand, Pars, 405) 
Appendix 15 shows more details relating to participants’ background.  
4.5.2. The Follow-up Interviews  
Following on from the first set of interviews and based on the reflection and analysis 
of the data gathered a second set of participants was chosen for a second round of 
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interviews. This second set of participants included some of the participants from the 
first visit and a number of newly identified candidates. In some cases, follow-up 
interviews with particular participants in the first round were not possible because of 
subsequent organisational changes and varying access limitations. The list of second 
round participants is shown in Table 43.  
Table 43: The final list of participants in the follow-up interviews  
Transcript 
No 
Candidate 
No 
Candidates’ job  
23B 1 Deputy Director of NPD Department  
N
P
D
 
D
ep
a
rt
m
en
t 24B 2 Prototyping Manager  
25B 3 Planning & Integration Class C/D Manager  
26B 8 Platform  X90 Manager  
27B 5 Design & Development of Engine Manager  
28B 6 Adaption of Engine & Power Transmission Manager  
29B 7 Planning & Integration Class A/B Manager  
30B 9 Deputy Director of Strategy Department  
S
tr
a
te
g
y
  
D
e
p
a
r
tm
e
n
t 
31B 10 Relationship Between Peugeot France Senior Advisor  
32B 11 Relationship Between Peugeot France Manager  
33B 15 Market Strategy Manager  
34B 12 Technology Strategy Manager  
35B 23 Material Research Centre Manager                             SAPCO  
36B 24 Deputy Director of Test & Auto Research                  SAPCO  
37B 25 The independent interviewee. A key informant of the PAD 
who led the joint venture project with IKCO 38B 25 
 
4.5.3. Back-up Plan for the Follow-up Interview 
It was felt necessary to have a back-up plan because of the limitations in terms of 
access and time. Accordingly, it was decided that, if the fieldwork was to encounter 
unexpected delays, then the following plan would be applied by the researcher, as 
shown in Figure 11.    
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Figure 11: Follow-up interview 
 
 
 
 
 
• First choice:  Peugeot SD which could give more opportunities to find out about the processes of KT / KC between IJVs  
• Second choice: SAMAND which could give more opportunities to find out about the process of KT/KC from IJV to a local 
brand 
• Third choice:  Peugeot Persia (PARS) which could give more opportunities to find out about an IJV project that had not 
improved   
SD 
Pars 
Samand 
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4.6.  Data Collection 
4.6.1. Alternative Data Collection Methods 
Figure 12 illustrates a number of different methods available for collecting data in 
social research. Data from a number of different sources is considered helpful in 
terms of triangulating findings; this helps to inform the validity of the research. The 
benefit of using multiple methods to gather data within a case study was mentioned 
by Benbasat et al., (1987, p.374) “using multiple methods of data collection offers the 
opportunity for triangulation and lends greater support to the researcher’s 
conclusions”.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: A way of Classifying Methods in Social Research 
Wellington & Szczerbinski (2007, p.79) 
 
Methods 
Primary data Secondary data 
Observer  Interviews  Questionnaires  Focus group Delphi method  
Structured Semi-Structured Unstructured 
Documents 
Pre-existing: 
 Gov reports  
 Census data 
 Records  
 Prospectuses  
  
Initiated & elicited  
 Diaries  
 Logs  
 
  
169 | P a g e  
 
In this research, the researcher decided to apply interviews and document sources as 
the main data collection methods. The document data in this research were collected 
from six sources (the organisation’s website, newspaper articles, independent reports, 
international reports and semi-structured interviews). Data collection via semi-
structured interviews involved developing multiple interview schedules; identifying 
knowledgeable informants; conducting pilot interviews and schedule refinement; 
carrying out the remaining interviews; and transcribing and translating the interview 
materials.  
4.6.2. Primary Data (Interview) 
The interview has been conceptualised in several different ways. For example, Rubin 
& Rubin (1995) and Johnson (2001) suggested that the interview is a conversational 
partnership, whilst Mason (2002) classified it as a type of social interaction. 
Moreover, Kvale (1996) argued that interviews are an interchange of views between 
two persons conversing about a mutual interest. For our purposes, Czarniawska 
(2004, p.47) succinctly defined the interview “as two people seeking knowledge and 
understanding in a common conversational endeavour”. In this sense, an interview is 
a purposeful discussion between two or more people (Kahn & Cannel, 1957. cited in 
Saunders et al., 2009, p.320). The popularity of the interview as a research tool is 
linked to its ability to achieve a range of informative views and to communicate 
multiple perspectives on a perceived fact (Johnson, 2001). This assists the researche r 
in capturing accounts of events from individuals who have often participated in those 
events (Walsham, 1995; Spender, 1989). As Kvale (1996, p.1) notes, “the interview 
helps to understand the world from the subject’s point of view, to unfold the meaning 
of people’s experiences, to uncover their world prior to scientific explanations”. The 
interview provides an undiluted focus on the informant and offers an opportunity for 
clarification and greater understanding through the use of follow-up questions 
(Legard et al., 2003; Ritchie, 2003). 
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In this study, the main tool for collecting data was conducting interviews, which 
could help the researcher to gather valid data relevant to the research questions and 
objectives. The interview was also selected as it offered the advantage of versatility 
particularly in terms of allowing opportunities to pose new questions that followed up 
on interviewees’ replies (Bryman & Bell, 2007).  
Interviews can be seen either as formalised or structured, using standardised 
questions for each research participant, or they may be informal and unstructured 
conversations. Interviews may be categorised into the following three groups:  
 
1- Structured interviews 
2- Semi-structured interviews  
3- Unstructured interviews.   
This research adopted semi-structured interviews to combine both structure and 
flexibility (Legard, et al., 2003). Appendix 15 gives more information about the 
participants’ backgrounds.  
4.6.3. Secondary Data  
Saunders et al., (2009) believe that re-analysing data that have already been collected 
for other reasons can present supplementary insights with which to answer the 
research questions. Most organisations keep and store different types of data and 
information to support their operations. This stored data can help researchers to better 
establish the organisation’s environment and business activities process. Secondary 
data also provides a strong role in triangulating results and findings. Secondary data 
is particularly useful in helpful to establish the background of an organisational 
context. In this study a number of secondary data sources were used to support the 
empirical analysis; these secondary data sources included the organisation’s reports, 
figures, government documents, national reports, international reports, and domestic 
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and international newspaper reports. Kontio (2004) argued that supporting 
documentation is also highly valuable when corroborating evidence collected in semi-
structured interviews.  
4.6.4. Semi-structured Interviews 
The researcher schedules interviews with people who have relevant information and 
knowledge on the issues. The questions have a particular structure, such as open 
questions. In semi-structured interviews, the researcher wants to know the 
informant’s viewpoint on the matter; on the other hand, the researcher also wants to 
know whether or not the informant can confirm insights and information already held 
by the researcher. Semi-structured interviews require a knowledgeable interviewer 
who is able to challenge and delve deeper into the minds of the interviewees without 
starting an argument and ruining the supportive atmosphere of the interview (Cooper 
& Schindler, 2008).  
Saunders et al., (2009) argued that, in semi-structured interviews, the researcher 
prepares a number of research questions and research themes that are going to be 
questioned and answered. However, Saunders et al., (2009) argued that these 
questions may differ from one interview to another or from one department to 
another. In this situation, the researcher may omit a number of questions in specific 
interviews or departments. Also, there is the possibility of changing the order of 
questions when the interviews and conversations flow. During a semi-structured 
interview, additional questions may be needed. It is worth mentioning that the 
conversations are recorded using audio recording equipment and notes are taken by 
the researcher.   
A semi-structured interview was applied in this study where the researcher 
interviewed IKCO’s knowledgeable staff. Key research questions, such as questions 
about the role of prior knowledge, absorptive capacity, and knowledge-transfer in the 
172 | P a g e  
 
NPD process, were investigated across the case study site. During the course of these 
semi-structured interviewees, the researcher achieved detailed answers. The 
researcher had a list of questions to be covered; some questions varied from interview 
to interview. This means that the researcher omitted some questions in particular 
interviews, given the specific organisational context that is met in relation to the 
research. The order of the questions was also varied depending on the flow of the 
conversation. On the other hand, additional questions and open-ended questions were 
required to explore the specific responses from individuals during the interview. As a 
result, the questions were not asked exactly as outlined in the schedule. Questions 
that were not included in the guide were asked as the interviewer picked up on 
responses from the interviewees; all of the questions were asked using a similar 
wording for all of the interviewees, as Bryman & Bell (2007) suggested. The 
following steps were implemented during the study:  
 
 Clarifying the study’s purpose and the research questions  
 Designing and planning the methods  
 Designing the research criteria  
 Choosing the interviewees based on the research criteria  
 Conducting interviews with the interview guide 
 Recording the interviews / taking notes  
 Transcribing the recorded interviews 
 Translating the transcripts  
 Analysing interview material  
 Verifying research findings 
 Reporting and communicating findings in a written medium.  
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4.6.5. The Study Challenges  
4.6.5.1. Permissions  
In this study, the researcher had to negotiate access permission from the organisation 
on several different occasions. The main cause of this issue (having to seek 
permission on four separate occasions) was a number of factors including major 
organisational change within the senior managerial levels, changes in the 
organisational chart, and changes in the organisation’s interests during 2009 -2010. 
However, it is worth mentioning that all permissions were documented on official 
papers. Unfortunately, however, the lengthy and disruptive negotiations to secure and 
maintain access affected and ultimately postponed the research processes for almost 
18 months. As already highlighted in the literature review, political factors affectively 
influenced the managerial and organisational behaviour after Iranian presidential 
election in 2009 and this political activity caused some changes in different 
managerial levels within the IKCO. To tackle the above mentioned challenges, the 
researcher had to go back to Iran and attend several meetings with new organisational 
(IKCO) members from the Data Protection Department, the Strategy Department, 
The Education and Training Department. In these meetings the processes of the 
research, the benefit of the research for the company / industry, the number of 
interviewees and also ethical matters needed to be clarified again with the new IKCO 
members. These new and latest negotiations did not lead to any changes in the 
research approach.   
4.6.5.2. Organisational chart 
IKCO is the biggest auto factory in Iran, the Persian Gulf region, the Middle-East, 
Central Asia and North Africa, and employs almost 55,000 people in general and 
22,000 employees in the passenger section. IKCO has a very large and complex 
organisational chart and having access to this chart required several permissions from 
varying departments. In addition, reviewing this chart and identifying the key 
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knowledgeable candidates based on the research criteria for the interviews was 
another major challenge in this study. Sometimes the chart was not up-to-date and did 
not mention the names of the staff, and sometimes the names were confidential. 
Besides the organisational chart, IKCO’s senior managers’/engineers’ feedbacks also 
helped the researcher to overcome this issue and identify the key members (who did 
not appear in the organisational chart) in different departments.  These candidates 
were introduced to the research by senior members. These key people were or are 
working on a number of NPD activities which are related to the research interest area.    
4.6.5.3. Set-up interview schedules: 
Planning the interview schedules was managed by the organisation’s research 
coordinator. However, during the field work, the coordinator changed three times and 
the new coordinator had to re-schedule meetings with the participants. It is worth 
mentioning that most of the participants were drawn from the senior managerial 
levels; therefore, it was difficult to set-up new meetings with them. As highlighted 
previously, there were several organisational changes whilst the research was in 
process, and the coordinators had to negotiate with the new replacement. This meant 
that, in some cases, the researcher had to ignore the research criteria discussed earlier. 
In one instance, for example, an important department head (Level 3) did not pass the 
research criteria but as a significant candidate the researcher had to ignore the 
research criteria and opportunistically interview this candidate. Communicating with 
the research coordinators in IKCO via phone call, E-mail and online chat on few 
occasions helped the researcher to re-schedule his interviews. The first visit was 
scheduled in 2007 by coordinator (A) and the researcher made his first visit in March 
2008. Unfortunately coordinator (A) left his department and the new coordinator (B) 
had to reschedule all meetings with the selected candidates. The research made his 
second visit in October 2008. There was a third scheduled visit in July 2009 and as 
result of political issues during that period the third visit was cancelled. The research 
was suspended by the organisation for 18-months and in January 2011 the researcher 
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had to renegotiate his research permission with the organisation in two different 
occasions and finally could reschedule his interviews with a new coordinator (C). The 
fourth visit was made in October 2011 and the final visit rescheduled for March 2012.            
4.6.5.4. National & international political issues  
There were enormous challenges and major issues within the country (Iran) after the 
Iranian presidential election in June 2009. To ensure the researcher’s safety and avoid 
possible difficulties and risks, some of the pre-confirmed meetings were cancelled by 
the participants, and after a while the government suspended all academic research 
run by Iranian students studying in the UK, the US, Canada, France and Australia. 
This suspension meant that the researcher had to organise a number of meetings with 
the Department of Security & Data Protection to obtain new permissions to conduct a 
case study in Iran. However, this political issue affected the research process for 
nearly 18-months from July 2009 till January 2011. The researcher had no power to 
overcome this level of matters and had to renegotiate several times with the company 
to receive new research permission with specific conditions. The renegotiation 
processes happened between July 2009-January 2011 by e-mails, phone calls and 
finally two interviews (face-to-face) in January 2011.    
4.6.5.5. No overseas staff allowed to be interviewed 
Because of an internal agreement between IKCO and Peugeot, the French employees 
within IKCO were not allowed to be interviewed. However, the researcher tried to 
schedule a number of interviews with the overseas candidates and finally the 
researcher was able to interview one of the key overseas candidates who had been 
directly involved in setting-up IKCO’s R&D department.  
4.6.5.6. Transcribing and translation  
All interviews were conducted in the Persian language, recorded, and where possible 
additional notes were taken. The major job was to translate these interviews (nearly 
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60 hours) from Persian to English. It was also recognised that, apart from the time 
element, since the researcher’s native language is Persian, there was the possibility 
and risk that personal views could bias any translation carried out by the researcher. 
As a cautionary strategy, a team of independent professional translators was 
employed to transcribe the recorded interviews. The professional translators 
transcribed the recorded interviews word-for-word in Persian; all Persian transcripts 
were reviewed and double-checked with the original record by the researcher. This 
helped the researcher to become deeply involved in the answers and to better 
understand the case study. Next, the translator team translated the transcripts from 
Persian into English and at the end the researcher double-checked the English 
translation with the original Persian recorded interviews as a check to avoid 
misunderstanding in the meaning of the responses.  
4.7.  The Interview Questions  
Kvale (1996) believed that high-quality interview questions should add value to the 
production of new knowledge, and may give excellent interview communication. The 
questions will change when interviewing for a conceptual analysis of the person’s 
concepts of a topic. The research questions were drawn from the aims of thesis in this 
research. The research questions were developed either by adapting measures that had 
been validated by other researchers or by converting the definitions of the constructs 
into research question format. The interviews began with a short introduction to the 
research using simple and non-academic language and the importance of the research 
area for the future of the company was explained. Each interview took between 60 
and 90 minutes in this study. Andrew (2003) argued that designing a research project 
whether it is a short dissertation, a thesis, or the main question for a large-scale 
research project the researcher will be asking rather than answering the question. 
Thus, it is important to remember what it is like to be on the receiving end. The 
research objectives were used to inform and guide the construction of the interview 
questions. The questions were selected with reference to the literature review, and 
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attention was paid to previous empirical works in terms of the questions and 
constructs used. The final interview schedules were pre-tested. Firstly, the 
supervisors of the thesis reviewed the final questions and provided feedback. 
Following on from this, the initial interviews then served as a pre-test. A manager 
from a British company based in Oxford was questioned to test the viability of the 
questions from a (English) manager’s point of view. A second test took place with an 
Iranian manager in an Iranian organisation. This time all questions were translated 
into Persian and the test was conducted in Persian via Skype Video Conference. 
These two tests helped the researcher to assess the viability and robustness of 
informants’ understanding and responses to the interview questions as well as the 
depth of the research inquiry. This pre-testing helped the researcher to provide a 
check on reliability. See appendices 1–14 for a list of the interview questions.  
4.7.1. The Follow-up Interview Questions  
Following the analysis of the first round of interviews, follow-up interviews were 
pursued to gather further information and for clarification. As a result of the previous 
experience (first visit/interviews), and based on the participants’ responses and the 
supervisor’s feedback, the follow-up research questions were designed and pre-tested 
in England (in English) and in Iran (in Persian). The questions were designed based 
on the answers that the participants gave to the interview questions in the first visit. 
Unusual differences, gaps and unclear answers led the researcher to review a number 
of new studies in the literature in the area of the research objectives. Appendices 9–12 
provide a copy of the final questions for the follow-up interviews in English/Persian. 
The issues identified from the first round of interviews were covered in the follow-up 
interview round from February 2011–March 2011. 
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4.8.  The Importance of Ethics  
Cooper & Schindler (2008b, p.34) defined ethics as, “the norms or standards of 
behaviour that guide moral choices about our behaviour and our relationship with 
others”. In addition, Cooper & Schindler (2008, p.202) have also argued that, “there 
are always ethical considerations to be bear in mind when dealing with the research 
client or sponsor. Whether undertaking product, market, personnel, financial or other 
research, a sponsor has the right to receive research that has been conducted 
ethically”.  
This study received clearance by Royal Holloway University of London’s research 
ethics; the researcher considered the recommendations by the universities’ ethics 
regulation. Saunders et al., (2009, p.185) also categorised a number of key ethical 
issues that could arise during the course of a research project: 
 “Privacy of possible and actual participants 
 Voluntary nature of participation and the right to withdraw partially or completely 
from the process 
 Consent and possible deception of participants  
 Maintenance of the confidentiality of data provided by individuals or identifiable 
participants and their anonymity 
 Reactions of participants to the way in which you seek to collect data , including 
embarrassment, stress, discomfort, pain and harm 
 Effects on participants of the way in which you use, analyse and report your data, 
in particular the avoidance of embarrassment, stress, discomfort, pain and harm 
 Behaviour and objectivity of the researcher”.  
In this research the following steps were taken to ensure the research ethics. The 
following ethical areas were recognised in this study: 
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1. Following the organisation’s rules in terms of data protection:  
The researcher has signed an official letter and accepted the organisational rules 
in terms of data protection. For example, bringing video camera, laptop, tablet, 
flash-memory card, recording video and taking photos were all forbidden and the 
researcher accepted all these rules. It was also forbidden to take any documents 
out of the organisation.      
2. The participants were fully informed about the research process: 
This was a part of the agreement between the organisation and the researcher. 
Each candidate was fully informed about the research and its process before the 
main interview.    
3. Participants’ privacy were fully guaranteed: 
The researcher promised to keep the name of the candidates anonymous in his 
thesis. All candidates had the second chance to read their own transcripts. 
Recording the interview (voice-recording) was an option and candidates had this 
opportunity to choose interview with a voice-record or without a voice-record.  
4. The researcher’s safety during the research was fully guaranteed: 
Accepting the organisation’s Health & Safety rules during the field work was 
compulsory and the researcher has signed the relevant documents.         
 
The research question design was reviewed by the supervisors of this research. 
Participant and department selections and access to each department were negotiated 
with IKCO and all ethical matters mentioned above are considered. The purpose of 
evidence collection and data management procedures were clearly outlined. Each 
informant’s anonymity was respected based on the agreements that were made 
between the researchers and each participant. The candidates’ names did are not 
mentioned in this research and evidence integrity was checked through respondent 
validation of the written transcripts.  
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4.9.  Methods of Data Analysis and Inductive Approach  
Hsieh and Shannon (2005) mentioned that content analysis is a qualitative research 
technique widely used to analyse text data and inductive content analysis of 
qualitative data can be seen as a way to recognise key themes, concepts and 
categories gained from the research. Elo & Kyngas (2007, p.107) argued that, “the 
aim of using content analysis is to build a model to describe the phenomenon in a 
conceptual form. The Inductive analysis process is represented as three main phases: 
preparation, organising and reporting”. Chinn & Kramer, 1999 cited in Elo & 
Kyngas, (2007, p.108) argued that, “an approach based on inductive data moves from 
the specific to the general, so that particular instances are observed and then 
combined into a larger whole or general statement”.  
For example, Strauss & Corbin (1994, p.273) argued that to “answer why questions 
rather than being able to explain what is happening, it may be more suitable to 
undertake the research inductively rather than deductively. The inductive approach is 
about developing theory that is grounded in data systematically gathered and analysed 
and it allows the investigator to stay close to the collected information and to test the 
research themes and develop patterns”. As already highlighted, this research has an 
interpretivist characteristic and as a result an inductive approach will be applied 
during the research. Table 44 shows the reasons for using an inductive approach. 
Thomas (2006, p.237) argued that the “inductive approach provides an easily used 
and systematic set of procedures for analysing qualitative data that can produce 
reliable and valid findings”. Table 44 summarises the main reasons for using an 
inductive approach:   
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Table 44: Purposes for using inductive approach:  
 
1 Condense raw textual data into a brief, summary format  
2 
Establish clear links between the evaluation or research objectives and the summary findings 
derived from the raw data and finally and finally 
3 
Develop a framework of the underlying structure of experiences or processes that is evident in 
the raw data 
Thomas (2006, p.237) 
 
However, Thomas (2006) believes that it is impossible to say that an inductive 
approach is better than other analytic strategies for theory or model development. 
Miles and Huberman (1994) argued that the process of qualitative content analysis 
begins at the beginning of data collection; it will assist the researcher to review links 
between concept development and data collection and will help the researcher to 
direct subsequent data collection towards foundations that are more useful for 
addressing the research questions.               
Jain and Ogden (1999) argued that transcripts should be reviewed several times to 
identify themes and categories. After discussions with the research supervisors a 
coding frame was developed and the transcripts were coded by the researcher. It is 
important to mention that on several occasions while the coding was written new 
codes emerged that caused changes in the original coding frame. In this circumstance 
the transcripts were reviewed and re-read based on the new structure. This process 
was used to expand and develop categories, which were then conceptualised into 
broad and advanced themes. In the following paragraphs more details will be 
presented. In this study, the researcher stayed within the organisation and interviewed 
candidates about their experiences and opinions related to the NPD projects. The 
principle here was to get a feel of what was going on, so as to understand better the 
nature of the issues within the NPD related projects. The researcher’s task was to 
make sense of the interview data that he had collected.  As Glaser & Strauss (1967) 
suggested, when interviews have been completed, the researcher should stay close to 
the data and identify what can be gained directly from them. There are a number of 
stages to analysing qualitative data via an inductive approach. It is important to 
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mention that this research was manually coded and this method helped the researcher 
to stay closer to the research materials and engage with the collected data directly. 
McPherson and Ziebland (2006, p.405) believe that it is important to “identify issues 
that emerge during the data collection and analysis as well as those that the researcher 
may have anticipated from reading or experience. Analysis is very time-consuming, 
but careful sampling, the collection of reach materials and analytic depth mean that a 
relatively small number of cases can generate insights that apply well beyond the 
confines of the study”.  The steps such as preparation, organising and reporting in this 
study are further discussed below.  
Negotiations between the organisation and the researcher took place in advance and, 
based on the research criteria, a number of interviewees were chosen. The research 
questions were designed and tested under different conditions, once in the UK with a 
British manager and once in Iran with an Iranian manager. As a piece of qualitative 
research, all interviews were taped and recorded and subsequently transcribed and 
where possible notes were taken. As an interviewer, the researcher was interested not 
only in what the candidates said, but also in the way they tried to express it. Before 
starting to examine the collected data, the first step was to transfer the 
tapes/recordings into Persian using the Microsoft Word Programme word-by-word. 
Each interview was transcribed from Persian to Persian and saved as a separate word 
document file. Each candidate’s interview sheet received a unique code (label) as a 
matter of ethical agreement. It was agreed to keep the names of the participants 
private and anonymous. Saunders et al., (2009, p.486) highlighted four alternative 
ways of reducing the time needed to transcribe audio-recordings: “A) Pay a touch 
typist to transcribe the audio-recording, B) Borrow a transcription machine with a 
foot-operated play mechanism, C) Dictate the audio recordings to the computer using 
voice recognition software, and finally D) Only transcribe those sections of each 
audio-recording that are pertinent to the research like data sampling”.  
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In this research, a team of professional translators was employed to do all 
translations. Translations were subsequently compared with the original transcripts as 
a check for accuracy. During this stage, each recording was transcribed into Persian 
word format and these were sent to the interviewees, who were given the opportunity 
to make comments or highlight any mistakes or confidential material amongst their 
personal interview transcripts. As matter of research ethics the researcher did not 
include the interviewees’ names and all of the transcripts were structured with 
headings and sub-headings and the candidates’ unique codes on the cover page. The 
researcher paid a team of touch typists to transcribe his audio-recordings from Persian 
to Persian. However, it was important to be familiar with the collected 
data/transcripts and to solve this issue; the researcher personally re-read and 
compared all of the transcripts word by word with the original audio-recordings. This 
helped the researcher to become more familiar with the data and the interview 
materials and also he could check for possible errors. The next step was to translate 
the Persian transcripts into English. The researcher‘s mother tongue is Persian and 
therefore there was a possible risk of applying the researcher’s personal views to the 
translations. To avoid this risk a team of professional translators was employed to 
translate all of the Persian transcripts into English. At the end of each translation the 
researcher personally re-read and compared the translated materials with the original 
records. Summarising data was the next important task.  
As Kvale (1996) mentioned, researchers need to produce a summary of the key points 
that emerge from the interviewees’ responses. This summary will reduce long 
statements into briefer statements in which the main sense of what has been said is 
rephrased in a few words. Schutt (2011, p.328) believes “that identifying and refining 
important concepts is a key part of the iterative process of qualitative research”.  
Robson (2002) argued that once the researcher has an abstract of the key points that 
emerged from the interviews and the research framework, he / she needs to attach a 
copy to the set of his/her written-up notes or transcripts for further reference. Based 
on Saunders et al., (2009) argument, organisational documents and secondary data 
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have been used as a means of triangulation to support the data collected by the 
researcher. Summarising the candidates’ responses and other documents helped the 
researcher to identify the key concepts that appeared to be important in clarifying 
what had been happening in the case study. The researcher highlighted the 
participants’ key answers to the research questions, made a short summary and wrote 
this next to each paragraph. Re-reading the transcripts and highlighting the 
summaries helped the researcher to come across more concepts, which had previously 
been missed. These missed concepts were gathered and they helped the researcher to 
set and design the follow-up interview questions. The steps in the follow-up 
interviews were similar to the first visit interviews. Saunders et al., (2009, p.492) 
argued that “categorising data involves two main steps: developing categories and, 
subsequently, attaching these categories to a meaningful amount of data”.  In 
addition, Dey (1993, pp.96-97) mentioned that “categories must have two aspects, an 
internal aspect which must be meaningful in relation to the data and an external 
aspect which must be meaningful in relation to the other categories”.  
Elo and Kyngas (2007, p.109) believe that “organising the qualitative data is one the 
main tasks for every researcher. This process includes open coding, creating 
categories and abstraction. Open coding means that notes and headings are written in 
the text while reading it”. The written material is read and reviewed again and as 
many headings as necessary are written down in the margins next to each paragraph 
to explain all of the characteristics of the content. The researcher summarised the 
interviewees’ answers highlighted the key points and wrote next to each paragraph. In 
the next step related/similar summaries were categorised under a same group (sub-
theme) and finally similar groups (sub-themes) were established and created the final 
research themes. Spiggle (1994, p.493) says that “categorisation is the process of 
classifying or labelling units of data and usually qualitative researchers categorise 
data during the processes of coding. The essence of categorisation is identifying units 
of data such as a page of text, as belonging to, representing or being an example of 
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some more general phenomenon”. In this research, 20 sub-themes were identified 
based on the above-mentioned method. 
Sub-Themes  
Group 1: Knowledge known as power  
Group 2: Effectiveness of information technology 
Group 3: Issues on knowledge sharing in the organisation knowledge repository  
Group 4: Issues on knowledge recording within the organisations    
Group 5: Issues on IT facility  
Group 6: Issues on access to the knowledge repository 
Group 7:  Political issues and IT facilities  
Group 8: Top and middle management support on knowledge recording and sharing   
Group 9: Repute or reputation and duplications 
Group 10: Source of power 
Group 11: Organisational structure   
Group 12: Senior management commitment  
Group 13: Lack of rewards system 
Group 14: Lack of encouragement system  
Group 15: Cultural distance between partners  
Group 16: The role of trust in knowledge sharing and transfer  
Group 17: Political influence on the IJVs’ behaviour in knowledge sharing  
Group 18: Knowledge acquisition, retention and creation within the R&D  
Group 19: Lack of recording system 
Group 20: Level of Hierarchy within the organisation  
 
Spiggle (1994, p.493) argued that the “next step is called abstraction which builds on 
categorisation. Abstraction goes beyond the identification of the data and it groups 
previously identified categories into more general, conceptual classes”.  It was an 
important job to make links between the above-mentioned 20 sub-themes and 
establish the final research themes. The 20 sub-themes were identified based on the 
participants’ answers and the data (reports, documents & news) that had been 
collected during the field study. It is worth mentioning that the researcher had two 
possible alternative ways of identifying the research sub-themes and research themes 
through analysing the data. In the first method, construct may result from prior 
themes (Mick and Buhl, 1992) or in second method construct may emerge from the 
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analysis itself, unanticipated but recognised as theoretically relevant (Belk et al., 
1988). In the first method the researcher should go back to the literature review and 
see what the literature review says. Then the researcher should go back to the 
collected data from the case study (transcripts and documents) and see if there is 
enough evidence to support the key sub-themes / themes that have already been 
mentioned in the literature review. The researcher should go back to the literature 
review and try to identify how such data would fit and match the themes in therein. 
However, this technique may cause potential problems. For example, it could lock 
and limit the research findings around the existing literature review, and thus prevent 
the researcher from presenting and exploring emergent new findings with the current 
reviewed literature. The second method in identifying research themes (applied in this 
research) is to go straight to the data collected through the interviews (transcripts, 
documents, reports and news) and try to identify and design new themes based on the 
new evidence gained from the participants’ answers. The research themes were 
mainly established based on the evidence collected during the field work, secondary 
data and the literature review. The related sub-themes together created the final 
research themes as follows:  
Theme 1: Knowledge sharing through knowledge repository  
 
 Sub-theme: Knowledge as power 
 Sub-theme: Effectiveness of information technology  
 Sub-theme: Top & middle management support 
 Sub-theme: Trust   
 
Theme 2: Knowledge sharing through interaction and socialisation 
 
 Sub-theme: Knowledge as power  
 Sub-theme: Effectiveness of information technology 
 Sub-theme: Top and middle management support 
 Sub-theme: Repute or reputation and duplications 
 Sub-theme: Source of power 
 Sub-theme: Organisational structure   
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 Sub-theme: Senior management commitment  
 Sub-theme: Lack of rewards and encouragement system  
 
 
Theme 3: Knowledge transfer from international joint venture partners  
 
 Sub-theme: Cultural distance between IKCO and IJVs 
 Sub-theme: The role of trust in knowledge sharing and transfer  
 Sub-theme: Political influence on the IJVs’ behaviour in knowledge sharing  
 Sub-theme: Lack of a recording system 
 
Them 4: Knowledge acquisition, retention and creation within the R&D centre   
 
 Sub-theme: Secondary and primary data, reports, organisational documents  
 Sub-theme: Knowledge as power  
 Sub-theme: Effectiveness of information technology 
 Sub-theme: Top and middle management support 
 Sub-theme: Repute or reputation and duplications 
 Sub-theme: Source of power 
 Sub-theme: Organisational structure   
 Sub-theme: Senior management commitment  
 Sub-theme: Lack of rewards and encouragement system  
 Sub-theme: Cultural distance between partners  
 Sub-theme: The role of trust in knowledge sharing and transfer  
 Sub-theme: Political influence on the IJVs’ behaviour in knowledge sharing  
 Sub-theme: Lack of recording system 
 
Finally, the next step was to gather evidence (the candidates’ quotations, data 
triangulation and evidence from the literature review) to define the answers and 
explanations behind each objective. It was important to recognise and identify, why, 
how, when and under what circumstances these sub-themes/themes are affected. As 
discussed earlier, this study adopted an interpretive stance focusing on human 
behaviours, participants’ actions and their answers to the research questions. This 
evidence clarified the research objectives. Hammersley (1987, p.67) states that, “a 
research account may be considered valid if it represents accurately those features of 
the phenomena, that it is intended to describe, explain, or theorise”. Figure 13 shows 
the process of data analysis in this research.  
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Figure 13: preparation, organising and reporting process in the research.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Inductive approach 
Research questions 
Reporting the analysing result        
 
Analysis & data triangulation 
 
The Interview materials    
The secondary data/reports  
The literature review   
  Categorising similar sub-themes into similar Research Themes  
 
Research Methodology Literature review  
 
Research context 
 
Selecting the unit of analysis 
 
Research criteria 
 
Selecting candidates 
 
Interviews 
 
Translations Summarising the key points   
 
  Categorising similar points  
Transcribing 
 
Categorising similar key points into similar sub-themes 
The research framework         
 
189 | P a g e  
 
 4.10.  Conclusion 
 
This chapter has discussed the design of the research and the factors that influenced 
the research strategies. It has been argued that one of the important methodological 
options in conducting management research is the use of qualitative methods for data 
collection and analysis. This qualitative research is characterised by an emphasis on 
describing, understanding, and explaining complex phenomena such as the 
relationships, samples and configurations in a specific organisation (IKCO). As an 
interpretivist (qualitative) researcher, questions such as what/why/how could help the 
researcher to understand the research questions (research objectives) in detail. 
Qualitative research was identified as a flexible and contextually sensitive method 
that allows for greater spontaneity and adaptation of the interaction between the 
researcher and the study participants. In addition, “with qualitative methods, the 
relationship between the researcher and the participant is often less formal than in 
quantitative research. Participants have the opportunity to respond more elaborately 
and in greater detail than is typically the case with quantitative methods” (Mack  et 
al., 2005, p.4). The case study method as a strategy for performing an empirical 
investigation was chosen for this research. It has a considerable ability to generate 
answers to research questions, and can be a very worthwhile way of exploring most 
of the theories existing in the attention of the research. The case study drew both on 
documentary secondary data as well as primary data in the form of interviews. The 
main benefit of the qualitative method in this research was applying open-ended 
questions during the interviews. This type of question gave a great opportunity to the 
candidates to respond to the interview questions in their own words. The candidates 
were not forced to decide and choose their answers from a set of fixed sources, as is 
the case with quantitative methods. In terms of the researcher’s point of view, Mack  
et al. (2005) have argued that qualitative methods give the researchers more 
flexibility to challenge participants and ask why and how questions. The semi-
structured interview has been identified as an important method in collecting 
evidence in interpretive research. This model of interview could he lp the researcher to 
ensure that the key knowledge management elements within IKCO were investigated. 
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All of the aforementioned techniques and methods ensured the validity, reliability, 
generalisability and ethics of the field study project.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
191 | P a g e  
 
CHAPTER FIVE: DATA ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS:   
5.1. Introduction  
Ahmad and Daghfous (2010) argued that Knowledge sharing takes place when one 
organisation is guided by the experience (know-how) of another, which can be either 
externally or internally. “Knowledge is created via a process by which information 
and know-how are shared and combined through various exchange” (Henard & 
McFadyen, 2006, p.41). In an organisation such as IKCO, R&D members are the 
knowledge- intensive and expert group; their knowledge and expertise is very 
important to new product development and their ability is the major strength of the 
product development strategy. Every R&D department is dependent on the skills, 
knowledge and experiences of its unit members. R&D team members can lea rn from 
each other and apply their past know-how and skills to solve new issues and develop 
new products or services (Zhuge, 2002; Jokinen, 1998).  
This chapter reports the key findings from the empirical research based on the              
semi-structured interviews, and also company documents and published information 
relating to IKCO and the automotive industry in Iran. This study identifies four key 
analytical themes that are pertinent to the understanding of knowledge sharing in the 
new product development process in IKCO. These four themes are: knowledge 
sharing through knowledge repository (vertical and centralised knowledge 
sharing);knowledge sharing through interaction and socialisation (horizontal 
knowledge sharing); knowledge sharing from international partners (inter-
organisational knowledge sharing); and, knowledge acquisition, retention and 
creation within the Research & Development (R&D) Centre. These four themes are 
discussed in detail below.  
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5.2. Knowledge sharing through knowledge repository 
A key objective of this research was to understand how knowledge was captured, 
transferred and stored in IKCO’s knowledge repository. Knowledge repository is 
often referred to using the parallel terminology 'organisational memory' (Wang, 
1999). However, some scholars argue that organisational memory encompasses a 
much broader range of knowledge: organisational memory is knowledge, learned 
from the past organisational experience, which can be brought to bear on present 
decisions (Walsh & Ungson 1991). Such knowledge can be tacit or explicit 
knowledge; on the other hand, knowledge repository is typically associated with a 
computerised system that systematically captures, organises and stores an 
organisation's knowledge. As already highlighted, Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) 
argued that nowadays, knowledge and the capacity to create and operate knowledge 
are considered to be the most important source of a firm’s sustainable competitive 
advantage. As already discussed, Nonaka (1994) argued that organisational 
knowledge is created through a channel of communication between tacit and explicit 
knowledge. The latter view is especially prevalent from the information management 
perspective, and a computerised system enables (often explicit or codified) 
knowledge to be captured, categorised and stored in the system so that it can be 
searched and retrieved. In this study, a knowledge repository is defined as an 
organisational information management system, often centralised in the organisation 
or in the department, which captures, organises and stores knowledge. Therefore, a 
knowledge repository allows knowledge search and retrieval to support specific tasks 
within the department or within the organisation. In other words, this analytical theme 
‘knowledge sharing through knowledge repository’ concerns sharing codified 
knowledge through a centralised knowledge repository, whereas sharing tacit 
knowledge will be discussed below under the second analytical theme ‘knowledge 
sharing through interaction and socialisation’.  
Knowledge-sharing can be seen in two main forms during the NPD processes. Firstly, 
vertical knowledge sharing can be seen across different levels within a single 
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department such as knowledge exchange between R&D members and secondly, 
horizontal knowledge sharing can be seen between different departments, such as 
knowledge exchange between the R&D and Marketing departments. Now the main 
function of the R&D is to generate new knowledge by recombining existing tacit and 
explicit knowledge (Kogut & Zander, 1992).In addition, while the analysis of the 
interview data shows that this knowledge exchange does happen, this study identifies 
three key aspects that affect the effectiveness of the knowledge repository in IKCO: 
knowledge as power that underpins IKCO's organisational culture (i.e. the 'soft' 
element); information technology in supporting the knowledge repository (the 'hard' 
element); and top and middle management support that is associated with the above 
two aspects. 
The following section focuses on these three aspects by discussing knowledge as 
power that underpins IKCO's organisational culture, which in turn influences people's 
willingness to contribute to and retrieve knowledge from, the knowledge repository; 
the effectiveness of information technology in supporting the knowledge repository; 
and how top and middle management support influences the organisational culture 
and information technology infrastructure.  
 
5.2.1. Knowledge as power 
As already highlighted in the literature review scholars such as Mudambi and Navarra 
(2004) believed that, in terms of cultural issues having valuable and exclusive 
knowledge gives authority to the knowledge holders and can be used as a great tool 
within the establishment when there is a need for negotiations within or between 
organisations. Also, Bacon (2011) described knowledge as power for the knowledge 
holder. He explained that power at work is identical to the power in a battery and that 
if there is more voltage then there is more impact. Knowledge represents what the 
knowledge holder knows. Knowledge represents the knowledge holders’ talent, skills, 
abilities, wisdom and accomplishments.  
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An essential function of the knowledge repository is that it serves to capture 
knowledge, such as success and failure of past organisational experience. Such 
experience provides the information and knowledge required for future decision-
making. Additionally, an effective knowledge repository would allow the knowledge 
captured and stored in the system to be retrieved and used for creating new 
knowledge (Inkpen & Dinur, 1998). Within IKCO, the interview data revealed that 
knowledge as power characterised the organisational culture, which in turn 
undermined people's willingness to contribute knowledge to, and retrieve knowledge 
from, the organisation's knowledge repository, as evidenced below. Knowledge as 
power is one of the key sub-themes that emerged from the interviews with IKCO’s 
participants from different departments and different managerial levels.  
For example, the Platform X90 Manager said: “People believe that having knowledge 
in the IKCO gives power to them. However, I teach and record whatever I know to 
others, they will also learn to do it. Of course, this is my way to tackle this behaviour 
among my department’s members. When I know something, I also share it with my 
colleague. I store and share with my personnel the information and methods that I 
know and they are encouraged to do it as well and this becomes a tradition. But if I 
keep my information to myself, they will also be encouraged to do the same" 
(Interview 08A, p.14, paragraph 4). It is clear that the Platform X90 Manager realised 
the importance of knowledge and the problem of individuals hoarding knowledge as 
power within his department. To encourage people in his department to contribute to 
the knowledge repository and share their knowledge, the Platform X90 manager tried 
to lead by example, that is, by sharing his own knowledge with people and colleagues 
in his department.  
 
Furthermore, the Platform X90 Manager explained why people in the department 
kept knowledge to themselves, rather than sharing it with other people: “People see 
knowledge as power. You cannot see a clear system [a centralised knowledge 
repository system shared by all the departments] for recording and storing the 
knowledge of success and failure, and if there was, then information / data / 
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knowledge were recorded and none could hold and keep it any longer, because the 
information would be stored and shared. There is no recording/sharing culture 
among members and it is natural in a place where job security is poor. The more they 
need you, the more chance you will have to survive. Thus, you take a path that at 
least they start to feel that they need you. Without this, it is difficult for one to survive 
and it has to be like this at least superficially. If this feeling is one’s heart, this will be 
really bad. We do have people in the IKCO who are actually like this and feel having 
knowledge is power"  (Interview 08A, p.15, paragraph 1). 1 
 
In a similar vein, the Market Planning Senior Advisor said: “Now everyone who has 
more information has more power; he or she could compete better here. Having 
information is considered an advantage. We have nearly faced a situation in which 
gaining more information means to keep it and not store and share it with anyone. Of 
course, things are much better in this department because we have friendly 
relationships but in any case, I cannot say that this situation has not influenced this 
department as well" (Interview 16A, p.15, last paragraph). This suggests that the 
Market Planning Senior Advisor also believed that knowledge was power among his 
personnel, but he pointed out that he had approached this problem by creating a 
friendly environment within his department to encourage his personnel to share their 
knowledge.  
Interestingly, the Market Planning Senior Advisor reflected on a different knowledge 
sharing practice in the past: “Information was recorded and shared very effectively a 
few years ago, but after some time, hierarchical strategy was adopted. Hierarchy 
                                                 
1
 The researcher's personal experience was consistent with the interview data. Following the 
change/removal of a head of a department, several members of the same department who were close to 
him lost their managerial positions. They were consequently moved to lower managerial levels or 
moved to different departments. For example, one of the level 4 managers was moved to a position 
under supervision of his previous subordinate, who now became his boss. Additionally, It is important 
to mention that the majority of key people within the organisation had a permanent contract for a 
maximum of 30 years, and it is against law to sack a staff without a reasonable reason from the 
organisation (reasons that can be accepted by the court). Therefore, job insecurity was much to do with 
moving staff from an upper managerial level to a lower level, and job security was associated with 
securing a better managerial position or promotion, according to the interviewees. 
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caused the information limitation and now, if you have more information and 
knowledge it means you are holding more power" (Interview 16A, p.15, paragraph 3). 
According to the company documents, a more hierarchical structure was introduced 
when the organisation decided to develop and improve its organisational reporting 
system in the year 2000. In developing a more hierarchical structure, many more 
managerial positions were created within IKCO, and a key criterion for an individual 
to secure a higher level managerial position was to demonstrate his personal 
knowledge and access to knowledge. This heavily influenced the current 
organisational culture within IKCO.2 The reluctance to share knowledge through the 
knowledge repository was not limited to the above two departments. In fact, it was 
prevalent within IKCO. For example, Planning & Integration Class C/D Manager 
echoed this sentiment: “I had this problem and it was difficult to share the 
information as most of the personnel have intra-professional information but these 
people are not willing to share it" (Interview 3A, p.11, paragraph 3).The above 
interview data supports the argument regarding the importance of knowledge for 
organisations and individuals within IKCO, as mentioned by Nonaka (1991), Barclay 
and Murray (1997), and Darroch and McNaughton (2002). Referring back to the 
above scholars’ theories and Mudambi and Navarra’s (2004), and Bacon’s (2011) 
argument, having exclusive knowledge within IKCO provided authority to the 
knowledge holders. The majority of IKCO’s staff believed that they could use their 
knowledge as an important device when the organisation or other colleague needed it. 
Exclusive knowledge is therefore used as a tool for bargaining and negotiation within 
and between departments and organisations.  
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 The researcher's personal observation coincided with the interview data. During social meetings after 
the interviews, the researcher was told that IKCO’s staff could secure their job position if the 
organisation or other colleagues needed their knowledge. If an individual shared his/her knowledge, 
he/she could lose power. Therefore, individuals were not willing to take risks, and tried to keep their 
valuable tacit and explicit knowledge, rather than contributing it to the knowledge repository. 
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5.2.2. Effectiveness of information technology  
Davenport et al., (1998) and Gourlay (2001) believed that the concept of knowledge 
management has been effectively controlled by information technology. Active 
communication enables people to exchange information and knowledge about the 
experiences they have gained in past projects and other colleagues can learn from 
these experiences. Now, it is clear that explicit knowledge can travel across nations 
quickly and cheaply, and that technologies such as the Internet are an enabler that 
allow people to access explicit knowledge around the world immediately. However, 
as already mentioned tacit knowledge is highly personal and can be transferred 
through face-to- face contact (O’Hagen & Green, 2002). The role of IT in knowledge 
management is widely recognised. Borghoff and Pareschi (1997) and Davenport and 
Prusak (1998) argued that information technology enables knowledge management 
activities, and that the Internet, Intranet, software and hardware are instrumental in 
improving knowledge management activities in organisations. However, findings of 
this research showed that information technology (IT) has a limited role in knowledge 
management in selected Iranian firms; this may be due to the lower level of IT 
deployment in Iran due to it being a developing country. However, Akhaven and 
Jafari (2008) argued that firms in Iran look at IT as a tool for facilitating some of their 
work and processes and not as an important enabler for knowledge management and 
learning. Hardaker (1998, p.72) has argued that “his research findings suggested a 
recognition of the need to invest in information technology”. In addition, Hardaker et 
al., (1994, p.20) argued that, “when looking at the impact of IT on various 
departments/functions, finance and operation within firms, as expected, they were 
generally found to be operating with the use of IT equipment. And this was found to 
be the case in over 90% of UK freight forwarders, sales/ marketing as in many other 
industries, seem late in fully adopting IT and in realising the full benefits to be 
gained”.  
This research showed that within IKCO, information technology was widely 
recognised as an important concept, but it was insufficient to facilitate the processes 
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of knowledge acquisition, organisation and storage. For example, the Design and 
Development of Engines Manager said: “IT use has now become almost a must. If 
one is not familiar with the information system in the NPD, one cannot do much 
work" (Interview 05A, p.13, paragraph 1). This sentiment was echoed by other 
interviewees. Additionally, the efficiency, flexibility and quality of IKCO’s 
information technology were important considerations.  
 
IKCO’s main IT tool was called the 'Information System'; this was a system to which 
all members of IKCO had access. Each member had their own username and 
password, but they were given different levels of access, depending on their position 
within IKCO’s structure. This system could be seen as similar to Microsoft Outlook. 
Members could send and receive emails, and attach documents and reports. Within 
the system there was a common drive where members could store and share 
documents and information with other members. The system was established and 
designed by IKCO's IT and Security and Data Protection Department nearly 10 years 
ago when data protection became an important factor for the organisation. It had been 
modified step-by-step by applying members’ and departments’ feedback over the 
years.  
 
However, there was a great deal of concern about the effectiveness, flexibility and 
quality of IKCO’s Information System due to multiple issues embedded in IKCO. 
First, data security and protection overshadowed the functionality, flexibility and 
effectiveness of the Information System. When it was first set up, the Information 
System had more flexibility and members could use a number of different free online 
software products such as Google Doc, SkyDrive, Yahoo and MSN products, and 
Skype. Hence the system was more compatible with other information technology 
available outside IKCO. However, given the organisation's increasing concerns over 
data security and protection, organisational members were no longer allowed to use 
the above-mentioned software.   
 
199 | P a g e  
 
For example, the Research & Entrepreneurship Manager commented: “I used to store 
my documents in a online based service called Google Doc and I could invite other 
members to join my online folder and exchange ideas but now we are not allowed to 
do this as the Security and Data Protection Department believes that Google is a 
USA based company and there might be a possibility of data theft" (Interview 20A, 
p.6, paragraph 3).  
 
IKCO’s Data Protection and Security Department believed that most of the 
information, data and technologies within IKCO should be kept secret and protected. 
The data protection policy also meant that the access restrictions applied to people in 
different departments and at different levels, as the HR Research Centre Manager 
commented: “part of the information which is secret and classified data, the 
organisation has certain access levels. Some reports, books, journals and scientific 
resources are usually open to everyone and members can use it" (Interview  20A, p.7, 
paragraph 2).    
 
Ironically, information that was widely publicised in other countries, for example, 
company annual reports, was considered as confidential and secure information in 
IKCO. It appeared to the researcher that this level of data protection among the 
members aimed to conceal IKCO’s weaknesses from its competitors rather than 
protect its own information, knowledge and technologies. This was because IKCO 
did not have its own innovative technologies and products, and most of its 
mechanical equipment and technologies had been imported from France, Germany, 
Korea, England, Italy and Japan.  
Second, the insufficient effectiveness of IKCO's Information System was also due to 
the lack of understanding of departmental needs for information technology. For 
example, the Planning & Integration Class C/D Manager commented: “we have 
connected to the IKCO’s information system and this has created some limitations for 
us. We used to have good software facilities at the beginning of the establishment of 
Information System but the IT and Data Protection Departments do not know many of 
200 | P a g e  
 
our needs (which are associated with different projects), and even if we shared these 
needs with these two departments, they might not have felt [understood] the needs 
and acted to meet our needs" (Interview 03A, p.9, paragraph 6).  
 
The above concern regarding the lack of understanding of individual departments' 
needs was echoed by other departments, such as the Marketing Department. 
Additionally, there was also a concern that the Information System was dated and 
required upgrading. For example, the Deputy Director of Market Research suggested: 
“in terms of facilities we are weak and our IT system needs to be updated, but since 
the decision makers (IT or Data Protection Departments) assumed the use of IT in 
this department with the System Department which is a mechanical unit, both receive 
the same IT facilities. We request them for software programmes or system updates. 
We need the system, and the decision makers tell us that they do not have budget. But 
I believe that this is not because of the budget. Rather, they consider us the same as 
the system unit” (Interview 17A, p.11, paragraph 1).  
 
Similarly, the Planning and Integration Class A/B Manager commented: “due to 
financial problems, the IT infrastructure has not developed proportionate to the 
information being generated. This caused some limitations such as slow networks and 
filtering issues" (Interview 7A, p.13, paragraph 3).  
 
Third, the lack of clear guidelines on how to use the system, such as how to record 
and classify data, was another problem that hindered the effectiveness of the 
Information System. As the Design and Development of Engines Manager 
commented: “The information system however has become problematic. One of the 
problems is the system on its own. When I send a letter or document to someone, I 
cannot follow up to see the final decision on my report or document, as it is not very 
easy to track the final decisions" (Interview 05A, p.13, paragraph 1). The Future 
Strategy Senior Advisor also commented: “the facilities that are needed to do the 
works are available in mechanised form but there are not systematic facilities for 
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transferring and storing the knowledge. We were in the office of knowledge 
development in the University Relations Development Department and we were 
seeking to create a knowledge network throughout the company so that a database 
exists in which we could store/save people’s knowledge and experiences for this 
specific purpose. Unfortunately it did not come to an end" (Interview 14A, p.12, 
paragraph 1). 
 
Through further clarification with the above interviewees, it came to light that their 
comments referred to the use of different formats of saving knowledge in the shared 
drive, which caused a great deal of difficulty and frustration when individuals 
searched for and retrieved information. There were no clear guidelines on how to 
label and codify data, or on an appropriate filing system. Such frustration was 
reflected in the Design and Development of Engines Manager's comment: “It is not 
easy to find out a clear guideline in IKCO that explains how everything should be 
written from the initiation to the end of project. But we knew Germany records 
everything in their project and if the project manager leaves the company, the next 
person can easily follow the project as all reports are still there" (Interview 05A, p.7, 
paragraph 2).  
 
Another example from the IKCO & Peugeot Relations Senior Advisor showed that 
producing reports on different objectives caused further confusion within the Strategy 
Department: “we have six groups here and each have two reports everyday, 12 
reports a day and monthly around 60 reports. These were the reports that our top 
managers would read and then the groups discussed the issues. There is no specific 
person to document these and each group individually reports its progress. The 
lockers you see there in front of the entrance have the reports from seven years ago 
up to now. It is easy to go and look for the information but there is a big problem. 
The problem is that there is no specific system and method to search within this 
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massive knowledge store and it is difficult to find out specific information" (Interview 
10A, p.9, paragraphs 2-3).3  
 
The above issues identified in IKCO caused a great deal of knowledge fragmentation 
due to the lack of efficient and effective information technology to support the 
development and management of a knowledge repository. Every department stored its 
knowledge independently within the central Information System or as hard copies in 
the internal knowledge repository (for example, in the locker at the Department of 
Strategy).  As many researchers have pointed out, a lack of information technology 
can jeopardise knowledge management processes (e.g. Davenport et al., 1998; 
Gourlay, 2001). For an organisation such as IKCO, it is important to identify and link 
experts who can share their tacit knowledge by providing higher standard solutions 
that are delivered faster and at a lower cost in general. APQC carried out a 
benchmarking study in 1997 for some 28 organisations on the use of IT to support 
knowledge management activities.  
 
APQC (1997, p.6) believed that: ‘It is no coincidence that information technology for 
easily connecting people and information has blossomed at the same time that 
knowledge is becoming recognised as the most valuable of a firm’s assets. As 
information technology (IT) has become our personal desktop tool and our link to 
each other, we grow to covet even more access to information and people’s 
knowledge. In turn, we demand even better IT tools, ones that become part of the way 
we work’.   
 
Fourth, the lack of guidelines discussed above caused great difficulty in the 
categorisation and retrieval of information and knowledge stored in the Information 
                                                 
3
 This coincides with the researcher's personal observation. The researcher had to obtain formal 
approval for research access four times during the three years of conducting the research. This was 
because the management changed, and each new manager had no record of the previous approval of 
research access.   
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System. For example, IKCO & Peugeot Relations Senior Advisor mentioned: “the 
lockers in front of the entrance have the reports from seven years ago up to now. It is 
easy to go (unlock the door of the locker) and look for the information but there is a 
big problem. There is no standard system and method (to show and help us in how to 
search) within this massive knowledge store and it is difficult to find out specific 
information” (Interview 10A, p.9, Paragraphs 2-3).  
 
The Design and Development of Engines Manager also said: “in this department 
there is no such specific system to record knowledge of success and failure and there 
is none to trace all of them and to write about problems faced along with situations. 
There is no action plan or any document that one can consult and see the problems 
from the first day to the end of the project. However, in our department, information 
is usually available in reports and the best person to consult is the project manager. 
Perhaps he/she has the technical information, tests but there is no such a specific 
system in the IKCO that everything is written from the initiation to the end of the 
project in the form of a report and you can see the progress. The Germans are a good 
example for this issue. The Germans record everything in their project. If the project 
manager leaves the job the records are there and still available. However, in our 
organisation, if the project manager leaves the company, the next replacement will 
not know where to look for the knowledge because there is no procedure for report 
writing" (Interview 05A, p.7, paragraphs 2-3). 
 
The lack of knowledge categorisation and an effective knowledge directory, caused 
by the lack of clear knowledge sharing guidelines, was echoed in different 
departments and at different levels of the organisation. For instance, the Market 
Planning Senior Advisor said: “we only submit our report produced weekly or 
periodically to the head and the head has a place to hold and record the reports or 
circulate them through the information system so that others can also use them ” 
(Interview 16A, p.9, paragraph 9).  
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Similarly, the Planning and Control Senior Advisor mentioned that: “success or 
failure has not been recorded in our department and we do not have a specific 
system; then none is in charge of recording and none can access it. In fact, the 
reason… to be precise one of the reasons is that consultation with the colleagues is 
the top priority and that is on its own right why we usually consult the people who 
have information, because they are not recorded anywhere” (Interview 13A, p.8, 
paragraph 2).  
This issue is also related to the fact that knowledge was perceived as power within 
IKCO. The knowledge holders could secure and save their managerial positions if 
other members of the organisation needed their unique knowledge. The value of 
having knowledge rather than contributing it to the knowledge repository was 
identified by Alavi and Leidner (2001). Referring back to the literature review, 
scholars such Davenport et al., (1998); Gourlay, (2001), O’Hagen and Green, (2002); 
Borghoff and Pareschi, (1997); Davenport and Prusak, (1998) and Hardaker, (1994 
and 1998), all argued that information technology plays a key role within 
organisations and effectively influences knowledge management factors (creation, 
transfer and acquisition). However, empirical studies in Iran show that information 
technology among Iranian organisations is improving slowly. Akhavan and Jafari, 
(2008); Farhanghi et al., (2013); Valaei and Aziz, (2012), Albadvi (1999) and 
Gerami, (2010), all believed that information technology has a limited role in 
knowledge management processes in Iranian organisations and that most Iranian 
firms look at IT as a facilitator rather than as an important enabler for knowledge 
management activities. Scholars have argued that information technology in Iran is 
not being fully exploited. Yet Iranian organisations are trying to develop their 
information technology step by step. The research findings show that information 
technology in IKCO has not been fully developed yet and the organisation is 
spending time developing its IT. The results show that IKCO’s members are having 
difficulties when they try to use their IT system. It is worth mentioning that all of the 
participants agreed that IT is an important tool for their knowledge management 
activities; however, the evidence shows that there are several issues around IKCO’s 
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information technology. The participants all argued that the effectiveness, flexibility 
and quality of IKCO’s IT are their main concerns. The flexibility and effectiveness of 
the system is problematic compared to the time of establishment in the year 2000. 
There are limitations with regard to having access to some of the IT facilities and the 
participants believed that the rules and regulations decided by the Department of 
Security and Data Protection are one of the main reasons that the role of information 
technology in IKCO is limited. Besides these issues other factors such as financial 
issues, a lack of clear guidelines, having different knowledge recording formats, 
knowledge being known as power, and a lack of a clear knowledge categorisation, all 
affected information technology usage among IKCO’s members.    
 
 5.2.3. Top and Middle Management Support 
Sweeney and Hardaker (1994) and Marisa and Yusof (2011) have argued that in an 
organisation, top management team has a key role and top management support is 
recognised as one of the important factors for knowledge management, and this is 
especially the case in organisations where the management team takes a more 
dynamic role in the business activities and decision-making (Lyles & Salk 2007). An 
empirical study by Abdolshah and Abdolshah (2011) showed that knowledge 
management in Iranian organisations is a new subject but it is growing slowly. In 
addition, other empirical research by Bidmeshgipour et al., (2012) also showed that 
in Iranian organisations top managements’ support and commitment plays a very 
important role in knowledge management adoption and the learning process. The 
researchers have argued that top managers can provide better opportunities to their 
employees to have better training and more opportunities to generate fresh ideas, and 
introduce new services into their organisations. 
 
Based on the interview data, two key roles of the top management in the (lack of) 
effectiveness of the knowledge repository were evident: encouraging individuals to 
contribute to the knowledge repository; and developing guidelines for the knowledge 
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repository. Therefore, top management support is associated with these two aspects: 
organisational culture and information technology. Elements such as motivation, 
reward, encouragement and organisations’ regulations on storing and sharing 
knowledge, play a central role in the top management support factor. As already 
mentioned, Rajan (1998) cited in Scarborough et al. (1999) argued that the need for 
reward is a personnel need among members which could be decided by top managers. 
In addition, creating an environment in which members feel motivated is directly 
related to the top managers’ role (Mitchell, 1982). First, whether the top and middle 
management motivates, rewards, and encourages organisational members to 
contribute their knowledge to the organisational repository plays a key role in the 
effectiveness of the repository. Within IKCO, the interview data revealed that 
IKCO’s top management did not do enough to support the development of an 
effective knowledge repository, and top management support was perceived as 
increasingly negative since the introduction of a more hierarchical structure in 2000.  
 
For example, the Market Planning Senior Advisor mentioned: “I cannot tell you this 
[encouragement] is being implemented 100%, because it is little by little fading 
rather than ameliorating in the IKCO. But before this, the motivation was mainly in 
the form of meetings. In addition to our group meeting, they also held meetings with 
senior management. This caused the people and employees to use new information. 
They had more skills acquisition this way. But now this is declining. I mean we see 
that even the senior management is not open-armed to the meetings and does not 
encourage it. It used to be good and everyone was at same level and there was only 
one manager and everybody worked together. The information was recorded and 
shared very effectively but after some time, they adopted the hierarchical strategy, 
which caused the information limitation. Now, if you have more information it means 
you are holding more power" (Interview 16A, p.15, paragraph 3).  
 
Further clarification with the interviewee revealed that face-to-face meetings were 
important to build trust among organisational members, which was key to 
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encouraging individuals to share knowledge through the knowledge repository. 
Despite the lack of top management support, middle managers realised the challenge 
of knowledge sharing among their departmental members, and introduced their own 
mechanisms to encourage members to share knowledge within their departments.  For 
example, the Deputy Director of the NPD Department recalled that: “As the 
department manager I give a score to the performance of the active members. 
However, instruction in this sense cannot exist here. A number of people gather in a 
timeframe and they have to give a development, product or output and this is the way 
we encourage them to store and share knowledge here. But the problem we often 
have in Iranian organisations is that the information is not more completely 
processed so that it can be converted to knowledge. We are trying to make this 
happen but it is a very hard undertaking. Everything happening in a project from A-Z 
should be documented and kept so that the next person to carry out a project could 
consult it. So it should be worked on and the processes mature so that the information 
becomes knowledge. But this hardly ever happens in our organisation" (Interview 
01A, p.10-12).  
 
The practice of middle management in supporting knowledge sharing varied. For 
example, the Market Strategy Manager recounted the practice in the Marketing 
Department: “When I, as a manager of the department, try to store knowledge or 
share it with my colleagues, it is natural that other colleagues will learn not to be 
stingy in transferring their knowledge to their colleagues. This has been the first step 
over the past 10 years. How to appreciate these people? It could not be financial or 
in the form of raises; the IKCO does not allow it. However, this mental image created 
for the people and department that they have this culture within themselves, motivates 
them by making them feel they are successful and positive. We try to encourage this 
feeling and stress this aspect that it is more tangible and they feel that others care 
about this good culture and practice they have within themselves" (Interview 15A, 
p.18, paragraph 1). 
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In comparison, the Planning and Integration Class C/D Manager commented: “when I 
started my job in this position, I had this problem. It was difficult to store and share 
the information / knowledge. Personnel mostly had intra-professional information 
and did not want to store/ share. I tried to create a store in the network and everyone 
could store and share his/her information in that place. This is specific to our 
department only and we had classified the information and we kept it here” 
(Interview number 03A, p.9, last paragraph). Interestingly, there was evidence that 
when individuals from different departments (akin to cross-functional teams) were 
sent on trade missions to other countries, they were more willing to share knowledge 
by presenting and reporting what had they learnt abroad. This was one of the effective 
ways of encouraging and motivating members to share their knowledge and 
contribute to the knowledge repository within IKCO. Unfortunately, the above 
departmental effort and mechanisms did not exist in all departments.  
 
For example, the Adapting and Integration Class A/B Manager said: “ we do not have 
any specific methods of reward here to motivate personnel"  (Interview 17A, p.16, last 
paragraph). The interviewees were also clear about what they wanted in terms of 
rewards for knowledge sharing, that is, that their individual contributions must be 
recognised by management. As the Future Strategy Senior Advisor suggested: “the 
company does not have any solutions for encouraging its personnel to store and 
share knowledge. When they share knowledge, only honours and cred its go to the 
employees" (Interview 14A, p.14, paragraph 2).4  
 
The findings show that there was no common method of motivation and 
encouragement; nor was there a reward system within IKCO. Although middle 
managers endeavoured to introduce their own mechanisms for knowledge sharing, 
there was no clear evidence of the effectiveness of these mechanisms. The lack of top 
                                                 
4
 When a member of staff achieves a goal within his/her department, he/she can personally present 
under his/her name the achievement in the meetings or conferences in front of the top managers/ 
audiences and this honour and credit will be in h is/her profile (CV).   
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management support caused fragmentation of departmental practice. It is important to 
mention that elements such as motivation, reward, encouragement and organisational 
rules on storing and sharing knowledge are playing a very important role in the top 
management support as Rajan (1998) cited in Scarborough et al., (1999) explained 
that the need for reward is a personal need among members, which could be decided 
by top managers.  Based on Marisa and Yusof (2011) argument, managers as the key 
staff, have an important role to play in terms of maintaining his/her staff’s 
performance.  
Second, the role of top and middle management in developing and implementing 
guidelines for knowledge sharing through a repository is another key aspect. Within 
IKCO, the lack of top management support caused fragmentation of the Information 
Systems as shown in the interview data. For example, the Deputy Director Quality 
Control commented: “it is not systematic and it depends on who likes to store and 
share knowledge. As I mentioned, our knowledge management does not have clear 
rules or guidelines on these matters. However, in our department, group meetings are 
one of the tools to encourage staff to store their knowledge and share it with others. 
For example, one of the colleagues helps others in the meetings about statistics” 
(Interview 18A, p.14, paragraph1).  
 
Similarly, the Market Planning Senior Advisor recounted that: ‘there is no clear 
(specific) guideline or system to tell us how to encourage personnel to store/share 
their knowledge and it is based on personal relationships. Also there is no guideline 
to tell us how to apply a reward system when the knowledge is shared and stored” 
(Interview 16A, p.20, paragraph 1). If we were able to share the information more 
easily the problem would be resolved” (Interview 16A, p.16, paragraph 3).  
 
The lack of clear knowledge sharing guidelines was echoed by the Internal Accessory 
Manager: “It is not systematic here. For example, we had a colleague here who was 
one of our project managers. He resigned and left. In one of his projects he came to a 
difficulty and the project did not progress well. He asked the personnel to have 
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internal seminars every week at work. Each person worked on a topic and they came 
here and they presented some information. We are currently pressed in a number of 
projects and there is not enough time for this. But the personnel do this among 
themselves” (Interview 04A, p.24, paragraph 2).  
 
Another example was given by the Planning & Control Senior Advisor: “It is not 
systematic but I can think of three methods such as series of meetings, presentations 
and running courses in different fields by other departments. However, I have to 
mention that these methods are only in our department and might not exist in the HR. 
There is quite the chance that if the present strategy manager leaves the department, 
the next one will not continue to do this” (Interview 13A, p.15, paragraphs 1-2).  
 
In sum, in developing and implementing knowledge sharing guidelines top 
management support was severely lacking in IKCO. Although there was a 
fragmented departmental effort towards knowledge sharing through contributing to 
the knowledge repository, there was not enough evidence on the efficiency and 
effectiveness of such departmental efforts. As Scarborough et al., (1999) suggested, 
knowledge sharing relies on individuals being able to see the benefits of contributing 
their knowledge. This in turn requires management to incentivise individuals to make 
contributions. The role of the top management team in acquiring knowledge was 
recognised by Prahalad and Bettis (1986), Lyles and Schwenk (1992) and von Krogh 
et al., (1994), who argued that gaining new knowledge results from organisational 
members exchanging experiences. In addition, top management plays an important 
role in building knowledge structures (von Krogh et al., 1994). In addition, the 
research findings showed that among Iranian organisation top management plays a 
key role within the knowledge management processes. At IKCO the role of top 
management is also an important factor. The majority of the participants believed that 
IKCO’s top management team members have a very important role in IKCO’s 
knowledge management process and that a manager’s behaviour could effectively 
influence IKCO’s knowledge sharing and knowledge recording activities. However, 
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this empirical study showed that there are a number of factors that have effectively 
influenced both the managers’ attitudes and the knowledge management process. The 
findings show that within IKCO motivation and encouragement policies are 
fragmented and there is no standard method among departments. Each manager and 
each department has different methods of motivating and encouraging staff to create, 
share and record knowledge. The more hierarchical structure in IKCO caused 
fragmentation of the staff’s motivation and encouragement processes within the 
departments. This research also found that the lack of trust between members and 
managers could be seen as one of key elements that affected staff motivation and 
encouragement when the organisation aimed to share, transfer and record new 
knowledge.     
5.3. Knowledge sharing through interaction and socialisation  
In the existing literature, knowledge sharing happens in different forms (Alavi & 
Leidner, 2001). As Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) argued, socialisation (tacit to tacit) 
is the sharing of knowledge in both official and unofficial ways, and there is the 
possibility of face-to-face meetings, emails, chats, collaboration elements and social 
network applications. On the other hand, in internalisation (explicit to tacit), every 
member of the organisation can have access to the information that is accessible on 
the Internet or in knowledge repositories and, as Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) 
mentioned, this is closely related to learning by doing.  
In every organisation, the R&D centre can be seen as a hub that gathers all possible 
useful internal and external sources (tacit & explicit) and enables the organisation to 
facilitate its new product development processes. However, there are a number of 
elements such as cultural, technological and organisational factors that affect the 
knowledge sharing process within and between organisations (Mudambi & Navarra, 
2004). As Foos et al. (2006) argued a number of aspects such as trust influence the 
knowledge sharing. Szulanski (2003) believed that a lack of experience on the 
recipients’ side makes knowledge sharing fragmented. Scholars such as Smith et al., 
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(2007); Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) and Bock et al., (2005) all argued that 
individual members play a very important role in the knowledge sharing process. Yet, 
within an organisation there are always knowledge sharing barriers among R&D 
projects. These barriers include codification, information technology support, lack of 
motivation among members, lack of time and suitable resources, and communication 
issues (Santos et al., 2012).  
 
In addition, the second analytical theme that emerged from the interviews and the 
analysis of the company documentation was the constrained manner of knowledge 
sharing through interaction and socialisation within IKCO. Sharing knowledge at 
IKCO appeared to be conducted primarily via codification and the knowledge was 
embedded within materials (reports, plans). In contrast, the sharing of knowledge 
through the transfer of experience and the establishment of shared contexts such as 
through face-to- face interaction appeared secondary to the generation of information. 
Furthermore, IKCO appeared to actively hinder the sharing of knowledge through 
socialisation. In this section, a number of factors that derived from the interviews that 
impact on knowledge sharing through interaction and socialisation inside the 
company are discussed. These factors include the emphasis on repute or reputation 
(Davenport & Prusak, 1998) placed by individuals as a source of power, the 
organisation of the company, senior management commitment, and the lack of reward 
and motivation systems.   
  
Conflict between departments appeared to hamper knowledge sharing within the 
organisation. One source of this conflict was job duplication across departments. The 
Materials Research Centre Manager commented (with some frustration) that: 
“unfortunately we have many departments who do parallel work and duplicate each 
other in IKCO and to reduce this, all duplicated positions and functions should be 
converged in one direction. For example, our lab here, there was a time IKCO had a 
lab and they wanted to integrate it. So they created ETRAK and then  SAPCO 
established its own lab and then problems happened and each lab was doing the 
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same tests in two different locations and interestingly they were ignoring the results 
of each other’s tests. They did not approve the results and they replicated the tests. In 
the quality and engineering departments we have this issue too” (Interview 35B, 
p.19, paragraph 1). This suggests that departments perceived other departments as a 
potential threat to their existence.  
 
The Deputy Director of Strategy Department also commented on job duplication, 
indicating that this repetition of roles was deliberate: “we naturally have this 
duplication here within IKCO and departments. We establish a department or a 
position to fulfil a function. For example, I employ someone to bring me tea, but if I 
am not satisfied with the tea he brings then I employ someone else and now you ask 
me why I do not fire the first one and the answer is, I cannot because maybe I have a 
reason, he or she might be a relative to Mr X” (Interview 30B, p.9, last paragraph).  
 
The importance and impact of family ties in creating and sustaining job roles in Iran 
was further supported by the independent interviewee: “Iranian priority at work first 
is family - to help them, extended family; if it is not extended family, it may be old 
school friends and when you run a business you try to find positions for each of those 
people and you may create positions even if it is not required” (Independent 
interviewee, p.15, paragraph 2). Although the exact level of job duplication in IKCO 
was not clear, some indication that this duplication was extensive was suggested in 
the following reflection by the Market Strategy Manager: “the effects of job 
duplication among departments continued until now and now the top managers 
recognise it and they are starting to change the organisational structure and job 
specification but it will take time” (Interview 33B, p.21, paragraph 1).  
 
The research findings show that job duplication has become a problem for IKCO, 
hampering the organisation’s effectiveness. Awareness of job duplication within the 
company not only makes IKCO cumbersome as an organisation and introduces a 
level of competition between departments but it also generates distrust between 
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individuals. This constrains the willingness with which individuals are prepared to 
share their knowledge and expertise with others (McEvily et al., 2003; Renzl, 2008). 
 
One reason for individuals’ inhibition is job security, engendered by the role 
duplication. The Platform X90 Manager explained why people in the department kept 
knowledge to themselves, rather than sharing it with others:  “There is no 
recording/sharing culture among members and it is natural in a place where job 
security is poor. The more they need you, the more chance you will have to survive. 
Thus, you take a path that at least they start to feel that they need you. Without this, it 
is difficult for one to survive and it has to be like this at least superficially. If this 
feeling is one’s heart, this will be really bad. We do have people in the IKCO who are 
actually like this and feel having knowledge is power" (Interview 08A, p.15, 
paragraph 1).  
 
In a similar vein, the Market Planning Senior Advisor cautioned: “Now everyone who 
has more information has more power; he or she could compete better here. Having 
information is considered an advantage. We have nearly faced a situation in which 
gaining more information means to keep it and not store and share it with anyone. Of 
course, things are much better in this department because we have friendly 
relationships but in any case, I cannot say that this situation has not influenced this 
department as well" (Interview 16A, p.15, last paragraph). Having a reputation as an 
expert in the company could be used to help secure an individual’s position, or be 
used as a bargaining device to secure future promotion.  
 
In this company, job security related to maintaining your position within the 
hierarchy rather than losing your occupation. Iranian state law makes it difficult to 
make people redundant but has little to say regarding the level or position that an 
individual is employed at. In other words, the concept of ‘constructive dismissal’ is 
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unusual in Iran. One stark illustration of this point is the researcher’s own experience 
in attempting to secure access to IKCO. 5  
 
Job duplication and the consequent growth in personnel within IKCO made the 
company difficult to manage effectively. One sign of that was the formal 
restructuring that took place in 2000. This introduced new layers of hierarchy, 
creating additional managerial positions and ushering in a more formal planning 
approach. Interaction between departments appeared to be formally structured and 
process based, with roles strictly delineated. The Technology Strategy manager 
explained that: “we receive information proportionate to our needs; if there is a 
problem with the parts in the production line, the information should be 
communicated to quality department” (Interview 34B, p.23, last paragraph). 
Similarly, the Market Strategy Manager stated that: “market research is carried out 
in this department to support strategic planning and we provide this information to 
the Strategy Department and R&D Department. We plan the market study and a 
private institute operates it” (Interview 33B, p.11, paragraph2).  
 
It is noteworthy from these comments that the candidates emphasised activities that 
passed on information rather than the active sharing of knowledge.  In other words, 
there was an emphasis on the explicit and codifiable, particularly through reports, 
rather than the sharing of tacit knowledge. This point was supported by the Deputy 
Director of the Strategy Department, who commented that: “cooperation among 
                                                 
5
 Following the change/removal of a head of a department, several members of the same department 
who were close to him lost their managerial positions. They were consequently moved to lower 
managerial levels or to different departments. For example, one of the level 4 managers was moved to 
a position under the supervision of his previous subordinate, who became his boss. Individuals are 
typically employed on a permanent contract for a maximum of 30 years, and it is against the law to 
sack an individual without a reasonable reason (a reason that will be accepted by the court) from the 
organisation. Therefore, job insecurity had much to do with moving staff from an upper managerial 
level to a lower level, and job security was associated with securing a better managerial position or 
promotion, accord ing to the interviewees.  
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different departments is happening but is sometimes affected by bureaucracy” 
(interview 30B, p.11, paragraph 4). 
 
The implication here was that there was a strict protocol regarding the chain of 
command through which interactions took place.  That is not to say that interaction 
between departments was always rigidly regimented. Some elements of face-to-face 
interaction did take place, typically in response to problem solving. The Prototyping 
Manager for example, explained that:  
“we have a project control department here at R&D that hands us our weekly 
timetable and task list every Saturday. If we do not come to a conclusion, we hold 
meetings and we complete the task through internal meetings” (Interview 2A, p.10, 
last paragraph.  However, even in the last quote, the emphasis placed by the 
Prototyping Manager was on the explicit (timetables, task lists) rather than on the 
tacit, in other words, what could be measured and assessed by the hierarchy.  
 
Just as interactions between departments appeared rooted in formality, interactions 
within departments were equally formal. In the Planning Department, for instance, 
the Planning and Integration Class C/D Manager clarified this: “since we work cross-
functionally, my personnel are directly in contact with me and planning personnel 
and project personnel give me the report on the project progress” (Interview 3A, p.4, 
paragraph 4). 
 
Note again, the emphasis of the Manager was once more on the explicit exchange of 
information in the form of reports. In contrast, in describing the setting up of the 
R&D department, the independent interviewee pointed to a greater emphasis on the 
sharing of knowledge and expertise through socialisation in the past: “We locked our 
selves away for a weekend and we designed the release form, a very rough process 
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and we said this will get you going” (Independent interviewee, page 29, paragraph 
2).6   
The adoption of greater hierarchy by IKCO also impacted on the transfer of 
knowledge within the company due to the unwillingness of senior managers to 
encourage and support the transfer of expertise and know how. Just as individuals 
lower down the hierarchy were fearful of losing their positions, senior managers were 
similarly concerned. An indication of this was given by the Market Planning Senior 
Advisor: “I mean we see that even the senior management is not open-armed to the 
meetings and do not encourage it. It used to be good and everyone was at same level 
and there was only one manager and everybody worked together. The information 
was recorded and shared very effectively but after some time, they adopted the 
hierarchical strategy, which caused the information limitation” (Interview 16A, p.15, 
paragraph 3).  
 
This suggests that senior managers were similarly concerned about the implications 
of sharing knowledge with their staff as the staff themselves. Consequently, senior 
managers did not appear to set an example in seeking out opportunities to socialise 
and share knowledge with their staff.  
 
Marisa and Yusof (2011) argued that managers as the key staff have an important role 
in maintaining the personnel’s performance. Exceptionally, one or two middle 
managers did appear to appreciate the benefits of setting an example. In one case for 
example, the manager appeared to recognise the personal value of reciprocity and 
altruism in generating knowledge flows within their department. The Platform X90 
Manager explained: “people believe that having knowledge in IKCO gives them 
                                                 
6
 However, the independent interviewee went on to bemoan the subsequent lack of reflection within 
the department: “That process is still working 10 years later. There are 3 processes such as the release 
form for manufacture; we said put this process in now and then we will improve it. But they never took 
them out and none stood back and said this was ok at that time but now we have the computers, 
databases, and let’s do value stream analysis and take out what we need “ (Independent interviewee, 
page 29, paragraph 2).  
218 | P a g e  
 
power. However, I teach and record whatever I know to others, they will also learn to 
do it. Of course, this is my way to tackle this behaviour among my department’s 
members. When I know something, I also share it with my colleagues. I store and 
share with my personnel the information and methods that I know and they are 
encouraged to do it as well and this becomes a tradition. But if I keep my information 
to myself, they will also be encouraged to do the same” (Interview 08A, p.14, 
paragraph 4).  
 
In another case, the manager acknowledged that leading by example was a deliberate 
attempt to counter the prevailing pattern of behaviour within IKCO. The Market 
Strategy Manager argued: “When I, as a manager of the department, try to store 
knowledge or share it with my colleagues, it is natural that other colleagues will 
learn not to be stingy in transferring their knowledge to their colleagues. This has 
been the first step through the past 10 years”(Interview 15A, p.18, paragraph 1). 
However, these managers were the exception rather than the rule at IKCO. 
 
Another contributory factor inhibiting interaction and knowledge transfer within the 
company was the lack of a central clearly defined rewards strategy that promoted the 
sharing of tacit experience. This left the rewarding of individual contributions to a 
more ad hoc, localised approach, dependent upon the interests and whims of 
individual departmental managers. As the Market Planning Senior Advisor noted: 
“there is no clear (specific) guideline or  system to tell us how to encourage 
personnel to store/share the knowledge and it is based on personal relationships and 
also there is no such a guideline to tell us how to apply a reward system when the 
knowledge is shared and stored” (Interview 16A, p.20, paragraph 1). This seems to 
imply that the transfer of knowledge depended upon the level of trust built up 
between individuals and their managers. Similarly, the Adapting and Integration 
Class A/B Manager said that: “we do not have any specific methods of reward here to 
motivate personnel” (Interview 17A, p.16, last paragraph).  
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Lacking centralised direction, some managers had developed their own ways to 
encourage knowledge transfer. One manager, for example, used face-to-face meetings 
to encourage socialisation and thereby the sharing of knowledge. The Deputy 
Director Quality Control said: “As I mentioned, our knowledge management does not 
have clear rules or guidelines on these matters. However, in our department, group 
meetings are one of the tools to encourage staff to store their knowledge and share it 
with others. For example one of the colleagues helps others in the meetings about 
statistics (Interview 18A, p.14, paragraph1). 
 
As the manager made clear in the quote, this appeared to be a deliberate personal act 
as a reaction to the lack of direction from the centre. Another manager, in the NPD 
department, used a points system to encourage the sharing of expertise within his 
department. The Deputy Director clarified: “As the department manager I give a 
score to the performance of the active members. However, instruction in this sense 
cannot exist here” (Interview 01A, p.10-12). The danger of this ad hoc approach is 
that socialization may not be encouraged consistently within the company.  
 
The ad hoc approach appeared to extend across the organization. Somewhat 
surprisingly, within the planning department there seemed to be no systematic 
process for knowledge sharing. Rather, knowledge seemed to flow haphazardly a nd 
outside the control of the department. In a revealing discussion, the Planning and 
Control Senior Advisor explained the process through which knowledge gaps were 
addressed: “a method, which is more general at the moment, is through our 
colleagues in the education department. For example, the colleagues identify a 
course, or a need or a task, and then they ask the relevant department to come here 
and present us with the information on the subject. I remember, last year there was a 
strategic course on the strategy culture and the strategy department personnel went 
to the education department and managers from other departments also went there 
and the information was shared” (Interview 13A, p.15, paragraph 1).  
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While the manager pointed to the importance of face-to-face interaction as a means of 
transferring knowledge, the process itself appeared to have been initiated outside of 
the department. This suggests that the manager did not perceive his tasks to include 
the encouragement of knowledge transfer within his department. Other managers 
pointed to the lack of meaningful work and fiscal rewards within the company. This 
was seen to be detrimental to the exchange of knowledge within IKCO. In a 
perceptive explanation, the Deputy Director of SAPCO Test & Research Auto stated: 
‘highly educated knowledgeable individuals need motivation to stay. By assign ing 
more technical tasks I try to satisfy my personnel. Sometimes they need to be satisfied 
technically and I try to motivate them to work this way. However, another important 
way of motivation is simply through giving them a good salary, which is limited and 
this is IKCO’s main problem. A company in the UAE continually advertises and 
encourages employees and graduates of certain places to go and work there with a 
salary 3-times as much we pay here. What does this mean? It means that the 
personnel cannot always remain the same” (Interview 36B, p.14, paragraphs 1-2).7  
Here the manager appeared to be acknowledging that he was virtually powerless to 
motivate his highly educated staff because of the lack of suitable work and the 
inability to compete on a fiscal basis.  
 
This second theme has explored the level of knowledge sharing in IKCO through 
interaction and socialisation using the interviews conducted in the field. In the view 
of the departmental managers, the company did not encourage such knowledge 
sharing although exceptionally some middle managers attempted through example to 
establish shared contexts and generate trust. However, individual efforts were 
mitigated by several inhibiting factors within the company at large. The restructuring 
and the introduction of additional layers of hierarchy appeared to entrench job 
duplication within IKCO. This sowed the seeds of distrust among individuals who 
                                                 
7
 Here the researcher’s personal experience could be used as an example. A key contact coordinator 
in IKCO left the company prior to the fieldwork starting and moved to one of the Persian Gulf’s Arab 
Countries. In exp lain ing why he was leaving the company, the coordinator mentioned similar reasons 
i.e. monetary rewards as the cause of him leaving the organisation.    
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feared for the sustainability of their positions within the company and therefore 
attempted to keep hold of their knowledge and expertise. The sharing of personally 
held knowledge did not lead to reciprocity but rather to position insecurity. Other 
factors did not act as a counter weight to these fears. Senior managers, fearing for 
their own positions, neither lead by example, nor attempted to put in place processes 
that would motivate and reward individuals.  
Consequently, when knowledge sharing through socialization did take place, this was 
very much on an ad hoc emergent basis directed by the individual whims of specific 
managers. To paraphrase Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995), IKCO as an organization did 
not systematically establish a field of interaction through which individua ls could 
share their experiences and mental models. Within IKCO, a lack of top management 
support, job duplication, the impact of family ties, the organisational hierarchy, job 
security, growth in personnel and the lack of a central clearly defined reward and 
motivation strategy, all negatively affected knowledge sharing through interaction 
and socialisation. 
   
5.4. Knowledge transfer from international joint venture partners 
International joint ventures have become a common type of entry method into 
overseas markets; entry into the new market is quicker and has lower risks. It has 
been argued that learning has always been recognised as one of the main driving 
forces of joint venture establishment (Lane et al., 2001; Khanna et al., 1998; Simonin 
2004). Chrysostome et al., (2013, p.88) stated that, “joint ventures permit acquisition 
of new know-how and consequently present a good setting for the development of 
strategic competencies”. However, Beamish (1988) highlighted that sometimes, the 
expected learning may not take place, and the partnership between the joint venture 
partners may result in conflicts relating to power, cultural difference and personal 
interests.  
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The third analytical theme delineates knowledge sharing with international joint 
venture partners (IJVs). IKCO had several key international partners (e.g. from 
France, the UK, Germany, and Korea) involved in different types of new product 
development projects. In this study, two international partners, namely Peugeot from 
France and Project Aerospace Development (PAD) (which later became First 
Automotive Company) from the UK, were chosen to be investigated, as IKCO’s 
experience of working with these two partners provided a clear contrast regarding 
knowledge sharing with international joint venture partners. Going back to the 1990s, 
a company called Project Aerospace Development (PAD) had an initial agreement 
with IKCO. According to an interview with a key informant from PAD, who led the 
joint venture project with IKCO (Interview 35B, Independent Interviewee), the 
company specialised in prototype body- in-white and had a Family Sedan project in 
Taiwan that would have been the first Chinese car. PAD had a car with 20 body shelf 
at VP level (verification prototype level), and it was the last prototype before 
production.  PAD had designed all of the databases but having that debt put the PAD 
project into difficulties and in order to survive, the company had to look around the 
world for another potential customer. PAD used that project as a fast track to find a 
new customer (automaker). PAD found two potential customers; one was Argentina 
and the other was Iran. In the end, PAD went to the Iranian market and collaborated 
with IKCO, eventually developing that project. As a result of this collaboration, PAD 
survived and started to regain its strength. It acquired another company called Press 
Patents that was specialist in quality measurement; this was a separate company 
besides PAD and the First Automotive Group. Under the First Automotive Group 
there were three main companies: Press Patents, PAD and Project Management 
International. PAD agreed to help IKCO to develop an Iranian National car and an 
R&D centre, and the final agreement was signed in the UK in 1995.   
 
PAD suggested that IKCO use the SAMAND as the learning curve for all of its key 
engineers. This would allow IKCO to learn on the job rather than having to wait for a 
few years to set up its R&D centre. Based on this agreement, PAD first trained 13 
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graduate engineers in IKCO. They were mostly fresh minds who had not worked in 
IKCO for a long time; therefore there was no bad practice or old thinking. The only 
exception was a senior engineer who was 10 years older than everybody else, who 
became the team leader. PAD brought these Iranian engineers to the UK and they 
became the founders of the R&D centre. In the second stage, PAD sold its intellectual 
property rights (IPR) to IKCO, which helped IKCO to break away from Peugeot's 
monopoly. To gain further independence, IKCO started to build its own R&D centre 
with the help of PAD. IKCO used the SAMAND project as its first pilot project 
between 1994 and 1997.  IKCO's R&D centre building was constructed during this 
period, and PAD trained and closely worked with the architects on building the R&D 
centre. The Introduction to Iran Khodro Group (2013, p.4) mentioned that since 1962, 
IKCO has developed its capabilities and become the biggest industrial group in the 
region that performs industrial and service activities in the automotive sector in both 
passenger and commercial vehicles. It has 1,000,000 units of production capacity and 
employs about 21,000 people. In addition, IKCO aimed to be a world-class car 
manufacturer. It founded its own R&D, engine development and test centre, together 
with investing in the latest technology production machinery, equipment and 
facilities, which were established in cooperation with leading countries in automotive 
industry in Europe including France (Peugeot).  
 
However, as the Deputy Director of Strategy Department mentioned, having France 
(Peugeot) as a key partner has had both advantages and disadvantages for IKCO. He 
argued that: “20-30 years ago, and just comparing the situation, international 
automakers could see that Iran was in the war and also was under sanctions and the 
Peugeot Company was the only option that IKCO could set an agreement/partnership 
with. Peugeot was a good choice at that time; however, after some time, IKCO 
became worried about the renewal of the policies. Unfortunately Peugeot is doing the 
same policy as 30-years ago and this is the negative point” (Interview 9A, p.10, last 
paragraph). Iran Khodro (2013 A) mentioned that in 1988 after the Iran-Iraq war 
ended, a three-year contract for the production of the Peugeot 405 sedan was inked 
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under the supervision of IDRO (Iran's Industries Development and Renovation 
Organization) and the Ministry of Industries. In addition, and due to the shutdown of 
the Talbot Factory, in 1989 IKCO made other new agreement with its French partner 
to assemble the Peugeot 504 engine on its popular Paykan body, and this was named 
the Paykan1800.  
 
In 1991, production of the Peugeot 405 started and this was followed by the 
establishment of SAPCO. In 1994, IKCO aimed to set up a 7-year strategic 
programme. It wanted to increase its production volume and the percentage of locally 
made parts and most importantly, it aimed to form an R&D centre. In 1999, the 
production of the Peugeot Persia (Peugeot Pars), a facelift of the Peugeot 405, started 
at IKCO. In 2002, the mass production of the Samand as the national car began. The 
Samand was a model based on the Peugeot 405 platform with higher technology and 
a new face, all of which was developed by IKCO. After the launch of the first model 
of the Samand by IKCO, Peugeot decided to launch its popular 206 model in Iran in 
the same year and IKCO started to assemble a number of different variants of the 
206. In addition, in 2005, a new product was successfully launched into both the 
national and international markets by IKCO. The new car called the Peugeot 206 SD, 
was jointly (IKCO – Peugeot) designed and developed in IKCO. Most recently in 
2011, IKCO started to assemble the Peugeot 207i, which was specified for the Iranian 
market by Peugeot.       
It is clear that IKCO has learned from its different business partners since 1962, when 
it started to assemble the Hillman-Hunter (PAYKAN). Finally, in the year 2001, 
IKCO launched its first locally developed automotive (SAMAND) into the Iranian 
market and since 2002 IKCO has been exporting this car overseas. However, this 
development, which began in 1962 and went on until 2000, took longer than 
expected.  For example, HYUNDAI –MOTOR, was established on 29th December 
1967, five years later than IKCO’s estab lishment. Now it is recognised that there is a 
difference in these two automakers’ place in the world automaker rankings and also 
in their product quality and quantity. The interview data revealed several key factors 
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that influenced IKCO's experience of working with its two key international partners, 
and hence its experience of knowledge sharing and transfer. Below, three key factors 
influencing IKCO's experience are discussed: the cultural distance between IKCO 
and its international partners; the issue of trust in knowledge sharing; and the political 
factors that influenced international collaboration.  
 
5.4.1. Cultural distance between IKCO and international partners  
As discussed earlier, Lewis (1990) and Makion et al. (2007) argued that the collapse 
rate of IJVs is far higher than the success rate and, in addition, learning within IJVs 
remains a difficult journey, owing to the cultural, institutional and geographical 
distances. However, Grant (1996) and Zander and Kogut (1995) argued that 
nowadays, organisations are developing more complex networks of communication 
with their partners. Organisations must have a good strategy to retain, develop, 
organise, transfer and utilise their resources and this requires systematic knowledge 
management, which has a significant influence on a firm’s strategy formulation and 
performance. However, as already discussed in the earlier theme, IKCO’s knowledge 
management system is not fully developed and is not acting effectively. A good 
example by Inkpen (2008) showed how IJVs in the US automotive industry (between 
GM and TOYOTA) could work well. However, as has been previously 
acknowledged, there is always the risk of losing one side of an IJV. Cultural 
differences and diversity in the final goal can be seen as key factors fo r this loss. For 
example, Yan and Gray’s (1994) findings showed that the local partner’s knowledge 
makes the foreign partner dependent on the local partner. However, once the foreign 
partner increases their knowledge of the local market, the instability of the IJV 
becomes possible. On the other hand, Inkpen and Beamish (1997, p.188) argued that 
“the local partner may acquire the skills and knowledge of its international partner, 
making the IJV redundant, as the international partner’s skill and knowledge are no 
longer needed”. In particular, the cultural difference between IKCO and its 
international partners was repeatedly mentioned by a number of the interviewees. For 
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example, the Planning & Integration Class A/B Manager mentioned that: “we have 
worked with the English and Germans. The Germans have everything documented 
and written and the documents are accessible. The French hardly transfer the 
knowledge and it is difficult to understand their documents; they are not logically 
easy to follow. Well, first I feel they think if they transfer their knowledge to other 
companies they are working with, the partner will one day overtake their place. 
Second, there is the inaccessibility of their documents. They lack naturalness and are 
not easily read. Another point is the self-pride the French have. Imagine they did 
something wrong and you tell them about it. They would hardly listen to you. They 
think they are the King of knowledge and they know everything" (Interview 7A, p.5, 
last paragraph).  
 
Similarly, the Planning & Integration Class A/B Manager commented: “When IKCO 
was producing the PAYKAN 20-years ago, IKCO made arrangements with Peugeot. 
IKCO was not at the organisational knowledge level that is now. The basis of the first 
relationship was established then it continued. Perhaps if IKCO was to make new 
relationships with a French company, the requirements and documents of the 
contract would be different and knowledge transfer would be much better than what 
is now"  (Interview 7A, p.6, paragraph 2). The Deputy Director of Strategy 
Department echoed this sentiment: “The French, generally speaking, are not really 
good at giving data and information to their partner. If you asked the German, 
English, Italian they are very good compared to the French and off course the 
Korean and the Japanese are much better" (Interview 9A, p.6, last paragraph). 
Similarly, the Deputy Director of Quality Control said: “[based on my work 
experience] The Germans are more open to questions. Renault is better than Peugeot 
in this respect. The knowledge they give is available and can be found in many books. 
The problem is that they have given us the systems of problem solving, management 
but in a sporadic manner and in pieces. They have not told us how they have 
designed the system. They only give us the results; they also do not give us the 
integration of the system. They have given us an island system. We have worked for 
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ten years with these systems; even the personnel in the production unit are confused 
how these systems work" (Interview 18A, p.5, paragraph 1).  
 
The above evidence points to the fact that the Iranian prefer a structured approach to 
knowledge acquisition that involves a high level of knowledge codification. This also 
indirectly reflects the fact that tacit knowledge is hard to transfer (Nonaka & 
Takeuchi, 1995), and effective transfer of tacit and explicit knowledge requires 
different mechanisms. For example, tacit knowledge is more easily transferred 
through interaction and socialisation, whilst explicit or codified knowledge can be 
shared through a knowledge repository, as discussed above.  
 
5.4.2. The role of trust in knowledge sharing  
Trust at an organisational level is a very important part of absorptive capacity as it 
encourages the ‘teacher’ organisation to actively support the ‘student’ organisation to 
understand the knowledge that it is offering. This is unlikely to happen except when 
the teacher is confident that its partners (students) are dependable and will fulfil their 
duties (Johnson et al., 1996). In addition, Inkpen and Beamish (1997) mentioned that 
a willingness to risk weakness is one of the dimensions of trust. In this case, the 
condition for using and sharing valuable and hidden information and tacit knowledge 
is a key factor. Chiles and McMackin (1996) argued that, the greater the trust in the 
relationship between IJVs, the greater the inclination for parties to share and 
exchange information that may make them vulnerable. Parkhe (1993) found that 
differences in partners’ nationalities and cultures would negatively influence the 
success on an IJV, mainly in terms of the ability to benefit from the knowledge that 
can be transferred from the other partner.  
Among IKCO’s members, the concept of trust was acknowledged as one of the 
important elements that could facilitate or hinder the intra-organisational or inter-
organisational processes, especially when knowledge sharing was concerned. In this 
study, trust emerged as a key issue between IKCO and its international joint venture 
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(IJVs) partners. The trust issue was easily identified when staff or the IJVs did not 
want to share and store their own knowledge with their colleagues or the business 
partner. The staff and IJVs did not fully trust each other and did not (fully) want to 
store their knowledge and share it with their colleagues and partners. The example of 
the successful joint project (SD206) and the failure of the domestic project show that 
the level of trust between IKCO and Peugeot was problematic. The interview data 
indicates that in the successful joint project (SD206) Peugeot did not fully present 
detailed information about the steps they took in their activities and, instead, they just 
presented the final results. This made it very difficult for IKCO to learn from 
Peugeot.  
Evidence provided by the candidates show that the French did not trust the Iranians to 
present all of the detailed information regarding the successes and failures they had 
had during the SD206 development. For example, the French did not let IKCO’s 
engineers and experts attend the process of the SD206 safety test in France; according 
to some of the interviewees, this was because the French did not want to present all of 
the detailed information, and furthermore they did not want to show them (IKCO’s 
experts) the process of these important tests. 
 
The difficulty of working with Peugeot was mentioned by a number of the 
interviewees. For example, the Planning & Integration Class A/B Manager said: “I 
had difficulties working with the French. We have worked with the English and 
Germans in the past. The Germans have a different working style - everything 
documented and written and the documents were/are accessible. The French hardly 
transfer the knowledge. Well, first I feel they think if they transfer their knowledge to 
us, as their domestic partner in Iran, we will one day overtake their place" (Interview  
07A, p.5, paragraph 5).  
 
Another example was given by the Planning and Integration Class C/D Manager He 
said: “it was difficult to get inside Peugeot for us. We have had this problem with 
them. We have had a hard time getting information/knowledge from them and this is 
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based on the nature of trust between us and the French" (Interview 03A, p.10, last 
paragraph).  
 
The case here was that, on the one hand the French (IJV) did not trust their Persian 
domestic partner and did not want to store and record their (Peugeot’s) important 
knowledge in IKCO’s knowledge repository; on the other hand the Iranian side did 
not have enough experience to play different games and find alternative ways of 
gaining knowledge from their French partner. The interviewees felt that Peugeot was 
concerned that IKCO would soon become a future competitor in the region, and this 
was one of the reasons why Peugeot was unwilling to store any valuable knowledge 
with IKCO.  
Furthermore, the Adaption of Engine and Power Transmission Manager commented: 
“when there is a matter of having access to the knowledge between us and the French 
the issue can be seen easily. The problem is that the French are famous for being 
proud and self-satisfied. For example, if you talk to an English person or a German 
person, they would more easily give the information and knowledge with respect to 
the French 8. The French only see themselves and when it comes to storing 
information, they hardly do it" (Interview 6A, p.5, and paragraph 1).  
 
                                                 
8
 For example, German Daimler Mercedes-Benz established a site in 1971 in Tabriz City called IDEM 
Company. IDEM Company develops and produces very advanced diesel and CNG engines with 
different horse-powers, used for buses, mini-buses, and as engine for agricultural and industrial 
purposes. Daimler Mercedes-Benz imported and supported all mechanical and technical elements and 
also the IDEM’s personnel train ing was under German supervision. Daimler Mercedes-Benz also 
established an assembly line in IKCO to produce the Benz E class in Iran. The English helped IKCO in 
the 1960s by establishing an assembly line in Iran (IKCO) to produce the Hillman Hunter (an 
advanced car in its time) and the English agreed to transfer 100% of the technology to the Iranians step 
by step. The percentage of domestically produced and developed auto -parts increased year by year, 
and in the 1980s the Hillman Hunter was made in Iran 100% domestically. Most recently, part of the 
design and testing of IKCO’s national car (SAMAND) was done jointly by English and German 
companies.    
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This viewpoint was shared by the Deputy Director of Quality Control: “The Germans 
are more open to questions. The knowledge they give is available and recorded. In 
the case of the French there is a problem; the problem is that they have given us the 
systems of problem solving but in a sporadic manner and in pieces. They have not 
told us how they have designed the system; they only give us the results. They also do 
not give us the integration of the system. They have given us an island system" 
(Interview 18.A, p.5. paragraph 1)9. 
 
The different levels of trust between IKCO and its two partners, Peugeot and PAD, 
were reflected in a number of the other interviewees' comments. For example, the 
Internal Accessories Manager said: “Fortunately our relationship with the English 
was in a friendly atmosphere and there was no such thing as let’s hide the 
information and let’s not give it to them. They were not like that at all. But we do not 
have the same kind of friendship with the French. The French do not transfer/store 
their knowledge to us; they hide it as they have a feeling of superiority" (Interview 
04A, p.5, paragraph 4).  
 
Similarly, the Deputy Director of the Strategy Department (International 
Relationship) commented: ‘Luckily I do not work with Peugeot. I mostly work with 
the Japanese. The Japanese have a culture of acceptance. For example, when they 
promise something they will fulfil it. On the other hand, the French are very cunning 
people and they are the kind of people who look from up to downward. But the 
Japanese are more similar to the Iranians and I personally believe that choosing 
Peugeot was not a good choice. They are not really good at giv ing (storing) data/ 
                                                 
9 The researcher asked the French (Peugeot members) who were based in IKCO to have a number of 
interviews for his research purposes. The French did not accept and refused to talk. They mentioned 
that they (the Frenchs in IKCO) do not have permission from their head office to do so. They are not 
allowed to talk to the Iranian media, reporters and researchers. The researcher also contacted the 
Peugeot head office several times and unfortunately did not receive any response. The researcher also 
tried to talk with Peugeot’s UK plant; they also refused to talk and advised him to contact the head 
office in France.  
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information to us. If you ask the Germans, the English, and the Italians, they are very 
good compared to the French and of course the Koreans and the Japanese are much 
better" (Interview 09A, p.5-6, paragraphs, 1-6). 
 
Trust is a key factor that influences knowledge sharing (Renzl, 2008). McEvily et al., 
(2003, p. 92-93) argued that, “trust makes decision making more efficient by 
simplifying the acquisition and interpretation of information and also guides action 
by suggesting the behaviour and routines that are most viable and beneficial under the 
assumption that the trusted counterpart will not exploit one’s weakness”.  
 
Al-Abrrow et al., (2013); Khanifar et al., (2012); and, Rezaeian et al., (2013) argued 
that among Iranian organisations the concept of trust has a significant impact on 
organisational performance; a low level of trust will cause a high level of pressure, a 
low level of efficiency and a lack of creativity among Iranian organisations. Mahdavi-
fard et al., (2013) said that trust is under the influence of the main culture of the 
community.  The research outcomes show that trust among IJVs and IKCO is one of 
the important factors and they also suggest that a lack of trust together with the 
cultural differences among IKCO and the IJVs could negatively affect knowledge 
sharing behaviour.  
 
This empirical study showed that the different levels of trust between IKCO and its 
two different partners (Peugeot and PAD) had two different outcomes for the 
knowledge sharing process. PAD, as a British partner, had a positive impact on 
knowledge sharing behaviour among IKCO members; on the other hand, French 
Peugeot did not have a good and positive feedback among IKCO members in terms 
of knowledge management process. Unfortunately, the French partner did not show 
any interest in participating in this academic research.    
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5.4.3. Political influence on the IJVs’ behaviour with regard to knowledge 
sharing   
Henisz and Delios (2002, p.340) suggested that the institutional environment includes 
“political institutions such as the national structure of policy making, regulation and 
adjudication, economic institutions, such as the structure of the national factor 
markets and the terms of access to international factors or production and socio-
cultural institutions, such as information norms”. Rondinelli and Behrman (2000) 
believed that the shape and influence of institutions will vary from country to 
country, and that this in turn will cause variations in the norm of ‘acceptable’ 
behaviour. Ferretti and Parmentola (2010) argued that in most developing countries 
government policies directly affect IJV relationships, and Abdolshah and Abdolshah 
(2011) believe that in Iran, the government has the key role in developing knowledge 
management processes.  
In this study, within IKCO, political factors also affected the effectiveness of 
knowledge acquisition and knowledge sharing. It is important to mention that the 
current international political factors are directly linked to the issue of (a lack of) trust 
that was previously analysed. In the case of IKCO, political relations have meant that 
it has been restricted in its international cooperation. Other issues such as 
international sanctions have also affected various aspects of its business transactions, 
such as banking and logistics, according to the Deputy Director of the Strategy 
Department (Interview 30B, p.3, paragraph 1).   
 
For example, the Design and Development of Engines Manager commented: “If I 
want to classify the problems, I should say the first issue is the political problems. 
For example, IKCO is currently trying to work with a German Company, but they 
have a committee so they have to check whether or not they are allowed to work with 
us and they have to get immunity and permissions" (Interview 27B, p.09, last 
paragraph).   
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Furthermore, the Deputy Director of the NPD Department sa id: ‘the political 
condition of our country is very influential. At present, they (the French) will never 
transfer the tiniest piece of knowledge, expertise or technology to us. Now imagine, 
this situation changed and there were a stable situation where there was little enmity. 
The French would and will never help us by transferring their technical knowledge to 
us" (Interview 1A, p.13, paragraph 4).  He also mentioned that the French do not like 
to consider IKCO as a strategic partner; there was no mention of IKCO’s name in the 
Peugeot 2009 annual report. “Peugeot has given us its products and we are producing 
them in Iran and they make money here, but Peugeot does not believe that it has a 
strategic partner named  IKCO. They believe that without having a strategic partner 
they can boost their interests” (Interview 1A, p.14, paragraph 2).  
 
As quoted in the previous paragraphs, it was difficult for IKCO to get inside Peugeot. 
IKCO had this problem with Peugeot and it had a hard time getting information 
(Interview 3A, p.10, last paragraph).  The Adaption of Engine & Power Transmission 
Manager also highlighted that: “the French partner is famous in the Europe for being 
proud and self-satisfied. For example, if we talk to an English or German person, 
they would more easily give the information with respect to the French. It’s true 
about the French, they only see themselves and when it comes to giving information, 
they hardly do it. The French usually give us general information that one could find 
in every textbook on automotive making and there is no need to give it to us. They 
always give us a final product and a final product plan [instead of presenting us with 
a step-by-step guide]" (Interview 6A, pp.4-5, paragraph 4 & 1&3). 
 
In addition, the Adoption of Engine & Power Transmission Manager said: "the 206 
cooling system and the engine oil temperature were problematic and the automatic 
gears had issues. We emphasised this to the Peugeot and they fixed the issue but they 
did not let us in on the design process. They tested the parts and sent the result back 
and we had it produced here and we tested it again and we found that it still had a 
problem. Peugeot reviewed it again and we reached what we wanted after a number 
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of trials and errors. But we were not involved in the design process. They just 
reported to us the tests they had done along with the diagrams and figures" 
(Interview 6A, p.9, paragraph 1).  
 
The Adaption of Engine and Power Transmission Manager also reflected on the 
working relationship with Peugeot: "our major partner is Peugeot and we have been 
working together for more than 15 years; the relationship between IKCO and 
Peugeot is not excellent one. Peugeot derives much profit from IKCO but they do not 
want our engineers to reach the level of Peugeot’s technical knowledge. If the 
relationship between IKCO and the Peugeot was good, perhaps  IKCO would 
perform much better than this, a relationship like Hyundai and Mitsubishi. These two 
have worked for about 15 years together. Now Hyundai is one of the titans in the 
world’s automakers and we (IKCO) have not progressed with respect to Hyundai" 
(Interview 28B, p.9, paragraphs 2-3).  
 
After 20 years of working with Peugeot, IKCO was still unable to  close the 
knowledge gap between Peugeot’s experts and its Iranian experts working on the 
same joint project. This indicates that IKCO was unable to successfully transfer 
knowledge from Peugeot to IKCO. Although the 206SD was a successful product in 
IKCO, IKCO was unable to replicate its success with the 206SD jointly developed 
with Peugeot. As a result, IKCO was unable to develop another new product 
independently.  
 
IKCO's connection with Peugeot was partly the result of international politics. The 
Deputy Director of the Strategy Department argued that having the French as a key 
partner had had both advantages and disadvantages for IKCO: "if you go back 20-30 
years ago, and just compare the situation, you will see that Iran was in the war and 
under sanctions. Peugeot was good at that time. But after that time, we were worried 
about the renewal of the policy. However, Peugeot is doing the same policy as 30-
years ago and this is a negative point."  (Interview 9A, p.10, last paragraph).  
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The following background also shows that Peugeot have had issues in the past with 
other automakers too. For example, in the early 1980s, Peugeot was one of the few 
companies that entered the Chinese market. Due to conservatism and political 
reasons, and the problems that existed in the early 1990s, they drew back from China. 
About the same time, the Germans invested there and their Volkswagen remained 
there despite the vague conditions when it was not clear where China headed. 
Volkswagen went on to develop there as the Chinese market began to develop. The 
company made maximum profit and only later did the French try to go back there. It 
seems that their conservatism and commercial view have prevented Peugeot from 
establishing business in other parts of the world. The collected evidence shows that 
they do not take risks. In their relationship with Iran, their conservatism and 
commercial view has pre-dominated their strategic view. They have the market but 
they do not have a strategic view; they only look at it commercially and they do not 
take risks.  
 
Recently, The Financial Times (March 2012) reported that: "Peugeot the French 
carmaker that has more expatriate employees in Iran than any other western 
companies, is bringing the staff home until further notice". However, an official 
report by the Tehran Times (2012) shows that PSA Peugeot Citroen halted activity in 
Iran in February 2012 when economic sanctions against the Islamic Republic were 
decided upon by the US, EU and UN. The French car-making group has also stopped 
its exports of vehicles to Iran, which accounted for around 13 percent of the firm’s 
global deliveries last year. Iran was PSA Peugeot Citroen’s second-biggest market in 
2011 in terms of trade volume. Based on the evidence above, it is clear that the 
French could easily change their strategies and policies based on their own interests 
and the international political circumstances, and they could easily ignore the 
agreements as Peugeot did in the early 1990s in China and later in Iran.  The Planning 
& Future Strategy Senior Advisor stated that: ”in a recent study carried out in 
Europe on 300 individuals of which 7% were automakers and 3% suppliers of the 
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automotive industry, they examined this issue in one of their questions to see how the 
conditions and sustainability of the automotive makers are in the view of the 
questioned group. Interestingly, the Germans were  first, the Chinese second and the 
Indian third. If we look closely we will see none of our present partners are among 
these leading producers and have no place in the results of this study. This means 
that we have not selected the right partners that actually are more sustainable and 
stable in terms of their competitive position” (Interview 14A, p.4, paragraph 1).  
 
Khabar Online (2012) the national news agency recently conducted an interview with 
IKCO’s former Chief Executive Mr. Mantegi. They asked him about IKCO and 
Peugeot’s relationship. Mr. Mantegi mentioned that in 2007 IKCO had aimed to 
increase the percentage of locally made auto parts for the Peugeot brands in Iran. 
Mantegi mentioned that after 20 years of trade and partnership under Peugeot license, 
IKCO had made a new agreement with Peugeot to replace a new platform with the 
existing 405 and Pars. Furthermore, the organisation had agreed to work on a new 
joint project 207-platform in Iran with 22 Million Euro capital (50%-50%) ownership 
and both companies had signed this agreement. However, Mantegi stated that after he 
left IKCO the organisation’s policy changed and the agreement did not go ahead. 
 
Interestingly, a few hours later, Khabar Online (2012A) conducted another interview, 
this time with IKCO’s Spokesman. The Spokesman stated that there were no 
documents, information or evidence that showed that IKCO and Peugeot had signed 
the above-mentioned agreement. Spokesman has denied all above mentioned 
agreement This shows that sometimes domestic political changes can change an 
organisation’s short and long term policies very easily. Peugeot would be a great 
choice in a time of war and sanctions; unfortunately in that situation they had an 
upper hand. No other country would take the  risk or have the courage to work with 
Iran but the French did. They set an agreement and now they are selling their 
products to the Iranian market without paying much in the way of costs and without 
transferring knowledge. The 405 and Pars are 20-year old products and the 206 is a 
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10-year old product. IKCO has no power to change French interests and policies in 
the Iranian market. Peugeot is producing over 500,000 units of its old models in Iran 
via IKCO and most interestingly, whenever they feel like it they can stop the trade 
and change the agreement (as shown by the above-mentioned examples). Now it is 
clear that international / national political elements can influence and affect the 
process of knowledge management in organisations. International sanctions and a 
lack of competition between IJVs are two important elements that could have affected 
the relationship between Peugeot and IKCO. Peugeot is the main player in IKCO’s 
production cycle. It controls the production cycle and it controls what knowledge can 
be transferred into IKCO’s knowledge repository. It is possible that if IKCO had 
more than one strategic IJV partners and if the international-political factors around 
the country were steady, then there would be more possibilities of knowledge and 
technology transfer into IKCO’s NPD process. In addition, the domestic political 
instability is another factor that could easily change the organisation’s policy and 
cause the process of knowledge transfer fragmented. The research findings show that 
international and national political factors and economical factors play a very 
important role in the knowledge sharing activities in IKCO’s new product 
development process. International political and economic sanctions and domestic 
political changes have effectively changed the organisation’s performance 
dramatically.  
5.5. Knowledge acquisition, retention and creation within the R&D 
Centre 
“Knowledge of Research and development is created via a process by which 
information and know-how are shared and combined through various exchanges”                 
(Henard |& McFadyen, 2006, p.41). As already discussed, R&D members are the 
knowledge- intensive and expert group in an organisation. Their knowledge and 
expertise is very important to new product development, and their ability is the major 
strength of a product development strategy (Henard & McFadyen, 2006). Referring to 
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the literature and reviewing different generations of NPD processes shows that the 
R&D centre can be seen as a hub that gathers all possible and useful knowledge from 
internal or external sources (this can be tacit or explicit knowledge). IKCO 
established its own R&D centre in 1997 and it employs 600 experts, engineers and 
administrators in its R&D Department. IKCO has had several joint projects with a 
number of international auto makers and international auto designer, including 
Germany, England, France, Japan, Korea and Taiwan. It jointly designed the 
domestic brand called the SAMAND under the Peugeot 405 platform and finally in 
2001, the first generation of the SAMAND was introduced to the local and 
international market. From 2002 up until 2005, three different generations of 
SAMANDS were launched into the domestic and international markets. During the 
same period, IKCO and Peugeot worked closely on a joint project/product called the 
SD206, which was introduced to the market successfully in 2005. Among the 
interviewees at IKCO, the SD206 was widely recognised as a successful project. The 
interviewees mentioned that customer satisfaction with the SD206 was very high, and 
its quality was highly satisfactory. The SD206 was also recognised as a successful 
project because it was delivered to the market on time. IKCO invested money during 
the successful SD206 project and Iranian engineers were actively involved in its 
development and market launch. However, some of the key Iranian engineers left 
IKCO after the SD206 was successfully introduced to the market. Most recently, a 
report by the Head of the Trade and Industrial Committee at the Iranian Parliament 
showed that in the last 10 years over 1000 experts have left IKCO and 300 of these 
experts could have found jobs with other international automakers in Canada, the US, 
the EU and East Asian countries (Ghanoononline, 2012).  
 
The interview data reveals that those Iranian engineers left IKCO primarily because 
they believed that IKCO could not reward them financially and there were not enough 
new activities to keep them satisfied. (The Internal Accessories Mechanism Manager 
mentioned that these experts were looking for new opportunities, new projects and 
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new challenges, and IKCO could not provide these opportunities and conditions 
(Interview 04A, p.9, paragraphs 3-4)  
 
The problem of knowledge retention was repeatedly mentioned by both the key 
informant at PAD and IKCO's employees. According to the key informant at PAD: 
“none of the engineers involved in the SAMAND project had any platform experience 
at the beginning of the project and those trained experts gained knowledge during 
their missions in the UK and back at the R&D centre in IKCO, and unfortunately 
these experts have left the R&D” (Independent interview, p.9, paragraph5).  
 
The Planning & Integration Class A/B Manager also highlighted that: “a number of 
personnel were absorbed in the R&D and they were trained and gained experience 
during different activities. However IKCO could not keep them all and these staff 
gradually, one by one left the company. These people came to the R&D centre right 
after graduation and had academic and theoretical experience rather than practical 
and over the years these staff gained practical experience too and became a valuable 
asset for the organisation (tacit knowledge) and unfortunately the IKCO could not 
keep them inside the organisation” (Interview 07A, p.14, paragraph 2). These are 
some of reasons why IKCO’s R&D centre, which was built in collaboration with the 
British, could not successfully transfer the knowledge learned into developing a 
subsequent model. The above example indicates that the lack of recording of 
successes and failures in past projects in the organisational knowledge repository 
hindered future new product development.  
 
For example, the Planning and Integration Class C/D Manager mentioned that the 
lack of recording of successes and failures could affect a project: “in case of the 
projects that have problems in terms of time management [time to launch new 
products to market] we unfortunately do not have a clear specific system to record 
the reasons for delays. This is a problem everyone has in IKCO and it is very 
important. We specify a project to be done by next year in the line. After one year the 
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manager changes/leaves and there is no record of his personal knowledge 
[knowledge of failure and success of the project] and the new manager would say 
that this is wrong and we have to stop” (Interview 3A, p.6, paragraphs 1-2).  
 
This sentiment was echoed by other departments. For example, the Platform X90 
Manager said: “there is not such a clear system, a specific system to tell us how to 
store knowledge in IKCO, to tell us how to store and record knowledge of success 
and failure, so since it did not exist none could record and have access it" (Interview 
08A, p.6, paragraph 2). Similarly, the Market Planning Senior Advisor mentioned 
that: “none is in charge of recording knowledge of success and failure; in fact our 
boss has all the information from the people who have been here in the past. 
Recording information in the present is mostly done individually. I am individually 
remembering my successes and failures, but it is not stored in a common place. There 
is no such clear system and it is not fully stored and recorded and nobody can have 
access to my file, since it is in our mind and not in a system” (Interview 16A, p.9, 
paragraph 1). 
The Deputy Director of the NPD Department also mentioned that recording 
knowledge of successes and failures within IKCO was problematic : “we document 
the information but as there are no central record policies in IKCO, it is difficult to 
find it and in this case the organisation tends to take cost and buy the same 
knowledge that has been stored somewhere within the organisation. The organisation 
goes and buys the knowledge they had, maybe a little more advanced version. IKCO 
pays these costs and they have it no problem but in the private sector we cannot see 
this” (Interview 01A, p.5, last paragraph).  
 
The lack of knowledge recording meant that IKCO could not take its past experience 
forward and learn from it. Additionally, IKCO had to spend money and buy 
knowledge from outside. This coincides with Alavi and Leidner's (2001) comments 
that much of the knowledge an organisation needs exists inside the firm, but 
identifying what knowledge exists, and then recording, sharing and leveraging such 
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knowledge, remains problematic. The practice (or lack) of knowledge retention had a 
significant impact on IKCO's new product development process. This was evidenced 
in a number of examples within the NPD Department which failed to record its past 
successes and failures (especially in previous joint venture projects with foreign 
partners) and hence failed to transfer knowledge to domestic product development.  
 
The state protected market and a lack of strong competition among the automakers in 
the Iranian auto market are other factors that have affected  IKCO’s R&D activities.  
Based on the Research and Markets report (2011), IKCO overtook its competitor 
SAIPA and took charge of over fifty percent of the Iranian auto market in 2011. The 
report showed that IKCO produced over 774,965 cars in 2010, an increase of 20% on 
the previous year and that it aimed to produce 850,000 vehicles by the end of 2011. 
This result is interesting for an organisation / country under international sanctions. 
The Iranian government has invested in the car industry with restrictions on foreign 
trade and high tariffs on imported vehicles, and the result is that domestic car buyers 
have little option other than to turn to Iranian manufacturers. Khalaj (2013, p.1) 
reported that, “car production in Iran has long been a political matter with central 
government taking a role in directing the operations of IKCO and SAIPA. Many 
commentators are now urging the government to bail out the industry and most 
recently the government has promised to pay $814m to the two leading carmakers 
IKCO and SAIPA”. The Iranian auto industry has been subsidised by the government 
and is not operating in a truly competitive environment. The government’s support 
has hidden financial weakness and operating inefficiencies and there remain serious 
concerns about consistent quality control. However, it is clear that locally built parts 
do not always meet the required standards and with the move towards vehic les built 
solely from Iranian parts, there is concern about the reliability of these vehicles once 
they out are on the road. BMI (2009, Q4, p.28) reported that, “quality control remains 
a major issue in the Iranian automotive sector as the Iranian Standard and Quality 
Control Company (ISQCC) raised widespread alarm about the level of faults in 
Iranian manufactured cars, when it found that models with a high level of locally 
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sourced content had a far higher number of faults than those assembled or made 
jointly. The SAMAND had over 300 faults per car on average while the Kia and RD 
had more than 500 faults’.   
 
The immature intellectual property rights (IPR) in Iran are one of the factors that 
influence R&D activities. Iran has been a member of the WIPO since 2002, and has 
acceded to several WIPO intellectual property treaties; however, the country is not a 
signatory to the WIPO Copyright Treaty yet and this is affecting all innovative ideas 
and activities within the R&D Centre. For example, the Platform X90 Manager 
mentioned that: “ IKCO does not have its own standards and there is a chance that if 
we look at the SAMAND plans, we will see other automakers’ standards” (Interview 
08A, p.5, paragraph 3).  
 
The Technology Strategy Manager said: “we receive benefit from other automakers 
by applying benchmarking and it is mainly Peugeot. There are also other automakers 
but we are trying to benchmark the automotive makers who are at our level in terms 
of the product class mainly those in classes C and D. However, IKCO does not 
benchmark the SAIPA for technologies because IKCO knows that the existing 
technologies inside Iran and domestic automakers are not comparable to IKCO’s but 
in terms of quantity and product these local automakers should be monitored” 
(Interviewee 12A, p.11, last paragraph). The Adaption of Engine & Power 
Transmission Manager said: “we act based on a series of standards we have or have 
taken from somewhere else” (Interview 06A, p.7, paragraph 3).   
 
When the participants were asked about the importance of creating innovative ideas 
within the R&D centre, most answered that the stage of their knowledge and 
experience had not reached the level of thinking about creative ideas / projects;  
avoiding risk was very important and they usually tried to benefit from their 
international competitors’ findings (i.e. by copying their findings). Deputy Director 
of the NPD Department says: “there are several things that we have used for the first 
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time in our products, but these were the things that the imported cars already had. 
However, among the producers in Iran the IKCO was the first to use those systems” 
(Interview 01A, p.8, paragraph 2).      
 
The Planning & Control Senior Advisor said: “We use and apply all sources of 
information in our job. For example, the SAIPA has been leading in providing sales 
methods with respect to IKCO. Our sales were mostly in the form of pre-selling and 
cash sales and then we introduced selling in installments; the SAIPA was leading in 
this method and so we got this idea from SAIPA. We Iranians do not normally take 
risks” (Interview 14A, p.11, last paragraph).  
 
The participants believed that the experts and skilled personnel were IKCO’s most 
valuable assets and strength and that losing these knowledgeable personnel could be 
one of the major issues within the R&D department. The Head of SAPCO Testing & 
Research said: “highly educated knowledgeable individuals need motivation to stay 
and these people need to be satisfied technically or financially which is not permitted 
here in IKCO and I think this is exactly IKCO’s problem. Our experts are 
encouraged to go and work in UAE with a salary 3 times more than their salary in 
Iran, with many facilities, accommodation, car and many other facilities” (Interview 
36B, p.14, paragraph 1).   
 
The Materials Research Centre Manager argued that: “the individuals who have 
worked during the past 15-20 years in IKCO are the most valuable assets and these 
valuable people possess knowledge and experience and they are the capital of IKCO 
and generally Iran’s automotive industry” (Interview 34B, p.17, paragraph 1). In 
addition, the Technology Strategy Manager said: “we are losing engineering and 
research personnel and one reason is that the new projects should be specified. As 
long as there was the SAMAND project these experts had a job to do, but now there is 
no new project and they want  IKCO to have innovative projects and when there is no 
project the experts and engineers leave for a better job and position. To keep these 
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people we have to introduce good development projects in IKCO” (Interview 34B, 
p.14, last paragraph). 
 
The Market Strategy Manager said: “how to keep and encourage them falls in the 
field of HR. First of all the organisation must be dynamic and continuously introduce 
new projects. It should also pay more attention to HR issues. The selection of higher-
rank managers and engineers needs motivation such as intellectual and material 
support” (Interview 33B, p.17, paragraph 3). 
 
The Planning and Integration Class A/B Manager said: “every department has its own 
experts. For example, we have product engineers, who have high value for us here in 
this department. We cannot stop these people from leaving since IKCO does not pay 
for its human resources and the organisation considers both the top level and lower 
ranks the same” (Interview 29B, p.12, paragraph1).  
 
The Adaption of Engines and Power Transmission Manager said; “if I am satisfied 
financially and have a mind free of distractions, I will stay here at IKCO. I will focus 
on my job. If I am worried about my life costs then what I am doing will be inefficient. 
IKCO should care about the personnel’s needs, their families and try to secure these, 
then the personnel will concentrate on their jobs” (Interview 28B, p.12, paragraph 1).  
Based on the participants’ answers and reports presented by the Iranian parliament, it 
is obvious that IKCO has no mechanism whatsoever to keep its key personnel. The 
Design and Development of Engines Manager said: “the HR system does not know its 
personnel. For example; I am a first-rank or second-rank expert. There might be 
another person besides me who is also an expert of the same rank. Take further that 
he is so active and hard-working so if he takes a day off, the whole production line 
will be interrupted. But my presence in IKCO has practically no influence and I say 
spend my working hours doing my personal affairs. IKCO consider both of us the 
same. We are both first-rank experts in their view” (Interview 27B, p.20, 
paragraph1).  
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The participants mentioned that there were two possible methods of keeping 
personnel at IKCO. One of them was to motivate personnel; the majority of the 
people did not care as much about material needs as they did about motivation. The 
Deputy Director of the NPD Department said: “I know people here in IKCO who do 
not care about money and only try to satisfy themselves by doing good jobs and being 
effective. The other method is financial. A person who works here must have lifelong 
security and can meet his needs and these are two aspects of the problem. We do not 
have a goal. Thus we ask the personnel to do a job, but what at the end? One asks, I 
do the job and finally the project will stop or will be assigned to someone else. I know 
there is a career path in foreign countries and goal setting and policy making are 
based on the path. Every individual knows his / her path in an organisation. In IKCO 
we do not have such a path and many people are in a state of uncertainty” (Interview 
23B, p.20, paragraph 1).  
 
The question here is, if IKCO were private, how would it be different? The Materials 
Research Centre Manager believed that “a huge corporation like IKCO with the 
present situation could not exist as a private company as it could not afford itself. The 
reason is that political problems as well as policy making in Iran are such that a 
large company such as IKCO cannot make decisions easily” (Interview 35B, p.16, 
last paragraph). 
 
However, the Technology Strategy Manager said: “if IKCO was private it would 
definitely have higher productivity. At the current productivity level we cannot 
compete. When we mention private then it means IKCO should act competitively. We 
could compete with our 206 with Hyundai, KIA and other products out there in the 
market. We should improve our productivity, which is one of our major issues. If 
IKCO was private we could be less affected by government policies. For example, a 
great number of our investments are affected by these policies and these could be 
reduced. Perhaps losing our personnel would be much less. Due to the fact that 
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IKCO is not private we are losing many of our experts” (Interview 35B, p.14, 
paragraph.1).    
 
The Market Strategy Manager said: “perhaps many decisions that IKCO made and 
gave them up in the middle and started something new would be eliminated” 
(interview 33B, p.17, last paragraph). Based on the participants’ views, it would have 
advantage and disadvantages. If IKCO was private, it could take advantage of 
financial and technical support and it would be smaller.  
 
The IKCO & Peugeot Relationship Manager argued that: “Private organizations 
usually try to work with the smallest number of personnel. IKCO is a company that in 
addition to the mission it has in the industry, it also has a responsibility in creating 
employment and this is one reason why it is a huge corporation. Thus if it was private 
it would have both advantages and disadvantages. If IKCO was private this could 
become a problematic aspect that it could not establish desirable relations as foreign 
companies might not be willing to work with small companies. The other aspect is 
that, being private could cause the processes to run faster” (Interview 32B, p.6, 
paragraph 2).  
 
The Relationship between IKCO and Peugeot Senior Advisor sa id: “one of the most 
important issues is the financial aspect; when we mention the word private the 
interests and profit will become a priority. However, when IKCO is not private, then 
the profit will be a lower priority. Instead, other goals, particularly political ones will 
be of higher priority, since they are more related to government. After all, although 
financial goals are important to the government, other goals are a priority to them 
such as political and social ones. In a private company on the contrary, you have to 
watch the money you spend and look after your personnel that will bring you more 
profit” (Interview 31B, p.6, paragraph 2). If IKCO was private it would be much 
more productive, it would work in a goal-oriented manner and it would be more 
motivating. There is a big difference between cleaning your own car and cleaning 
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somebody else’s car. In this case, if IKCO was private, the personnel would feel a 
sense of owning the product. As already mentioned, there are several parallel systems 
duplicating each other and this is a big problem for IKCO at the present time. If it 
was private it would not work like this. There are jobs within the organisation that are 
duplicated in other departments and these jobs might not be necessary at all. The high 
number of personnel is a problem in itself.  
 
The Planning and Integration Class A/B Manager said: “there are a number of 
departments in IKCO which are not necessary. We currently have several 
engineering departments in IKCO, SAPCO, R&D and most of them are working in 
parallel and duplicating each other’s tasks. The quality department does not have 
any division as engineering but it also carries out engineering practices” (Interview 
number 29B, p.14, paragraph.1).  
 
The participants believed that the first thing that is usually paramount to a private 
sector company is loss and gain and trying to keep it positive. Also, the management 
of a private company attempts to take full advantage of the organisation’s capacities 
to enable it to maximize its revenues. It was believed that if IKCO was privately run, 
it would not bear many of the costs it does now. It might establish a stronger link to a 
partner to create a more varied product basket out of its production capacity. It would 
not be constrained to its existing products and therefore it could expand its markets, 
and thus its profit. Another important point is that at present there are several parallel 
departments in IKCO; these would not exist if IKCO was a private company.  
 
The Planning and Integration Class C/D Manager said: “the evaluation would be 
better if IKCO was private and would be better in terms of quality. Being  a private 
company will improve competitiveness and IKCO would act better in development” 
(Interview 25B, p.6, paragraph1).  
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Johne and Snelson (1988) believed that product development is an important key 
factor for the future of organisations, and based on Ansoff’s matrix a new product 
development strategy can be seen to be one of the main elements in an organisat ion’s 
growth. In the literature review the development of the NPD process has been 
reviewed and the findings show that the actual development of a new product is the 
process of transforming a new idea into a new product or a new service. The literature 
review showed that scholars such as Saren (1984); Baker and McTavish (1976); Jong 
et al., (2007); and Tidd et al., (2006) identified different models of new product 
development processes to explain and show the best way to achieve successful new 
product development.  
 
In addition, Hart and Baker (1994) argued that in order to be successful in the new 
product development process, a firm should simultaneously meet two important aims: 
firstly, maximizing the fit with customers’ needs; and secondly, minimizing the time 
to market. Scholars are always exploring and challenging different knowledge 
management concepts to achieve these two important aims.  NPD models talk about 
how to create, gain, record and share knowledge among departments, staff and 
organisations smoothly and effectively, and how to deliver it (new knowledge) to the 
final successful product or service.  
 
Models such as the department-stage model, the activity-stage model, the decision-
stage model all aim to introduce the best NPD process model with a higher degree of 
performance. The research findings show that IKCO’s NPD process can be 
recognised as an early developed NPD model the called Activity-stage model (See 
3.3.1.2). The research findings show that IKCO’s NPD process is broken down into a 
number of activities; each department carries out a specific task and passes the result 
the next department. In this model the departments specify the task needing to be 
conducted. However, the tasks are performed sequentially, which causes a long 
development time, communication problems among members and departments, and 
increased costs (Clark & Fujimoto, 1991).  
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The R&D centre can be seen as a hub that gathers all useful knowledge (both tacit 
and explicit) from internal and external sources in an effort to facilitate its new 
product development process. In this study, the explicit and tacit knowledge sharing 
was explored in the first two themes. Knowledge sharing through the knowledge 
repository mainly focused on issues around explicit knowledge sharing and 
knowledge sharing through interaction and socialisation mainly focused on issues 
around tacit knowledge sharing.  
 
However, it is important to mention that all of the factors (sub-themes) in these two 
early themes influence each other. The research findings show that there are 
knowledge sharing barriers in the context of IKCO’s R&D projects. IKCO, as an 
important organisation in Iran, is facing a variety of difficulties in its R&D projects: it 
is not able to keep its tacit knowledge (know-how) within the NPD Department; there 
is no clear strategy to record knowledge of successes and failures; there are issues 
around information technology; there is neither a clear strategy nor any guidelines 
regarding reward and motivation systems; and there are issues around top 
management support.  
 
The research findings confirm that, “there are always knowledge-sharing barriers in 
the context of R&D projects. Knowledge-sharing barriers in such contexts include 
codification, inadequate IT to support knowledge-sharing, a lack of initiative and 
strategy by the workers, a lack of time and suitable resources, communication 
barriers, and the interdependence of knowledge and skills between partners and 
participants”. (Santos et al., 2012, p.27)   
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CHAPTER SIX: DISCUSSION 
Based on the semi-structured interviews, company documents and published data          
(data triangulation) this study identified four key analytical themes that helped the 
researcher understand knowledge-sharing within the new product development process 
in IKCO. The research findings confirmed that although theory on knowledge sharing 
developed in the West is applicable to the Iranian context to some extent, knowledge-
sharing and knowledge-transfer processes are considerably influenced by the 
idiosyncratic organisational context, which in turn is significantly influenced by the 
wider context, such as the political regime, industry dynamics, technological 
development and institutional framework. The research findings are categorised into 
four main research themes. These four main themes are identified based on the 
methods that have been already discussed in the methodology chapter. The research 
themes are:  
  
1. Knowledge-sharing through the knowledge repository  
2. Knowledge-sharing through interaction and socialisation 
3. Knowledge-sharing with international joint venture partners  
4. Knowledge acquisition, retention and creation within the R&D                      
Knowledge-sharing through the knowledge repository has mainly focused on explicit 
knowledge sharing within the organisation and has explored different factors that 
affect the process. The second theme, knowledge-sharing through interaction and 
socialisation, generally focused on tacit knowledge sharing within the organisation and 
identified elements that play a central role within the process. The third theme, 
knowledge- sharing from international partners mainly focused on IKCO’s IJV 
partners and explored the facts that influence the process of knowledge-sharing 
between IJVs and the organisation. Finally, the fourth theme explored knowledge 
acquisition, retention and creation between IKCO’s R&D and other departments and 
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Organisational Processes 
 
            Who records the knowledge? 
 
How knowledge is classified? 
 
How knowledge is recorded? 
 
   Knowledge becomes known as power? 
identified a number of factors that influence knowledge management elements 
(acquisition, retention, creation and sharing).  
A number of factors that also impact the aforementioned themes are categorised in 
Figure 14. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14: Factors affecting  the research theme  
 
 
Evidence gathered through this research shows that, within IKCO, there is valuable 
knowledge such as documents, reports, CADs, maps and expertise in different forms, 
i.e. hard or soft formats. However, the evidence shows that IKCO does not benefit 
from these valuable assets. In other words, a number of factors impacting the 
knowledge repository fragmentation were identified. The fragmented knowledge 
repository was controlled and affected by several elements shown in Figure 14. 
Top Management 
Support 
Fragmented 
knowledge 
repository 
Existing IT 
system 
Trust as 
Cultural Issue 
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Firstly, the researcher reviewed some of the definitions of knowledge repository. 
Wang (1999) believed that knowledge repository is often used as a parallel 
terminology to organisational memory. Other scholars such as Walsh and Ungson 
(1991) argued that organisational memory is knowledge learned from past 
organisational experience, which can influence present decisions. In this study, the 
knowledge repository is defined as an organisational information management 
system, often centralised in the organisation or in a department, which captures, 
organises and stores knowledge. Therefore, the knowledge repository allows for the 
retrieval of knowledge to support specific tasks within the department or the 
organisation. In other words, the analytical theme "knowledge sharing through a 
knowledge repository" concerns sharing codified knowledge through a centralised 
knowledge repository in IKCO. Based on the participants’ answers and other 
supporting documents, three elements (sub-themes) effectively influence IKCO’s 
knowledge repository, as follows: 
 
1. Knowledge sharing through the knowledge repository (1st theme)  
 
Mudambi and Navarra (2004) and Bacon (2011) believed that having valuable and 
exclusive knowledge provides authority to the knowledge holders and can be used as 
a great tool within the establishment when there is a need for negotiation within or 
between organisations. The research findings supported the argument on the 
importance of knowledge for organisations and individuals within IKCO. The 
research findings confirmed that having exclusive knowledge within IKCO provided 
authority to the knowledge holders. The majority of IKCO’s staff believed that using 
their knowledge was an important factor when the organisation or other colleagues 
needed their knowledge. This exclusive knowledge is used as a tool for bargaining 
and negotiation within and between departments and organisations. The research 
findings show that the majority of the participants believed that once the holder of the 
knowledge (tacit or explicit) shares and stores their knowledge, and then he/she loses 
power. The instability of the organisation shifts the balance of bargaining power and 
253 | P a g e  
 
without this power the participants believed that it is impossible for one to survive. In 
addition, the research findings show that the hierarchy within IKCO caused 
information limitations; now, if a member has more information and knowledge, this 
means that he/she holds more power and this is one of the main reasons that the 
knowledge holders try to keep their valuable tacit or explicit knowledge and not store 
and share it in a common place. The research findings also show that the organisation 
did not have clear guidelines or regulations that could encourage the personnel to 
avoid such behaviour. The research findings in the sub-theme “effectiveness of 
information technology” show that information technology can be seen as one of the 
main factors that causes knowledge repository fragmentation in IKCO. The role of 
information and communication technology in knowledge management is widely 
recognised.   
In terms of  IT and knowledge sharing within the organisation, Davenport et al., 
(1998); Gourlay (2001); Borghoff and Pareschi (1997) and Davenport and Prusak 
(1998) argued that information technology enables better knowledge management 
activities, and that information technology, such as the Internet, Intranet and e-mail 
can be used, not only for the storage of explicit knowledge in databases but also as 
communication devices to exchange experience and knowledge with others (Egbu & 
Botterill, 2002). However, the research findings show that information technology 
has a limited role in knowledge management in selected Iranian firms and this may be 
due to the lower level of IT deployment in Iran. Akhaven and Jafari (2008) argued 
that firms in Iran look at IT as tool for facilitating some of their work and processes 
and not as an important enabler for knowledge management and learning. It is 
important to highlight that Hardaker (1998) argued that there is a need to invest in 
information technology. Akhavan and Jafari, (2008); Farhanghi et al., (2013); Valaei 
and Aziz, (2012), Albadvi (1999) and Gerami, (2010), all believed that information 
technology has a limited role in the knowledge management process in Iranian 
organisation. The research findings confirm that information technology in IKCO has 
not been fully developed yet and IKCO’s members are having difficulties when using 
their IT system.  
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Within IKCO, information technology is widely recognised as important; however, it 
is insufficient in terms of facilitating the process of knowledge acquisition, 
organisation and storage, as revealed in the interview findings. The research findings 
show that there are overlapping results in different sub-themes. For example, the 
findings show that there are issues around recording the knowledge of success and 
failure in IKCO’s knowledge repository (via information technology). IKCO did not 
have clear guidelines to show departments how to use information technology 
effectively to record knowledge of success and failure, and every department and 
individual acted independently. Within IKCO, there was a great deal of concern about 
the effectiveness, flexibility and quality of IKCO’s information technology (called the 
Information System) due to multiple issues embedded within IKCO. Issues such as 
data security and data protection overshadowed the functionality, flexibility and 
effectiveness of the Information System. IKCO’s Data Protection & Security 
Department believed that most of the available information, data and technologies 
within the organisation should be kept secret and protected. This policy also created 
access restrictions for personnel in different departments and different levels of the 
organisational levels. Ironically, information that was widely publicised in other 
countries, such as the company’s annual reports, HR reports and financial reports, was 
considered as confidential material in IKCO. 
The ineffectiveness of IKCO’s Information System was also due to a lack of 
understanding of departmental needs for Information Technology. Data classification 
had become a major problem since the organisation believed that every single piece of 
data/knowledge and every document was highly confidential material. The participants 
believed that it was safer if they kept their knowledge /data/ information out of the 
common place to avoid the risk of sharing and storing confidential elements of it.  The 
lack of clear guidelines on how the system could be used to record and classify data 
was another important issue hindering the effectiveness of the Information System. 
For example, the interviewees highlighted that the use of different formats for saving 
knowledge in the shared drive (repository) caused a great deal of difficulty and 
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frustration when individuals searched for information. There were no clear guidelines 
on how the data should be labelled and codified or on an appropriate filing method. 
Every department stored its valuable knowledge independently within the central 
Information System, or as hard copies in its own internal knowledge repository. In 
addition, the evidence shows that, within departments, there was no specific function 
to trace the activities and write about the problems faced along the way in different 
situations, and their solutions. The candidates mentioned that this information 
(knowledge of success and failure) was usually available in reports and the best person 
to consult was the project manager. However, IKCO does not have clear central 
regulations on this matter with regard to how everything should be written up, from 
initiation up to the end of the project.  
The lack of a clear guidelines caused great difficulty in the categorisation and retrieval 
of information and knowledge stored in the Information System. The lack of 
knowledge categorisation or an effective knowledge directory caused by the lack of 
clear knowledge-sharing guidelines was echoed in different departments and at 
different levels of the organisation. The issues surrounding regulations and rules 
related to the storing of knowledge of success and failure within the IKCO were 
obvious, and every department stored its knowledge in different ways; however, the 
main concern was centred on having clear central regulations and rules that could be 
provided by IKCO’s decision makers. Every department recorded its knowledge; 
however, there were no central recording policies across IKCO as a whole. Thus, it 
was difficult to find knowledge and the organisation tended to bear costs due to buying 
knowledge that was in fact stored somewhere within it. Alavi and Leidner (2001) 
argued that much of the knowledge an organisation needs can be found within the 
organisation but the main issue is that the organisation may not be able to identify that 
existing knowledge. For example, one participant mentioned a locker in the Strategy 
Department that contained over seven years of stored data (hard copy); however, the  
issue was how to find a single page of data within this massive knowledge store.  
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Lyles and Salk (2007); Sweeney and Hardaker (1994) and Marisa and Yusof (2011) 
argued that top management support is recognised as important for knowledge 
management and this is especially the case in organisations where the management 
team takes a more active and direct role in the business activities and decision 
making. Abdolshah and Abdolshah (2011) showed that knowledge management in 
Iranian organisations is a new subject and Iranian organisations top management 
support and commitment plays a very important role in knowledge management 
adoption and the learning process. As Bidmeshgipour et al., (2012) mentioned that 
top managers can provide better opportunities to their employees to have better 
training, and to generate fresh and new ideas and launch new services into their 
organisations. The findings of this research show that in IKCO decisions are 
centralised and then disseminated from the top to the bottom. The research identified 
two key roles of the top management in the lack of effectiveness of the knowledge 
repository: firstly, in encouraging individuals to contribute to the knowledge 
repository; and secondly, in developing guidelines for the use of the knowledge 
repository. It was clear that top management support was mainly associated with the 
organisational culture and information technology. The research findings show that 
IKCO’s top management did not do enough to support the development of an 
effective knowledge repository and top management support was perceived as 
increasingly negative since the introduction of a more hierarchical structure since 
2000. The findings show that, within IKCO, there was no common or mutual method 
of motivation, nor was there an encouragement and reward system. However, middle 
managers tried to introduce their own mechanisms for knowledge-sharing. There was 
no clear evidence of the effectiveness of these mechanisms. The lack of top 
management support caused the fragmentation of departmental practices. The role of 
top and middle management in the development and implementation of guidelines for 
knowledge-sharing through the repository was another key aspect. The evidence 
collected shows that the lack of top management support had caused the 
fragmentation of the Information System. Top management support in developing 
and implementing knowledge-sharing guidelines was clear in IKCO. However, there 
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was fragmented departmental effort in knowledge-sharing through contributing to the 
knowledge repository. There was not enough evidence of the efficiency and 
effectiveness of such departmental efforts. The more hierarchical structure in IKCO 
had caused fragmentation of the staff’s motivation and encouragement processes 
within the departments. This research also found that the lack of trust between 
members and managers could be seen as one of key elements that affected staff 
motivation and encouragement when the organisation aimed to share, transfer and 
record new knowledge.     
 
2. Knowledge sharing through interaction and socialisation (2nd theme) 
 
There are a number of elements such as cultural, technological and organisational 
factors that affect the knowledge sharing process within and between organisations 
(Mudambi & Navarra, 2004). Factors such as a lack of trust among members (Foos et 
al., 2006), a lack of experience on the recipient’s side (Szulanski, 2003), and the role 
of individuals (Smith et al., 2007; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Bock et al., 2005) play 
a very important role in tacit knowledge sharing among organisations. Yet, within an 
organisation there are always knowledge sharing barriers among R&D projects. 
These barriers include codification, information technology support, a lack of 
motivation among members, a lack of time and suitable resources, and 
communication issues (Santos et al., 2012). The second analytical theme is the 
constrained manner of knowledge sharing through interaction and socialisation within 
IKCO. Sharing knowledge at IKCO appeared to be conducted primarily via 
codification; the knowledge was embedded within materials (reports, plans). In 
contrast, the sharing of knowledge through the transfer of experience and the 
establishment of shared contexts such as through face-to-face interactions appeared 
secondary to the generation of information. Furthermore, IKCO appeared to actively 
hinder the sharing of knowledge through socialisation. In this section, a number of 
factors deriving from the interviews that impact on knowledge sharing through 
interaction and socialisation inside the company are discussed.  
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One of the findings centres on conflicts between departments that appeared to hinder 
knowledge-sharing within the organisation. One source of this conflict was job 
duplication across departments. This suggests that job duplication has become a 
problem for IKCO. The importance and impact of family and friends’ relationships in 
creating and sustaining job roles in Iran was further supported by the independent 
interviewee. This awareness of job duplication within the company not only makes 
IKCO cumbersome as an organisation and introduces a level of competition between 
departments, but also generates distrust between individuals. This also constrains the 
willingness with which individuals are prepared to share their knowledge with other 
members. One reason for this inhibition of individuals is job security, engendered by 
role duplication. It is important to mention that job security within IKCO is related to 
maintaining a person’s position within the hierarchy rather than losing his/her 
occupation. Job duplication and the consequent growth in personnel within IKCO had 
induced difficulties in terms of effective management. One sign of this was the formal 
restructuring that took place in 2000. This introduced a new layer of hierarchy that 
created additional managerial positions and ushered in a more formal planning 
approach. Interaction between the departments appeared to be formally structured and 
process based, with the roles strictly delineated. It is important to highlight that the 
participants emphasised activities in which information was passed on rather than the 
active sharing of knowledge. In other words, there was an emphasis on the explicit and 
codifiable, particularly through reports, rather than the sharing of tacit knowledge. We 
cannot say that interaction between departments was always strictly regimented. 
Sometimes, face-to- face interaction took place, typically in response to problem-
solving. The adoption of greater hierarchy by IKCO had also impacted on the transfer 
of knowledge within the company due to the unwillingness of senior managers to 
encourage and support the transfer of expertise and know-how. Just as individuals 
lower down the hierarchy were fearful of losing their position, senior managers were 
similarly concerned.  
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Another contributory factor inhibiting interaction and knowledge sharing within the 
company was the lack of a central clearly defined reward strategy that promoted the 
sharing of tacit experiences. This left the rewarding of individual contributions to a 
more ad hoc, localised approach, dependent upon the interests and whims of individual 
departmental managers. Lacking centralised direction, some managers had developed 
their own ways of encouraging knowledge-sharing. This important theme has explored 
the levels of knowledge-sharing in IKCO through interaction and socialisation using 
the interviews conducted in the field. From the departmental managerial point of view, 
the organisation did not encourage such knowledge-sharing, although exceptionally 
some middle managers had attempted, by example, to establish shared contexts and 
accordingly to generate trust. Hierarchy and job duplication within IKCO caused 
distrust between individuals who feared for the sustainability of their positions within 
the company and thus attempted to keep hold of their knowledge and expertise. The 
sharing of personally held knowledge did not lead to reciprocity, but rather position 
insecurity. To paraphrase Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995), IKCO did not systematically 
establish a field of interaction through which individuals could share their expertise 
and mental models. The research findings show that within IKCO, a lack of top 
management support, job duplication, the impact of family ties, the organisational 
hierarchy, job security, growth in personnel and the lack of a central clearly defined 
reward and motivation strategy, all negatively affected knowledge sharing through 
interaction and socialisation. 
3. Knowledge-sharing with international joint venture partners (3rd theme) 
The third analytical theme delineates knowledge-sharing with international joint 
venture partners. The international joint venture business strategy is a common type 
of entry method into a foreign market. This method gives quick access with low risk. 
Chrysostome et al. (2013, p.88) stated that, “joint ventures permit acquisition of new 
know-how and consequently present a good setting for the development of strategic 
competencies”. However, Beamish (1988) highlighted that sometimes, the expected 
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learning may not take place, and the partnership between the joint venture partners 
may result in conflicts relating to power, cultural difference and personal interests. 
The interview data revealed several key factors that influenced IKCO's experience of 
working with its two key international partners, and hence its experience of 
knowledge sharing and transfer. Below, three key factors influencing IKCO's 
experience are discussed: the cultural distance between IKCO and its international 
partners; the issue of trust in knowledge sharing; and the political factors that 
influenced its international collaboration. The research findings show that IKCO has 
been learning from its different business partners since 1962. However, a number of 
factors have affected this learning process. Cultural differences are known to 
influence the way people in different nations or different organisations work. The 
evidence collected shows that Iranians preferred a structured approach to knowledge 
acquisition that involves a high level of knowledge codification. In some ways, this 
also reflects the fact that tacit knowledge is hard to transfer, as Nonaka & Takeuchi 
(1995) believed. Effective tacit knowledge-sharing or explicit knowledge-sharing 
requires a different mechanism. For example, tacit knowledge is more easily 
transferred through interaction and socialisation, whilst, explicit or codified 
knowledge can be shared and transferred through a knowledge repository, as 
discussed earlier. The research findings show that the concept of trust was 
acknowledged as one of the key factors that could facilitate or hinder the intra-
organisational and inter-organisational processes—especially when knowledge-
sharing was concerned. In this case study, trust emerged as a key issue between 
IKCO and its international joint venture partners. A lack of trust was easily identified 
as an issue when neither IKCO personnel nor their IJV partner wanted to share and 
store their own knowledge with their colleagues or business partners. The IKCO staff 
and their IJV partners did not fully trust each other and they did not want (fully) to 
store their knowledge and share it with their colleagues. This issue could be seen 
easily in the examples of the successful SD206 and the failure of their domestic 
product. Having a low level of trust between members and IJVs can affect the process 
of storing knowledge effectively. In addition, the issue of trust can be seen more 
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clearly and is obvious when knowledge becomes known as power between the 
members and the IJVs. It is clear that if you do not trust your partner/colleagues, you 
will not feel able to share your interests with them. Political factors were another 
important element that directly and indirectly affected knowledge acquisition and 
knowledge-transfer among the IJVs. Specifically, in the case of Iran, current 
international and domestic political factors are directly linked to the issue of (a lack 
of) trust, highlighted previously. In the case of IKCO, Iran’s political relations meant 
that IKCO was restricted in its international cooperation. Issues such as international 
sanctions, banking, finance and logistics limitations, all affected knowledge 
acquisition and knowledge-sharing. According to the participants’ responses, it was 
clear that these political factors prevented the organisation from choosing the best 
possible IJV partners and that the IJV partners had the upper hand in many projects.  
In this study, within IKCO, political factors also affected the effectiveness of 
knowledge acquisition and knowledge sharing. The research findings show that 
international and national political and economic factors have played a very important 
role in the knowledge sharing activities in IKCO’s new product development process. 
International political and economic sanctions and domestic political changes have 
effectively changed the organisation’s performance dramatically.  
 
4. Knowledge acquisition, retention and creation within the R&D 
Department (4th theme)                    
The research findings show that as Henard & McFadyen (2006) argued, within 
IKCO’s R&D department, knowledge is created when information and know-how are 
shared and combined through a number of exchanges. The research findings show 
that IKCO’s NPD process can be recognised as an early developed NPD model called 
the activity-stage model. The research findings show that IKCO’s NPD process is 
broken down into a number of activities; each department carries out a specific task 
and passes the result on to the next department. In this model the departments specify 
the task needing to be conducted. The research findings show that within the R&D 
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department the majority of issues that have already been discussed are noticeable. As 
the researcher has already argued, the R&D department is a hub that gathers all 
possible knowledge and all related matters (matters related to knowledge). In 
addition, a number of new findings are also highlighted in the 4th theme; for example, 
the research findings indicate that the lack of recording of successes and failures in 
past projects in the organisational knowledge repository have hindered future new 
product development. The research findings show that IKCO could not keep its 
know-how, knowledge and expertise and that knowledgeable staff could easily leave 
the R&D department. The organisation could not effectively motivate and encourage 
its members to create, share and store knowledge. The research findings also show 
that the lack of financial reward within the organisation can be seen as one of the 
reasons for members leaving the organisation. The research findings also show that 
there are knowledge sharing barriers in the context of IKCO’s R&D projects. IKCO, 
as an important organisation in Iran, is facing a variety of difficulties in its R&D 
projects: it is not able to keep its tacit knowledge (know-how) within the NPD 
Department; there is no clear strategy to record knowledge of successes and failures; 
there are issues around information technology; there is neither a clear strategy nor 
any guidelines regarding reward and motivation systems; and there are issues around 
top management support. The research findings confirm that, “there are always 
knowledge-sharing barriers in the context of R&D projects. Knowledge-sharing 
barriers in such contexts include codification, inadequate IT to support knowledge-
sharing, a lack of initiative and strategy by the workers, a lack of time and suitable 
resources, communication barriers, and the interdependence of knowledge and skills 
between partners and participants”. (Santos et al., 2012, p.27). Figure 15 shows the 
final research framework after the discussion.   
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6.1  The Research Framework after Discussion  
Knowledge management in the NPD process  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15: The research frame work after discussion 
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This study aimed to investigate issues on knowledge-sharing in the new product 
development process in a single embedded case study (IKCO) in particular. This 
research investigated the way in which Western theory on knowledge-sharing and 
transfer can be applied, refined or developed in the Iranian context. It is important to 
mention that the “terms knowledge- transfer and knowledge- sharing are sometimes 
used synonymously or have overlapping content” (Paulin & Suneson, 2012, p.1).  
 
Jonsson (2008, p.39) argued that, “within the frame of reference both knowledge 
sharing and knowledge transfer are used and discussed interchangeably”. In addition, 
it is better to recall the definition of knowledge-sharing and knowledge-transfer first 
and then move on to the research framework (Figure 15). “Knowledge-sharing refers 
to the provision of task information and know-how to help firms and individuals to 
work together and collaborate with others to solve issues, develop new ideas or 
implement policies or procedures. Knowledge-sharing can occur via written 
correspondence or face-to-face communications through networking with other 
experts” (Wang & Noe, 2010, p.117). In the knowledge-sharing concept both parties 
benefit from each other’s knowledge.  
 
Furthermore, knowledge-transfer has typically been used to describe the movement of 
knowledge between different units, divisions or organisations (Szulanski et al., 2004) 
and they may or may not benefit from their joint business. As already stated, IJVs 
have become a widespread type of entry into foreign markets. IJVs are a way for 
overseas organisations to enter new markets faster with lower risks. On the other 
hand learning in the host organisation has always been recognised as one of the main 
motivations of IJV establishment (Lane et al., 2001). It is clear that both IJV partners 
will benefit from the collaboration. One side will enter the market with lower risk and 
will benefit from the business generated, and the other side (home/recipient) will 
benefit from their internationa l partner’s experience and knowledge and try to 
develop and improve their own or the shared business. The research framework 
(Figure 9) is drawn based on the research literature review and Western theories 
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around the research interest.  In figure 9, Knowledge-sharing between organisations 
(IJVs) and individuals is shown as double sided arrows (                  ).These double 
sided arrows show that both parties are benefiting from their joint business by sharing 
knowledge mutually. However, in the final research framework (Figure 15) the 
knowledge-sharing concept between the IJVs, individuals and departments is not 
steady and, based on macro and micro factors, the knowledge-sharing concept is 
affected and becomes known as knowledge-transfer (             ). In the final research 
framework within IKCO, one side may benefit from the joint business and the other 
side may not; the result is that knowledge-sharing activity can be transformed into 
knowledge-transfer activity.   
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSION  
The first chapter (introduction) provided an overview of the thesis and the importance 
of the research. As a piece of research involving a single case study, it was important 
to have a clear view of the research context. Chapter Two reviewed the auto industry 
locally and internationally and highlighted the strengths and issues within the Iranian 
automotive industry, and particularly in IKCO. It was important to review this unique 
industry and identify its issues, strengths and weaknesses. It has been mentioned that 
the automotive industry is one of the fastest growing industries within the global 
economy and, based on this view, the Iranian government has highlighted the Iranian 
auto industry as one of the key industries for its economic growth. However, reports 
and independent investigations have shown that, within the industry, there is a diverse 
lack of effective knowledge sharing between domestic and international partners. The 
cause of these weaknesses was investigated in Chapter Five in the data analysis and 
findings. 
The third chapter (literature review) brought together a number of key elements from 
the knowledge management literature in order to develop a better understanding of 
knowledge sharing and the new product development process. These key elements, 
such as knowledge transfer, knowledge creation and the NPD process, were all 
reviewed. Knowledge based theory of the firm and the role of knowledge management 
elements in the new product development process were investigated. It was argued that 
the ability to understand the technology and market knowledge (absorptive capacity), 
and experiences and expertise that were embodied in employees’ minds or saved in the 
organisation’s knowledge repository (prior knowledge) support the new product 
development process. In addition, literature about different types of knowledge (tacit 
and explicit), the development of the NPD process and knowledge-sharing and 
knowledge creation were also reviewed and at the end of chapter 3, there was a 
specific section on knowledge management in Iran. As Abdolshah and Abdolshah 
(2011) argued, the knowledge management concept in Iranian organisations is almost 
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a new subject and Iranian organisations are slowly developing this concept. Yet, 
compared to developed countries, knowledge management in Iran is in its early stages.    
The fourth chapter (research methodology) described the methods that were used to 
gather the data in order to justify the research objectives and answer the research 
questions. This qualitative research is characterised by an emphasis on describing, 
understanding and explaining complex phenomena such as the relationships, patterns 
and configurations within the organisation (IKCO). As an interpretivist researcher, 
questions such as what/why/how helped the researcher to understand the research 
questions in a detailed way. As mentioned previously, case study method was the 
strategy chosen to undertake this empirical investigation. Open-ended questions give 
candidates the opportunity to respond in their own words rather than forcing them to 
choose from fixed responses. This qualitative method allowed the researcher the 
flexibility to investigate participants’ responses. The semi-structured interview was 
identified as an important method for gathering evidence. This method of interviewing 
helped the researcher to ensure that the key knowledge management elements within 
IKCO were investigated. 
In Chapter Five, the main research themes based on the participants’ answers and the 
secondary data collected were identified and discussed:  
 
 Knowledge-sharing through the knowledge repository  
 Knowledge-sharing through interaction and socialisation 
 Knowledge-sharing with international joint venture partners  
 Knowledge acquisition, retention and creation within the R&D                      
 
A number of elements (sub-themes) were identified which were effectively 
influencing the four main themes mentioned above. Smith et al., (2007) argued that 
organisations are interested in particular types of tacit knowledge-sharing which 
provide value to their organisations. Based on the quotes above and the evidence 
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presented here, within IKCO there is valuable knowledge all around the organisation; 
this includes knowledge such as documents, reports, CADs, maps and expertise in 
different forms. However, the evidence shows that IKCO does not benefit from these 
valuable assets. A number of factors and elements, known to be causing fragmentation 
of the knowledge repository were identified.  The organisational process was one of 
the central factors raised when the fragmented knowledge repository within IKCO was 
asked about. It was mentioned that knowledge has become known as power, in 
particular when the personnel felt that their job security was under threat. The staff 
believed that if the organisation or other colleagues needed them, they had more 
chance of surviving and securing their positions. If the holder of the knowledge (tacit 
or explicit) shared or stored his/ her knowledge then he/she would lose this power. The 
organisation’s instability had shifted the balance of bargaining power and without this 
power the participants believed that it was impossible for them to survive. The 
hierarchy within IKCO had caused information limitation; if a member ha more 
information and knowledge, this meant that he/she was holding more power, and this 
was the main reason that knowledge holders tried to retain their valuable tacit and 
explicit knowledge and not store or share it in the common place. It was clear that the 
organisation did not have clear regulations encouraging personnel to avoid such 
behaviour.  
Issues surrounding the recording of the knowledge of success and failure in IKCO’s 
knowledge repository were another important factor within the organisational process. 
IKCO did not have clear guidelines to show its departments how to record knowledge 
of success and failure and every single department and individual acted independently. 
The evidence shows that within each department there is  no specific person who 
traces all of the department’s activities and writes about the problems faced along with 
situations and solutions. The participants mentioned that this information (knowledge 
of success and failure) is usually available in reports and the best person to consult is 
the project manager. However, IKCO does not have a clear central regulation on this 
matter, with regard to where everything should be written about, from the initiation up 
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to the end of the project. It was interesting to see that most of the participants 
mentioned their German and English partners as good examples of recording 
knowledge. The participants believed that the Germans and English recorded 
everything in their projects, and if the project manager left their job, the records were 
still there and there was no problem. However, the personnel and organisation could 
not learn from this lesson and the successful joint project (SD206) and unsuccessful 
domestic project were the best examples of this weakness. IKCO did not have a clear 
strategy to encourage its personnel to record the knowledge they had gained during the 
SD206 project.  
The issues around the regulations and rules related to storing knowledge of success 
and failure within IKCO were obvious and every department stored its knowledge in 
different ways. However, the main concern was about having clear central regulations 
and rules that could be provided to IKCO’s decision makers. Every department 
recorded its knowledge; however, there were no central record policies in IKCO as a 
whole, and it was difficult to find the knowledge. Importantly, in this case, the 
organisation tended to shoulder costs to buy the same knowledge that had been stored 
somewhere. Alavi and Leidner (2001) also argued that much of the knowledge an 
organisation needs can be found within the organisation; however, the main issue is 
whether the organisation can identify this existing knowledge. For example, one 
candidate mentioned a locker in the Strategy Department with over seven years of 
stored data (hard copy), but the issue was how to find a single page of data within this 
massive knowledge store.  
Data classification was also a major issue and this had become a major problem when 
security and data protection became important for the organisation. The organisation 
(Security and Data Protection Department) believed that every single piece of data and 
knowledge, and every document was highly confidential material. The participants 
believed that it was safe if they kept their knowledge/data/information out of the 
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common place, to avoid the risk of sharing and storing confidential elements in a 
public place.    
The concept of trust, the existing IT system and top management support were other 
major elements that could facilitate/influence/control the organisational process during 
the fragmentation of the knowledge repository. The issue of trust could be seen clearly 
in the example of the successful SD206 and in the failure of the domestic product 
highlighted. Having a low level of trust between members and IJVs could affect the 
process of storing knowledge effectively; in addition, the issue of trust could be seen 
more clearly when the knowledge became known as power amongst the members and 
IJVs. It is clear that if you do not trust your partners/colleagues then you will not feel 
able to share your interests with them. The existing IT system was highlighted as one 
of the key facilitators within the organisational process that could affect the process of 
storing knowledge. Borghoff and Pareschi (1997) and Davenport and Prusak (1998) all 
argued that the availability of certain information technologies has been important in 
improving and facilitating knowledge management activities (such as storing 
knowledge). However, the use of IT within IKCO was problematic, and issues relating 
to IT usage affected the organisational process when members tried to store their 
knowledge of success and failure in the knowledge repository.  
Limited access to the software and hardware and a lack of clear central regulations on 
how to use IT in a better common sense and financial issues all affected the use of 
information technology for the storing of knowledge. It is important to highlight the 
security and data protection issues here. It was difficult to establish what kind of data 
could be stored and who could have access to data. The shortage of clear regulations 
on the classification and codification of the stored data can be seen as one of the main 
concerns here. Top management support with regard to storing knowledge in IKCO’s 
knowledge repository was highlighted as one of the main elements that could 
influence and control the organisational process. Elements such as motivation, 
encouragement, reward and regulation on the knowledge storing process were 
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identified as part of the top management’s supportive actions. The evidence shows that 
IKCO did not have clear central regulations/ rules on motivation, encouragement and 
reward when knowledge was stored by a member. However, every department had its 
own way of motivating and encouraging its staff to share and store their knowledge. 
There was no financial reward within IKCO; every department’s reward system was 
different and rewards were non-monetary.  
The purpose of this thesis was to investigate issues on knowledge-sharing in the new 
product development process in a single embedded case study (IKCO). The findings 
reveal a range of issues influencing three key knowledge-sharing processes within the 
IKCO. These three key knowledge-sharing processes are:  
 
 Knowledge-sharing through a centralised knowledge repository;  
 (Vertical) knowledge-sharing along the organisational reporting line;  
 (Horizontal) knowledge-sharing across departments and knowledge-transfer 
from international partners.  
 
Based on the findings, within IKCO, there is valuable tacit/explicit knowledge across 
the organisation. This knowledge (explicit) could be documented or it could be 
embedded in employees’ minds (tacit) across the organisation. However IKCO, as the 
owner of this valuable knowledge (tacit /explicit), could not fully benefit from it, and 
there were always issues surrounding the sharing of knowledge between members, 
departments and IJV partners.  
The first issue identified was when knowledge became known as power amongst 
IKCO’s members.  The participants mentioned that this issue occurred when they felt 
that their job security within IKCO was very poor. The majority of the participants 
believed that, if IKCO or other colleagues needed their knowledge, then they had more 
chance of surviving and securing their positions. The candidates believed that if they 
shared or stored their knowledge, they might lose the power. Instability of 
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organisations at a macro or micro level, such as political change at a macro level and 
managerial change at a micro level, shift the balance of bargaining power and without 
this power it is impossible for one to survive. The hierarchy was identified as one of 
the issues that was causing knowledge-sharing fragmentation within the IKCO. The 
hierarchy caused information limitation, and the majority of the participants 
highlighted that, if a member had more information and knowledge, then this meant 
that they held more power. There was no reason to share this power with any others, as 
highlighted by the participants. It was mentioned that IKCO did not have clear 
guidelines or regulations that encouraged the personnel to avoid such behaviour. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, IKCO did have knowledge repositories across its 
departments. The main concern was related to the way that knowledge of success and 
failure was recorded within these repositories. First of all, there was a lack of clear 
guidelines to show the departments how to record knowledge and this issue was 
pointed out by the majority of the participants. The evidence collected shows that 
within the departments there was no specific person to trace the department’s activities 
and record the problems faced along with the solutions. The participants argued that 
the organisation did not have clear regulations on this issue and that each department 
recorded knowledge of success and failure in different ways, in different formats and 
using different categorisations. In addition, it was difficult to identify specific 
knowledge within these repositories; in this case, IKCO tended to bear costs because it 
would buy the same knowledge that was stored somewhere within the organisation. In 
addition, a lack of connection between different repositories was another issue. Data 
classification was also identified as one of the major issues in storing knowledge of 
success and failure within IKCO’s knowledge repository. Data protection had become 
important for the organisation and the Security and Data Protection Department 
believed that every single piece of data and knowledge, and every single document 
was highly confidential material. The majority of the participants argued that, to avoid 
the risk of sharing confidential material, they preferred not to share information or data 
in the knowledge repository. Other factors, such as the existing IT system, top 
management support and the concept of trust, were other major elements influencing 
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knowledge-sharing within IKCO’s knowledge repository. The IT system at IKCO was 
highlighted as one of the facilitators of knowledge-sharing within the organisation. 
However, limited access to software and hardware, financial issues and a lack of clear 
guidelines all affected the use of IT in the knowledge-sharing process. The majority of 
the participants highlighted that it was difficult to understand what kind of data could 
be stored and who could access those data. Participants also mentioned that financial 
difficulties have caused the organisation’s hardware and software to remain out-of-
date. Top management support was one of the key factors potentially influencing 
knowledge-sharing within IKCO. Elements such as personnel motivation, 
encouragement and personnel reward systems were identified as part of top 
management’s supportive action. However, the insatiability of the policy makers at the 
macro and micro levels had caused a diversity of management attitudes within IKCO. 
The evidence collected shows that, within the organisation, departments have different 
motivation, encouragement and reward systems and each department acts in different 
ways. However, the reward systems within the departments were non-monetary. In a 
state-owned organisation, such as IKCO, the majority of policies and regulations are 
made by the top managers. However, the instability of the top managers (due to the 
international and national political circumstances) does not allow the organisation to 
establish long-term plans, policies and regulations; all of these are unstable and one 
early decision can easily be rejected or ignored by new managers.  
I have aimed to investigate issues on knowledge-sharing in the new product 
development process within a single embedded case study called Iran Khodro 
Company (IKCO). I have argued that IKCO is Iran’s most important automotive 
company and it has struggled to develop new products independently, despite its 
experience of jointly developing new products with international partners. I have 
argued that western theories on knowledge sharing and knowledge transfer can be 
applied, refined or developed in the Iranian context. This empirical study was based on 
40 in-depth semi-structured qualitative interviews conducted with 25 senior and 
middle managers from key important departments relevant to the NPD process.  
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Besides the primary data, secondary data based on published industry reports, 
unpublished company reports and other international reports supported the analysis of 
the interview data.  
The findings show that within the organisation a range of elements influence the four 
key knowledge-sharing themes. The findings show that although theory on 
knowledge-sharing and knowledge-transfer developed in the West are applicable to 
the Iranian context to some degree. The knowledge-sharing process is significantly 
controlled by the idiosyncratic organisational context, which in turn is significantly 
influenced by the wider context, such as the political regime, industry dynamics, 
technological development and institutional framework. The final research framework 
(figure 15) clearly shows that within IKCO the knowledge-sharing process become 
knowledge-transfer. One side (of IJVs) may benefit from the joint business and the 
other side may not. However, as we already disused, IJVs are a way for overseas 
businesses to enter new markets faster with lower risks and on the other hand learning 
in the host organisation has always been recognised as one of the main motivations of 
IJV establishment (Lane et al., 2001)   
7.1.  Empirical Contribution  
This research, as an empirical study, had the opportunity to investigate the knowledge-
sharing concept in the new product development process in one of the most important 
automakers (IKCO) in Iran. However, due to the international and national political 
and economic circumstances in Iran, there are always access limitations for 
researchers; these limitations make it difficult for researchers to deeply and freely 
investigate issues within the Iranian automotive industry. For example, a comparison 
between the number of studies which have been done on Western or international 
automakers and Iranian automakers shows that there is a gap between the quantity and 
quality of these research works. This is further highlighted by the limited number of 
academic studies on the Iranian auto industry within international academic journals. 
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The Iranian automotive industry is a unique area for empirical studies, and has the 
potential to create good opportunities for researchers (who are able to) to investigate 
and examine methods and theories.  
7.2.  Limitations and Further Research  
This study has a number of limitations that further research should address. First, due 
to time and budget limitations, this study focused on a state-owned single case study. 
However, it would be better to include another case study that is privately owned, with 
both organisations’ views on knowledge sharing in the NPD process. Second, during 
the fieldwork, it was impossible to interview and meet the foreign partners (Peugeot’s 
employees working in IKCO); this issue caused a limitation with regard to the foreign 
partners’ views being addressed to meet the research objectives. It is recommended 
that further research should try to access overseas’ employees, and ask questions and 
interview them. Third, as mentioned previously, in many emerging countries, such as 
Iran, the government is directly involved in relationships with foreign investors 
(Ferretti & Parmentola, 2010, p.175). During this study there were several ways in 
which the macro and micro scales effectively influenced this research. International 
and national political factors, such as government change in Iran and international 
sanctions against it, caused difficulties in completing the research smoothly and on 
time. As already mentioned, in emerging countries such as Iran, political exchange 
may cause business and management activities to be impacted very easily and 
researchers should take additional care with regard to how such upcoming issues are 
tackled. Fourth, due to the aforementioned issues and the access limitations to both the 
organisational and state data, this research mainly adopted a qualitative approach. 
Subsequent research should try to find ways to gain access to the data and to apply 
quantitative methods to the study as an additional supporting tool. The researcher 
hopes that further research continues to challenge and explore knowledge-sharing 
activities within the NPD process, and that the results may help organisations to share 
knowledge smoothly and freely amongst members, departments and organisations.  
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  APPENDICES  
    Appendix 1: Opening Questions 
Main questions Probing questions Interviewees 
1. Please tell me about 
yourself?  
 Age: (How old are you?)  
 Educational background: (What subject / degree have you studied?)  
 Current job positions: (What is your current job position in IKCO?)  
 Length of current job at IKCO: (How long have you been working in your current position?)   
 Why you joined IKCO: (What was the reason you joined IKCO?) 
 How you joined IKCO: (How you became a member of IKCO?)  
 Length of time at IKCO: (How long have you been working for IKCO?) 
 Past job location: (Where did you work before coming to IKCO?) 
 Past job positions: (What was your job position in the previous job?) 
 Length of pervious job before IKCO: (How long did you work in your current position?)      
Gender :  M    F  
All  
2. Tell me about the history 
of IKCO?  
 When did IKCO set up?  
 How did IKCO set up?  
 Key events in IKCO history? (e.g. change of leadership, change of structure, change of 
ownership, political regime)?   
 Which important new technologies introduced in the past in IKCO’s history?  
3 
A, B, C, D, E   
3. What does your 
department do?  
 What is the main role of your department within the company? 
 How can you describe the relationship between your department and JV?   
All  
4. What role do you play 
within your depart. ? 
 
 What is your responsibility within your department?  
 Who reports to you and who do you report to?  
 How many people do you supervise and manage?  
 Please describe your typical day in the office? Please give me an example? 
All  
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Appendix 2: General questions: 
Some general questions will be collected from the company databases  
Main questions   
1. The company personnel’s educational background within different 
departments ( How many people in each )  
 Particular attention to the background of the R&D and Marketing 
departments  
 The difference between domestic and JV staff ‘s background  
 High School  
 HND 
 BSc/BA 
 MSc/MA 
 PhD 
From databases or get 
from VPs or Heads of 
departments   
2. The company personnel’s educational background in terms of 
subjects within different departments? 
 Particular attention to the background of the R&D and Marketing 
departments  
 The difference between domestic and JV staff ‘s background 
 For example :  
 BSc in mechanic? 
 BSc Electronic?  
 BA Finance?  
From databases or get 
from VPs or Heads of 
departments   
3. Categorising personal work experience within d ifferent 
departments?    
 Particular attention to the background of the R&D and Marketing 
departments  
 The difference between domestic and JV staff ‘s background 
 Less than 5 years  
 Between 5-10 years  
 Between 10 – 15 years  
 Between 15 – 25 years  
 Between 25 – 30 years  
 More than 30 years  
 In Iran staff can work 
maximum 30-years 
From databases or get 
from VPs or Heads of 
departments   
4. R&D intensity to measure ACAP at business unit level. Marketing intensity will be measured at 
business unit level.  
 R&D intensity shows expenditure in R&D department.  
 Where they spent this money. For example; they spent this amount of money for expanding th eir 
buildings or they spent this money on a new technology. And the rate of inflation have to be 
recognised year by year  
 This is going to be year by year from 1997 (establishment of R&D) t ill 2010.  
From databases 
Main questions:  
What is the role of prior knowledge in the process of knowledge transfer in the NPD process?  Prior knowledge means that the knowledge which is 
available within the organisation from the past experience and project and it can be documented or it can be in people’s mind    
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   Appendix 3: Prior knowledge  
3. Prior Knowledge (PK)  
Main questions Probing questions Interviewees 
1. Where do you go if you need help or if you have 
problem?  
 Do you refer to recorded informat ion  
 Do you refer to company regulations? 
 Do you refer to technical manual?  
 Do you go and ask your colleagues?  
 Do you ask people outside your company, 
such as family, friends and ex-classmates? 
All  
2. What are the most common problems you come across?  
3. Tell me about a specific example?  
 How do you solve these problems? All  
4. How do you record success and failu re of your past 
projects?  
 Who is responsible for recording the 
informat ion?  
 Who has access to such information?  
 How do you use the informat ion recorded 
whether success or failure?  
All  
5. How do you gather market feedback about your products 
and who do you report to these market feedbacks? 
 How do you gather domestic feedback?  
 How do you gather international feedback?  
 What steps do you take to apply these 
feedbacks to development of a new product?  
 Please tell me an example? 
3  
B , E  
 
What is the role of absorptive capacity in the process of knowledge transfer in the NPD process?  
Absorptive capacity is an ability to recognise issues, analyse those issues and solve and find answers for those issues  
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     Appendix 4: Absorptive Capacity 
4.1 Absorptive Capacity ( ACAP)  
Main questions for  Acquisition capacity Probing questions Interviewees 
AD1: 
1. Who are the key players / firms in the auto sector?  
2. What is the position of your company in the auto 
sector?  
3. Who are potential competitors to your sector? 
 Who is responsible for gathering the 
informat ion? 
 How do you gather informat ion on them?  
 What kind of in formation do you collect?  
 How do you use the informat ion? 
 Who has access to the informat ion?  
3 , 4 , 5 ,  
 A, B, C , E  
AD2 & AD3: 
4. What sort of relationships do you have with external 
knowledge sources such as R&D / technical institutes 
and universities? 
5. Could you take me through a specific example please?  
 
 Who are the most important and valuable? 
 How do you gather informat ion on them?  
 Who is responsible for gathering the 
informat ion? 
 What kind of in formation do you collect?  
 How do you use the informat ion? 
 Who has access to the informat ion?  
3 , 4 , 5 ,  
A, B, C ,E  
 
Above questions will measure: Acquisition capacity  
 
 
AD1: knowledge of the competition              AD2: Openness towards the environment     AD3: R&D cooperation     
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4.2 Absorptive Capacity ( ACAP)  
Main questions for  Assimilation capacity   Probing questions Interviewees 
AS1, AS6 & AS5  
1. How do you encourage employees to increase their 
knowledge / skills? 
2. Can you give me a specific example?  
3. How do you identify training needs for employees?  
 Is this successful and why?  
 How can you have access to external 
events (e.g. conferences) ? 
2, 3 , 4 , 5 ,  
 B, C , D , E  
AS2:  
4. What technologies / new business processes / new 
manufacturing processes / new ways of doing things 
have you introduced in your current role?  ( depends on 
who I am interv iewing)  
5. Have they all been successful?  
6. Take me through a specific successful example?  
7. Take me trough a specific unsuccessful example?  
8. What have you learnt from the experience?  
 What have you done differently since 
then? 
 What would you do differently from now 
on? 
 Why?  
2, 3 , 4 , 5 ,  
B, C , D, E 
AS3: 
9. What do you do that is different from other firms in your 
sector? 
10.  Take me trough a specific examples? 
11.  Are there lessons (success or failure) from other firms 
in the sector that you are thinking of applying?  
12. Why?  Take me through a specific example?  
 How do you think these lessons will 
change the company? 
 Improvement  ( better)  or / worse   
2, 3 , 4 , 5 ,  
B, C , D, E 
AS4:  
13.  In what kind of circumstances employees can attend 
and present papers at scientific conferences and 
congresses. Or receive outside staff on research 
attachments?  
 Are there any benefits for employees who 
are attending and what are those benefits?  
 When they return, how do they share the 
informat ion with other people in the 
company?  
 And who do they share with?  
3 , 4 , 5 ,  
A, B, C , 
Above questions will measure: Assimilation capacity   
AS1: Assimilation of technology   AS2: Human resources    AS3: Industrial benchmarking   AS4: Involvement in spreading the kn owledge   AS5: 
Attendance at training courses and professional events      AS6: Knowledge management  
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 4.3 Absorptive Capacity ( ACAP)  
Main questions for  Realized ACAP   
Transformat ion capacity  Probing questions Interviewees 
TR1:  
1. How do you manage and use information technologies (IT) 
in order to improve information flow?  
 What IT facilities do you have? 
 How do you encourage your staff to use IT to 
share knowledge? 
 How do you manage virtual meetings between 
professionals?   
3 , 4 , 5 ,  
A, B, C ,E 
TR2:  
2. What would you say are the firm’s key capabilities / 
strengths in NPD? 
3. What do you do differently in NPD from other firms in the 
automotive sector? 
4. Is there any good practice in NPD in others firms that you 
could learn from 
 How you can improve the ability of the firm’s 
capacity to get rid of out of date internal 
knowledge, thus motivating the search for 
different innovation? 
 R&D, specifically laboratory and equipment, 
staff,  
 How is integration between departments? 
 How is integration with external sources?  
3 , 4 , 5 ,  
A, B, C ,E 
TR3: 
5. How do you adapt technologies designed by others to the 
firm’s particular needs?  
6. Take me through a specific example?  
 Who in the company are responsible for / expert 
in this area? 
 Do you work with firm (s) or experts outside the 
company when adapting technologies?  
3 , 4 , 5 ,  
B, C  
TR4:  
7. How do you encourage your staff to share their own 
knowledge and information with others?   
 How does the organisation benefit from staff’s 
knowledge? 
 How is the staff who shares knowledge with 
others rewarded?  
3 , 4 , 5 ,  
A, B, C , E 
TR5: 
8. In terms of managing the R&D process within the 
organisation, how do you coordinate tasks between 
engineers, production lines and marketing people? 
9. How do R&D and marketing departments work together? 
10. Take me through a specific example?  
 Is there any routine plan for this coordination 
programme?  
 Who makes the final decision if any differences 
among different people / departments?  
3 , 4 , 5 ,  
B, C , E 
Above questions will measure: Realized ACAP   
TR1: Trans mission of the IT-based knowledge                      TR2: Renewal capability                            TR3: Adaptation capacity  
TR4: Exchange of scientific and technological informat ion    TR5: Integration of R&D  
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4.4 Absorptive Capacity ( A CAP)  
Main questions for  Application capacity    Probing questions Interviewees 
AP1:  
1. What new technologies are you implementing at 
present? 
2. What have been the challenges and how do you deal with 
them?  
 How do you categorise level of 
organisational / technical adaption?   
3 , 4 , 5 ,  
B, C  
AP2: 
3. What steps do you take to apply a new knowledge into 
product and process development?  
 
 
 
 When you find out a new knowledge / 
informat ion; how you are going to apply 
and use it in your own NPD process?  
 Who are the key people you should talk to 
about this and how makes the final 
decision? 
 Generally speaking, how long does it 
normally take fo r a decision to be made? 
3 , 4 , 5 ,  
A, B, C , E 
 
AP2:  
4. If you want to introduce a new technology – how would 
you go about it?   Take me through a specific example?  
 
 What are the procedures? 
 Take me through a specific example?  
3 , 4 , 5 ,  
A, B, C , 
AP3:  
5. What are the key pressures (political, economic, social, 
technological, legal, competit ive, etc.) on the company in 
terms of the marketplace and how do you think you will 
respond to these pressures?  
 Who is responsible for gathering the 
informat ion?  
 How is the informat ion circulated and 
discusses?  
 Who are involved in the decision making 
if any action must be taken? 
 Take me through a specific example?  
3 , 4 , 5 ,  
A, B, C , E 
Above questions will measure: Application capacity    
           AP1: New knowledge exp loitation             AP2: Development of patents   AP3: Technological proactiveness  
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      Appendix 5: Knowledge Creation 
5. Knowledge Creation (KC)   
Main questions for   Probing questions Interviewees 
1. How do you encourage employees to develop new 
ideas / technology?  
 How / when do you encourage your 
employees to test and exchange unusual 
knowledge and ideas? 
 What happens if they are successful? 
 What happens if they are not successful?  
3 ,  4 , 5 
A , B , C , E  
2. How are colleagues encouraged to cooperate with 
others and in what situation?   
 How are staffs mot ivated to exchange 
knowledge with group members?  
All  
 
1: Culture for risk taking            2: Culture for teamwork    3: Number of new product and service (to be asked in general questions)                             
4: Knowledge Stocks   ( a part of screening questions)       
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     Appendix 6: Knowledge Transfer  
6. Knowledge Transfer (KT)   
Main questions for   Probing questions Interviewees 
1. Tell me about how your department  works with the JV  
2. Tell me how your department (JV) works with other domestic 
departments. 
3. How are t he key people liaising / coordinating the work between 
JV and domestic departments?  
4. How do you exchange knowledge and expertise between JV and 
domestic departments? Take me through a specific example.  
5. What are the major difference in terms of way of working between 
JV and domestic departments (OR how do JV and domestic 
departments work d ifferently)?  
6. In what areas do JV and domestic departments work together?  
  Did you actively transfer locally 
developed technological /know-how 
to other manufacturing or R&D units 
between 1997 -2010   (In 1997 the 
first national brand introduced). 
 What steps do you take when you 
want to transfer your knowledge to 
other R&D / organisation?  
 Have you  received by the same 
means as above technological know-
how developed from other R&D 
units into  your company between 
1997 -2010   (In 1997 the first 
national brand introduced). 
3 
A,B,C,D 
7. What has been learnt from the JV? Can you give me specific 
examples? 
8. How are such lesson transferred into the departments? 
9. Which department has benefited the most? And why? 
10. Which department has benefited the least? Why?  
11. What has the JV learnt from you?  
 In terms of  processes  
 In terms of technology  
 In terms of skills   
2 , 3 
A , B , C , E 
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   Appendix 7: New Product Development 
7. New Product Development (NPD)   
Main questions for   Probing questions Interviewees 
New product development types: 
 
1. How does your department approach NPD?  Take me 
through the process of developing a particular new product 
in recent years?  
2. Have you tried different approaches in the past? 
3. How did it work? Take me through a specific example? 
4. Are you aware of other approaches to NPD in other firms? 
And whether you are thinking of adopting one of these 
approaches?  
 How / where a new NPD project usually starts? 
 Who are the key decision makers? And who else 
are involved?  
 Where is the idea from (top, middle management 
or shop floor)?  
 How do you explain relationships with other 
NPD ? 
 Does each department carry out it is own special 
task within the new product development process 
or is there one team responsible for all 
development process?   
 What is the role of marketing and sales people in 
the NPD process?  
4  ,  5 
B , C, E  
Success:  
 
5. How do you measure the success or failure of your 
individual new product development projects? 
6. What measure of success do you currently use? (financial / 
Non-financial)  
 What measure do you think would be best 
evaluate the success or failure of the new 
products your organisation introduces? 
 How do you test and validate these 
developments? 
 At what stage do you bring in customers’ opinion 
/ influence on NPD?  
 3 , 4 , 5 
B , C , D , E 
 
Process: 
7. What is the source of most new product ideas? 
  
 How do you validate your product for the end 
customer?  
 
  3 , 4 , 5 
B , C , E 
8. How do you work with your suppliers?   
 Have they (suppliers) ever put forward a new 
suggestion and what did you do with their 
suggestions?  
 Please give me an example  
3  
B, E,  
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Q: Is there anything else about the organisation / department that you think I should know (will help my research) or any fin al comments you 
would like to make?  
           Appendix 8: Closing questions: 
 
 Thanks  
 Whether I will talk to h im/her again to clarify some points  
 I will tell h im/her that the interview is over. Off the record, ask him/her to tell me how they feel about working in the company. 
 I will note down his/her personal reflection straightaway after the interview.  
 
 
 **** This is a very important process to reflect whether they have given me genuine answers or official lines.  
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These questions will be asked in terms of 3 different brands   (SD, SAMAND &5-Doors SAMND) 
 
Appendix 9: Inter- Org Factors: 
 
                     
                         
 
 
A1. Can you describe how you are working with different international partners?  
A2. What issues did you face during a project when you worked with the international partners?  
 
A3. What were the key issues during SD206, SAMAND, 5-Door SAMAND?  
A4. How d id you resolve the issues? 
A5. Describe your working style and is there any difference before and after your JVs  projects? 
A6. How do you describe the working approach of the different international partners?  
A7. Did you fell to adopt your working style? What did you do to adopt yourself?  
A8. What have you learned most from each partner and how did that take p lace?  
A9. How d id you use that knowledge?  
A10. Is / was there anything or other factors that influenced your relationship with each of your 
partners (French, German, Korean, and Japanese)?  
A11. What could you have done to learn more from your partners? Can you give me an example when 
you tried to learn from your partners?  
A12. Where and how do you get your informat ion about what is happening in the production lines? 
A13. Are you happy with the style of the transferring informat ion from production lines to you?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A
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Appendix 10: Organisational Factors: 
 
 
                      
 
B1. How would be different if the IKCO was a private company?  
B2. How do you feel about the automotive technology in Iran compared with the international 
competitors? 
B3. How do you rank IKCO’s cars quality in the Iranian and International market?  
B4. What is your strength and weaknesses compared with each of your international partners?  
B5. How did people at the top perceive these three products?  
B6. Do you have any system to capture new knowledge, transfer it and save at IKCO?  
B7. How do you define successful and unsuccessful in the NPD project?   
B8. What is the most successful project in the NPD and why?  
B9. What is the most unsuccessful project in the NPD and why?  
B10. How would you characterise the support you are getting from IKCO’s board for the R&D 
activities within SD, SAMAND, and 5-Doors SAMAND? 
B11. How do you identify the roles and responsibilit ies among employees? I have notice that there is 
product quality role in the R&D department and also in Production department and also in SAPCO? 
How do you identify and exp lain this?  
B12. Is there any incentive to do some new ideas for staff?  
B13. What type of projects do you enjoy more?  
B14. What is your definit ion about risky project?  
B15. Where newcomers / new employees come from in last 2 years and most recently?  
B16. Who IKCO not to effort to lose and why?  
B17. Who in your view is the technical expert, and why?  
B18. Who makes things happened? (Within the department, project champions, in terms of SD, 
SAMAND and 5-Doors) and what made them effective?  
B19. How do you record knowledge, particularly success and failure and who has access to this 
knowledge?  
B15. What would make it easy to share knowledge between different departments at IKCO?  
B16. How do you try to retain the key people?  
B17. How do you work with other departments and is there anything that would help you to work 
better with them?   
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Appendix 11: R&D Department Factors: 
  
 
                       
 
C1. Did you find it easy or difficu lt to work with your international partners and why> and what would 
helped? 
C2. How do you get informat ion from your customers and how do use this information?  
C3. How do you work with your suppliers?  
C4. What have you learned from suppliers?   
C5. What is the role o f the SAPCO and how do you coordinate with SAPCO?  
C6. What would help you to work better with your suppliers?  
C7. What have you learned from that project?  
C8. Do you think the SD206 project was successful or unsuccessful and why?  
C9. Why 5-Doors Samand was unsuccessful? 
C10. What lessons were learnt from SD206?  
 
 If the answer is no lessons learnt, then I will ask why they could not learn  
 If the answer shows that they have learnt from SD, I will ask: why they could not apply those 
lessons to 5-Door SAMANDS   
C11. How do you work with universities in Iran?  
C12. How do you make sure that you get the up-to-date data & technologies in the world?  
C13. How d id you come to IKCO? Who are the key knowledgeable people inside or outside IKCO?  
C14. What do you reckon is the best way to attract these talented people?  
C14. Do you know the history of IKCO? What do you know? And who did you hear that from? 
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Appendix 12: For the French Members only: 
 
 
 
 
Name; Positions; The duration of work at IKCO; The work experience; Education; work background:  
  
F1-Can you tell me the history of French and IKCO JV?  
F2-Can you tell me when you started to work at IKCO and what is your role and responsibilit ies?  
F3- How do you describe your relationship with IKCO?  
F4- Can you describe working style of IKCO?  
F5- How do you communicate with the IKCO?  
F6- In what areas can you communicate with the IKCO?  
F7- Are there some aspects that Peugeot does not want to share with IKCO?  
F8- Who is the key person within this JVs relationship and what these people do and how they 
communicate with each other?  
F9-What do you think about the SD & 5-door Samand projects & reasons for success and failure?  
F10- What have you and IKCO learned from each other and how did that take place?  
F11-Is there any other factors that influence the learning from each other?  
F12-Do you involve IKCO in the design of a product or development of a pro ject? 
F13-How does Peugeot benefit from this JV with IKCO?  
F14- What contribution does Peugeot make to IKCO?   
F15- What contribution does IKCO make to Peugeot?  
F16- How IKCO can benefit from this JV?  
F17-How do you see political factors influence this relat ionship? 
F18. What is surprised you about working with IKCO?  
F19- Why Peugeot wants to have JVs relat ionship with IKCO?  And what was the benefit for Peugeot? 
F20- Was / is there any target for this JVs relationship for Peugeot?  
F21- What is the strength and weaknesses of IKCO?  
F 
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 naisreP ni snoitseuQ tisiv tsriF :31 xidneppA     
  
  seeweivretnI سئوالات فرعی  سئوالات اصلی 
 به من بگوئید  ؟ نکاتی در مورد خودتان .5
 تان  ؟سن  .1
 مدرک تحصیلی؟ .2
 شغل فعلیتان در ایران خودرو؟ .3
 مدت اشتغال به شغل فعلی  در ایران خودرو؟ .4
 علت پیوستن به ایران خودرو؟ .5
 نحوه آغاز به کار شما در ایران خودرو؟ .6
 به چه مدت در ایران خودرو مشغول به کار هستید؟  .7
 شغل قبلی شما در چه ارگانی بود ؟ .8
 بود؟مسئولیتتان در شغل قبلی چه  .9
 مدت اشتغال به کار قبلی؟ .11
  جنس؟ .11
   llA
مختصری در خصوص تاریخچه ایران خودرو به  .6
 ؟  من بگوئید
  تاریخ  افتتاح ایران خودرو؟ .1
 نحوه آغاز به کار ایران خودرو؟ .2
 رویداد های مهم  در تاریخچه ایران خودرو به عنوان مثال تغییر مدیریت ؟ .3
  خودرو به نظر شما چیست؟مهمترین ت کنولوژی به کار رفته در ایران  .4
 3
   E ,D ,C ,B ,A
 
مسئولیت های  حوزه ای که در آن مشغول به کار  .7
 هستید  ؟ 
 مهمترین مسئولیت حوزه شما در ایران خودرو چیست؟ .1
 چگونه است ؟ VJ   نحوه ارتباط  بخش  شما ب ا قسمت  .2
   llA
مسئولیت کاری شما در بخش که در آن فعال  .8
 هستید چیست ؟
 
 شما در بخشتان چیست ؟ مسئولیت 
 چه کسانی به شما گزارش میدهد و شما به چه کسی گزارش میدهید؟  
 چند نفر تحت نظارت شما فعالیت می نمایند ؟ 
 لصفا یک روز کاری تان  را با ذکر مثال مختصرا  توضیح دهید ؟ 
   llA
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  :snoitseuq niaM
  ?ssecorp DPN eht ni refsnart egdelwonk fo ssecorp eht ni egdelwonk roirp fo elor eht si tahW
 ti dna tcejorp dna ecneirepxe tsap eht morf noitasinagro eht nihtiw elbaliava si hcihw egdelwonk eht taht snaem egdelwonk roirP
    dnim s’elpoep ni eb nac ti ro detnemucod eb nac
  )KP( egdelwonK roirP .2
 seeweivretnI snoitseuq gniborP snoitseuq niaM
  در صورت بروز مشکل به کجا مراجعه می نمائید ؟ .6
 آیا به آرشیو اطلاعاتی کارخانه مراجعه می نمائید؟ .1
 آیا به آیین نامه کارخانه مراجعه می نمائید ؟ .2
 نمائید؟آیا به دفترجه راهنما مراجعه می  .3
 آیا با همکارانتان مشاوره می نمائید ؟ .4
 آیا با آشناهایتان در خارج از کارخانه مشورت مینمائید ؟ .5
  llA
 رایجترین مشکلاتی که با آن روبرو می شوید ؟ .7
  لطفا با ذکر مثال توضیح دهید؟ .8
معمولا برای حل  چنین مشکلاتی چه راهی را پیش می  .1
 گیرید؟
  llA
شکستهای احتمالی در پروژه های کاری گذشته را چگونه موفقیتها و یا  .9
  ثبت می نمائید؟
 چه کسی مسئول ثبت این اطلاعات مب یاشد؟ .1
 چه کسی دسترسی به این اطلاعات را دارا می باشد ؟ .2
  چگونه از این اطلاعات استفاده می نمائید ؟ .3
  llA
چگونه اطلاعات بازاریابی را جمع آوری میکنید و به چه کسانی این  .11
 اطلاعات را گزارش می دهید؟
 چگونه اطلاعات بازاریاب ی داخلی را جمع آوری می نمائید ؟ .a
چگونه اطلاعات بازاریابی خارجی را جمع آوری می  .b
 ?نمائید؟
چه اقداماتی را جهت استفاده از این نظر سنجی ها در  .c
 ارتقای محصولات تولیدی و یا خدمات به عمل می آورید؟
 .باره بیان کنیدلطفا مثالی را در این  .d
  3
  E , B
  ?ssecorp DPN eht ni refsnart egdelwonk fo ssecorp eht ni yticapac evitprosba fo elor eht si tahW
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  seussi esoht rof srewsna dnif dna evlos dna seussi esoht esylana ,seussi esingocer ot ytiliba na si yticapac evitprosbA  
 
  )PACA ( yticapaC evitprosbA 1.3
 seeweivretnI snoitseuq gniborP yticapac noitisiuqcA  rof snoitseuq niaM
 :1DA
 شرکتها حرف اول را در صنعت خودرو می رنند ؟/چه کسانی .6
 موقعیت ایران خودرو در صنعت خودروی ایران چیست؟ .7
 مهمترین رقبای تجاری شما چه کسانی هستند ؟ .8
چه کسی مسئول جمع آوری اطلاعات در باره این      
 موضوع می باشد؟
 چگونه این اطلاعات جمع آوری می شوند؟ 
 چه نوع اطلاعاتی را جمع آوری می کنید ؟ 
 چگونه این اطلاعات مور استفاده قرار می گیرند ؟ 
  چه کسی دسترسی به این اطلاعات را دارا می باشد ؟ 
  , 5 , 4 , 3
  E , C ,B ,A 
 :3DA & 2DA
سطح روابط شما با منابع اطلاعاتی و تحقیقی خارج از شرکت مانند  .9
 دانشگاه ها چگونه می باشد؟
 آیا می توانید موردی را در این باره توضیح دهید ؟ .11
 
 چه کسانی مهمترین  و با  ارزشترین منبع می باشند ؟ 
 چگونه این اطلاعات جمع آوری می شوند؟ 
 می کنید؟چه نوع اطلاعاتی را جمع آوری  
 چگونه این اطلاعات مور استفاده قرار می گیرند ؟ 
 چه کسی دسترسی به این اطلاعات را دارا می باشد ؟ 
  , 5 , 4 , 3
  E, C ,B ,A
 
  yticapac noitisiuqcA :erusaem lliw snoitseuq evobA
 
               noitarepooc D&R :3DA     tnemnorivne eht sdrawot ssennepO :2DA              noititepmoc eht fo egdelwonk :1DA
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  )PACA ( yticapaC evitprosbA 2.3
 seeweivretnI snoitseuq gniborP   yticapac noitalimissA  rof snoitseuq niaM
  5SA & 6SA ,1SA
 چگونه کارکنان را برای کسب مهارت و دانش بیشتر تشویق  مینمائید؟ .41
 آیا می توانید مثالی در این باره ذکر کنید ؟ .51
  چگونه تشخیص ب ه نیاز اموزش دیدن کارکنانتان می دهید ؟ .61
 آیا این روش موفقیت آمیر می باشد ؟ 
چگونه می توانید به دانش خارج از شرکت مانند  
 داشته باشید ؟کنفرانسها دسترسی 
  , 5 , 4 , 3 ,2
  E , D , C ,B 
  :2SA
روش نوین /روش جدید تولید / تکنولوزی نوین/چه راهکار تجاری .1
 )بستگی به مصاحبه شوند ه دارد.(انجام کار خاص را به کار برده اید
 آیا تمامی روشهای به کار رفته موفقیت آمیز بوده اند ؟ .2
 روش به کار رفت ه ارائه نمائیدلطفا مثالی در قبال موفقیت امیز بودن  .3
  لطفا مثالی در قبال نا موفقیت امیز بودن روش به کار رفته ارائ ه نمائید .4
  چه تجربیاتی را از بکار بردن این روشها  به دست آورد ه اید ؟ .5
 چه چیز خاصی را متفافت  از قبل انجام د اده اید ؟ 
 چه چیزی را متفاوت انجام  خواهید داد ؟ 
  چرا؟ 
  , 5 , 4 , 3 ,2
 E ,D , C ,B
 :3SA
 چه کاری را متفاوت  از دیگران در حوزه خودتان انجام می دهید؟  .1
 لطفا با ذکر مثال توضیح دهید .2
 آیا در فکر به کار بردن تجربیات رقبایتان در حوزه کاریتان هستید؟ .3
  چرا ؟لطفا ب ا ذکر مثال توضیح دهید .4
پیشبینی شما  از عاقبت  به کار بردن این تجربیات  
 چیست؟
 پیشرفت و یا پسرفت؟ 
  , 5 , 4 , 3 ,2
 E ,D , C ,B
  :4SA
به چه نحوی کارکنان می توانند مقالات خود را در کنفرانسهای علمی  o
و یا صنعتی   ارائه دهند و یا  از محققان خارج از محدوده شرکت 
  مشارکت بگیرند؟
آیا فوایدی حاصل کارکنانی که در این نوع کنفرانسها  
 کنند می شود؟شرکت می 
به چه نحوی کارکنان داشن آموخته ای خود از این چنین  
 کنفرانسها را به اشتراک می گذ ارند؟ 
 با چه کسانی این اطلاعات را به اشتراک می گذارند؟ 
  , 5 , 4 , 3
 , C ,B ,A
   yticapac noitalimissA :erusaem lliw snoitseuq evobA
  :5SA   egdelwo nk eht gnidaerps ni tnemevlovnI :4SA   gnikramhcneb lairtsudnI :3SA    secruoser namuH :2SA   ygolonhcet fo noi talimissA :1SA
  tnemeganam egdelwonK :6SA      stneve lanoisseforp dna sesruoc gniniart ta ecnadnettA
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  )PACA ( yticapaC evitprosbA 3.3 
   PACA dezilaeR  rof snoitseuq niaM
 snoitseuq gniborP  yticapac noi tamrofsnarT
eweivretnI
 se
  :1RT
نحوه مدیریت و استفاده از  ای تی  جهت انتقال اطلاعات را در حوزه  o
 خود توضیح دهید  ؟
 را ن ام ببرید  ؟   TIامکانات موجود  
 چگونه به کارگیری ای تی را در بین کارکنانتان ترویج می کنید ؟  
  به چه طریق ملاقاتهای مجازی را مدیریت می کنید ؟  
  , 5 , 4 , 3
 E, C ,B ,A
  :2RT
 در شرکت چیست  ؟    DPNبه نظر شما نکات قوت  حوزه   .1
انجام  DPNچه روشهای متفاوتی در مقایسه با رقیبان خود در حوزه  .2
 میدهید؟  
از رقیبان خود سراغ    DPNآیا روشهای خاص و مفیدی در حوزه  .3
 دارید که میتوانید از آن استفاده بکنید ؟ 
چگونه میتوانید قدرت دفع اطلاعات غیر ضروری و کهنه شرکت را بهبود  
 بخشیده ؟ و قدرت خلاقیت  به وجود آوردن محصولی جدید را  بهبود ببخشید  ؟
 و ی ا آزمایشگاه و یا وسایل آزمایشی ؟    D&R 
 چگونگی ارتباط بین دپارتمانها  ؟  
 چگونگی ارتباط با مؤسسات خارج از شرکت ؟  
  
  , 5 , 4 , 3
 E, C ,B ,A
 :3RT
  چگونه تکنولوزی های ابداء شده توسط دیگران را بکار میگیرید ؟ .1
  لطفا مثالی را در این باره ارائه دهید ؟ .2
 مسئولیت این کار را بر عهده دارند؟چه کسانی  
آیا برای به کار گیری تکنولوزی های جدید از من ابع خارج  از شرکت استفاده  
  می نمائید ؟
  , 5 , 4 , 3
  C ,B
  :4RT
به چه نحوی کارکنان را ترغیب به سهیم کردن همکارانشان  از  .1
   تجربیات شخصی و یا حرفه ای می نمائید ؟
 از دانش کارکنان بهره می برد؟سازمان شما چگونه  
آیا کارکنانی که دانش خود را به اشتراک میگذارند  از طرف شرکت تشویق می  
  به چه نحوی؟/ شوند؟ 
  , 5 , 4 , 3
 , C ,B ,A
 E
 :5RT
در شرکت ایران خودرو ، چگونه هماهنگی   D&Rدر  ارتباط با مدیریت .1
  د ؟بین  مهندسین و خطوط تولید و بازازریابان ایجاد میکنید
 و بازرایابی را توضیح دهید ؟    D&Rچگونگی  ارتباط بین بخش . 2
 لطفا مثالی را در این باره ارائه دهید ؟  .3
 آیا روال خاصی در مورد هماهنگی وجود د ارد ؟ 
  در صورت بروز اختلاف و یا ناهماهنگی بین بخشها تصمیم نهای ی با کیست؟  
  , 5 , 4 , 3
 E , C ,B
   PACA dezilaeR :erusaem lliw snoitseuq evobA
  yticapac noitatpadA :3RT                            ytilibapac laweneR :2RT                      egdelwonk desab-TI eht fo noissim snarT :1RT
  D&R fo noitargetnI :5RT    noi tamrofni lacigolonhcet dna cifitneics fo egnahcxE :4RT
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  )PACA ( yticapaC evitprosbA 4.3
 seeweivretnI snoitseuq gniborP    yticapac noitacilppA  rof snoitseuq niaM
  :1PA
 چه تکنواوزی نوینی را در حال حاضر اجراء می نمائید؟ .3
با چه مشکلاتی در این راه رودرو شده اید و به چه نحوی سعی در  .4
  برطرف کردن آنها دارید ؟
تکنولوژی را چگونه طبفه سطح  سازمان دهی و اقتباس  
   بندی می نمائید ؟
  , 5 , 4 , 3
  C ,B
 :2PA
 
چه اقداماتی را در جهت به کار گیری دانش و فن آوری های نوین به .  3
  عمل می آورید؟
 
 
 
هنگامی که دانش و ی ا اطلاعات جدیدی را کسب می کنید  
 چگونه آنرا را در فرایندDPNکارمیگیرید؟ 
مورد تخصص د ارند و چه کسی تصمیم چه کسانی در این  
 نهایی را اتخاذ میکند؟
 برای اتخاذ تصمیم نهایی عموما چقدر وقت لازم است ؟  
  , 5 , 4 , 3
 E , C ,B ,A
  :2PA
چگونه تکنولوزی جدید را به کار می گیرید لطف ا با ذکر مثال توضیح .   4 
 دهید؟
 روند کار چیست؟ 
  لطفا با ذکر مثال توضیح دهید 
  , 5 , 4 , 3
 , C ,B ,A
  :3PA
از لحاظ کسب و یا حفظ مقام شرکت در بازار خودرو چه فشارها و یا .   5
قانون ی و یا رقابتی /تکنولوزیکی/اجتماعی/اقتصادی/مصائبی اعم از سیاسی 
  را احساس می کنید؟وچگونه با این فشارها مقابله می کنید ؟
 عهده دارد؟چه کسی وظیفه کسب این اطلاعات را بر  
 روند نشر اینگونه اطلاعات به چه نحویست؟ 
در صورت نیاز برای تصمیم گیری در این موارد چه کسانی   
 مسئول هستند؟
 لطفا با ذکر مثال توضیح دهید؟ 
  , 5 , 4 , 3
 E , C ,B ,A
   yticapac noi tacilppA :erusaem lliw snoitseuq evobA  
  ssenevitcaorp lacigolonhceT :3PA         stnetap fo tnempoleveD :2PA             noitatiol pxe egdelwonk weN :1PA  
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  noitaerC egdelwonK   
   )CK( noitaerC egdelwonK .4
 seeweivretnI snoitseuq gniborP   rof snoitseuq niaM
تکنولوزی تشویق می /ابداع اندیشهبه چه نحوی کارکنان را در راه  .3
 کنید ؟
چگونه و در چه زمانی کارکنان را تشویق به بکار گیری  
 روشها و دانش های نا مرسوم و غیر معمول  می نمائید؟
 در صورت موفقیت چه گونه برخورد می کنید؟ 
 در صورت ناموفقیت چگونه برخورد می کنید ؟ 
 5 , 4  , 3
  E , C , B , A
   تشوی ق به همکاری با همکارانشان می شوند؟کارکنان چگونه  .4
کارکنان چگونه تشویق به اشتراک گذاشتن دانش خود ب ا  
  گروه کاریشان می شوند ؟
  llA
 
                                )snoitseuq lareneg  ni deksa eb ot( ecivres dna tcudorp wen f o rebmuN :3            krowmaet rof erutluC :2            gnikat ksir rof erutluC :1  
       )snoitseuq gnineercs fo trap a (   skcotS egdelwonK :4  
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  refsnarT egdelwonK   
   )TK( refsnarT egdelwonK .5
 seeweivretnI snoitseuq gniborP   rof snoitseuq niaM
 را شرح دهید  ؟   SVJنحوه همکاری دپارتمان خود بین   .21
 چگون ه با دیگر حوزه ها همکاری می کند؟)  SVJ( حوزه شما  .31
 چه کسانی مسئولیت هماهنگی بین شریک خارجی و دپارتمانها را برعهده دارد ؟  .41
 چگونه تجربه و دانش خود را بین دپارتمان و شریک خارجی تقسیم میکنید ؟  .51
( شریک خارجی و دپارتمان بومی را شرح دهید ؟  تفاوت اساسی بین روشهای همکاری بین  .61
 ؟ ) روشهای همکاری 
 ارجی و دپارتمانها همکاری تنگا تنگ دارند ؟ این کدام حوزه شریک خ .71
در (آیا دانشی که بصورت محلی  
به وجود  آمده )   داخل ایران خودرو 
    D&Rرا به کارخانه دیگر و یا   
 1112ت ا  79دیگر بین سا لهای 
 انتقال د اده اید؟ 
 
چه اقداماتی را جهت انتقال دانش به  
به   D&Rدیگر سازمانها و یا دیگر 
 عمل می آورید؟
 
آیا همانند روشهای ذکر شده بالا  
دانش و ی ا اطلاعاتی را برای بکار 
های    D&Rاز  گیری درسازمانتان
 کسب کرده اید ؟ دیگر 
 3
 D,C,B,A
 چه چیزهائی را  از شرکاتتان با شریک خارجی بدست آورده اید ؟   .1
 چگونه این آموخته ها به حوزه شما انتقال یافته است؟ .2
 بخش و دپارتمان  بیشترین سود را از این آموخته ها کسب کرده است؟ چرا  ؟ کدام .3
 کدام بخش کمترین سود را از این آموخته ها کسب کرد ه است؟ چرا ؟ .4
  ارسال میشود ؟    SVJچه دانشی از طرف شما به سمت  .5
 در مورد روند کار 
 در مورد تکننولوزی 
   در مورد مهارت کاری 
 3 , 2
 E , C , B , A
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 tnempoleveD tcudorP weN   
   )DPN( tnempoleveD tcudorP weN .6
 seeweivretnI snoitseuq gniborP   rof snoitseuq niaM
 
 را به کار میگیرد؟ روند تولید محصول جدید را توضیح دهید ؟ مثال     DPNحوزه شما چگونه  .9
 آیا از روش دیگری قبلا استفاده نموده اید ؟ .11
 ذکر مثال نحوه کاربرد آن را توضیح دهید ؟لطفا با  .11
 در دیگر شرکتها آگاه هستید  ؟    DPN آیا از دیگر روشهای به کار رفته در روند  .21
   آیا در فکر به کار گیری این روشها م یباشید ؟ .31
 آغاز میشود؟    DPN چگونه و کجا یک پروزه جدید  
 چه کسانی وظیفه اتخاذ تصمیم نهای را بر عهده د ارند ؟ 
  طرح و یا اندیشه جدید از کدام بخش نشآت می گیرد؟ 
 ... ) مدیریت میانی ، فوقانی ( 
 ها را چگونه توضیح می دهید؟   DPNرابطه با دیگر  
مجزا به روند تولید محصول از دپارتمانها آیا هر یک  
جدید می پرد ازد؟ویا یک تیم خاص تمامی روند تولید 
 محصول جدید را بر عهده می گیرد؟
ش کارکنان بخش بازاریابی و فروش را در روند  نق  
 را شرح دهید ؟    DPN
 5  ,  4
  E ,C , B
  :موفقیت
 
 نحوه سنجش سطح موفقیت و یا ناموفقیت در پروژه تولید محصول جدید چیست؟ .41
  )مالی و یا غیر مالی(کدام روش سنجش موفقیت را در حال حاظر به کار می برید؟ .51
سنجش  جهت ارزیابی موفقیت به نظر شما کدام ابزار  
 محصول جدید ارائه شده مناسب می باشد؟
به چه نحوی این پیشرفت ها را آزمون و تائید اعتبار  
 می کنید؟
را بهبود   DPNدر کد ام مرحله نظریه مشتری ها   
    میبخشد ؟ 
 5 , 4 , 3 
 E , D , C , B
 
 :روند
 
 گیرد؟منبع اصلی ایده های محصولات جدید از کجا نشعت می  .61
  
چگونه اعتبار محصول جدید از نظر مصرف کننده را  
 جویا می شوید؟
 
 5 , 4 , 3  
 E , C , B
   نحوه کارتان با تآمین کننده گان قطعات چگونه است؟ .71
آیا آنها تاکنون طرز فکر نوینی به شما ارائه داده  
 اند؟نحوه برخورد شما چگونه بوده است؟
  فرمائید ؟لطفا مثالی در این مورد ارائ ه  
  3
  ,E ,B
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 :krameR gnisolC
  آیا مطلب خاصی در مورد شرکت و یا حوزه کاری تان می خواهید اضافه کنید؟ :Q
 
 
 
 با تشکر 
 آیا نیازی برای مصاحبه ب ا این شخص جهت روشن شدن مطلبی لازم است؟ 
  شخسیش را در مورد شرکت جویا می شومبعد  از اتمام مصاحبه  از شخص مورد نظر نظرات  
  .انعکاس نظرات مصاحبه شونده بعد از مصاحبه نوشته می شود 
 
 
 
 این امر مهمیست برای تشخیص صداقت پاسخهای مصاحبه شونده **** 
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 naisreP ni snoitseuq pu-wolloF :41 xidneppA
 
  srotcaf lanoitasinagrO-retnI
 
 لطفا درباره نحوه فعالیت و همکاریتان با شرکای مختلف بین المللی خود توضیح دهید ؟ .1
 به چه مشکلاتی هنگام همکاری بر روی پروژه های مشترک با شرکای خارجیات روبرو میشوید؟ .2
 برخورد کردید ؟ به چه مشکلات اساسی و مهم در طول پروژه ای مربوط به سه مدل کار .3
 چگونه بر این مشکلات فائق آمده اید ؟ .4
لطفا در مورد نحوه کارتان و تفاوتهای موجود قبل و بعد از پروژه های مشترک با شرکای خارجیتان شرح  .5
 بدهید؟
 نحوه کار شرکای بین المللی تان را چگونه ارزیابی می کنید؟ .6
 ق داده شود؟ چگونه این کار ا کردید؟ایا احساس کردید که نحوه کارتان بایستی با آنها وف .7
 مهمترین آموزه هایتان از شرکای تجاریتان چه بوده و چگونه به این آموزه ها رسیده اید؟ .8
 چگونه از این آموخته ها استفاده کردید؟ .9
 آیا مسائل خاصی وجود دارد که روابط کاریتان را با هریک از شرکایتان را تحت تاثیر قرار بدهد؟ .11
 روش خاصی در جهت یادگیری از شرکایتان در پیش گرفته اید و یا میتوانستید انتخاب کنید؟چه کار و یا  .11
 چگونه اطلاعات مربوط به خط تولید را دریافت می کنید؟ .21
 آیا از نحوه و چگونگی انتقال اطلاعات از خط تولید به خودتان راضی هستید ؟  .31
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 بودن شرکت ایران خودرو به نظر شما چه تفاوتهائی با وضع فعلی میداشت؟در صورت خصوصی  .41
 تکنولوژی خودروسازی ایران خودرو در مقایسه با رقبای بین المللی را چگونه ارزیابی میکنید؟ .51
 ارزیابی شما از کیفیت خودروهای تولیدی ایران خودرو در بازار داخلی و خارجی چیست؟ .61
 در مقایسه با هر یک از شرکای بین المللی چیست؟مزایا و معایب ایران خودرو  .71
 دارند؟ 612سمند و , مدیران ارشد چه ارزیابی از سه برند  پارس  .81
ایا روش خاصی جهت کسب دانش فنی جدید و انتقال و ذخیره دانش کسب شده در شرکت وجود  .91
 دارد؟
 ید ؟را چگونه تعریف میکن   DPNموفقیت و شکست یک پروژه یا طرح را در مجموعه .12
شرکت ایران خودرو چیست و دلایل این موفقیت را    DPNموفقیت آمیز ترین طرح در تاریخچه  .12
 بازگو کنید؟
شرکت خودرو و دلایل این عدم موفقیت را    DPNناموفق تریت و مهمترین شکست در تاریخچه  .22
 بازگو کنید؟
در این سه مدل را     DPNارزیابی شما از نحوه همکاری هیئت مدیره ایران خودرو در مورد فعالیتهای  .32
 بازگو کنید؟
 روش شناسائس مسئولیتها و وظایف کارمندان چگونه است ؟ دلایل موازی کاری ها در چارت سازمانی چیست؟ .42
 آیا روش خاصی جهت تشویق کارمندان وجود دارد؟ .52
 بیشتر می پسندید ؟ چه پروژه هائی را .62
 تعریف شما از یک پروژه پر ریسک چیست ؟ .72
 کارمندان تازه استخدام شده از چه منابع و از چه روشهائی به ایران خودرو وارد شده اند؟   در دو سال گذشته .82
 از دست دادن چه کسانی برای ایران خودرو مشکل ساز است و چرا ؟ .92
 کارشناس فنی نامید و چرا ؟ به نظر شما چه کسانی را میتوان متخصص و یا .13
 چه کسانی نقشی موثر در اجرای یک پروژه را دارا میباشند و چه عواملی این قبیل افراد را کمک میکند؟ .13
 دانشهای فنی موفق و یا ناموفق را چگونه ثبت میکنید و چه کسانی به این اطلاعات دسترسی دارند؟ .23
 خودرو را تسهیل میکند؟ چه عواملی اشتراک دانش مابین بخشهای مختلف ایران .33
 چگونه اشخاص تخصصی را آموزش می دهید ؟ .43
 همکاری بین بخشهای مختلف ایران خودرو به چه صورت بوده و راههای بهبود این ارتباط؟ .53
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   srotcaf tnemtrapeD D&R
 
 
 پیشگیری کرد؟آیا در همکاری با شرکای بین المللی با سختیهای خاصی مواجه شده ایدو چگونه میشد  .1
 اطلاعات مشتریهای تان را چگونه جمع آوری میکنید؟ و چگونه از این اطلاعات استفاده میکنید؟ .2
 نحوه فعالیتان با تآمین کنندگان قطعات چگونه است ؟ .3
 ایا دانش خاصی را از همکاری و فعالیتان با تلمین کنندگان قطعات کسب کرده اید؟ .4
 همکاری میکنید؟ نقش ساپکو چیست ؟ و چگونه با ساپکو .5
 چه عواملی ممکن است نحوه فعالیتان را با تامین کنندگان قطعات را بهبود ببخشد؟ .6
 آر این گونه پروژه ها چه چیزی آموخته اید؟ .7
 موفق بوده است یا نا موفق؟   DSایا فکر میکنید پروژه  .8
 علل شکست و یا موفقیت را در چه میبینید؟ .9
 از شریک خارجی آمختید ؟ DSچه چیزهای خاصی را در طی پروژه  .11
را نتوانستید به نحو احسن در دیگر پروژه ها  DSچرا این آموخته های کسب شده در طول پروژه  .11
 به کار ببرید؟
 همکاریتان با دانشگاهها چگونه است ؟ .21
 جهت کسب دانش و تکنولوژی به روز چه اقداماتی را انجام داده اید ؟ .31
 گونه برای شما بود ؟نحوه آغاز به فعالت در ایران خودرو چ .41
 متخصصترین و آگاهترین افراد در ایران خودرو و خارج از ایران خودورو را چه کسانی میدانید ؟ .51
 چگونه میشود این افراد متخصص را به همکاری با ایران خودرو ترغیب کرد ؟ .61
 ید؟ایا اطلاعاتی در مورد تاریخچه ایران خودرو دارید ؟ این اطلاعات را از کجا کسب کرده ا .71
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       Appendix 15: The candidates’ personal information  
        A: The 24 candidates’ educational background  
ducational 
Level 
NPD 
Department 
Strategy 
Department 
Marketing 
Department 
Quality 
Department 
HR 
Department 
SAPCO 
Department 
Total 
Secondary 
Degree 
- - - - - - - 
High School 
Degree 
- - - - - - - 
College 
Degree 
- - - - - - - 
BSc / BA 
Degree 
2 1 1 - - - 4 
MSc / MA 
Degree 
5 6 - 1 4 1 17 
PhD 
Degree 
1 1 - - - 1 3 
Total number 
of candidates 
8 8 1 1 4 2 24 
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        B: The 24 candidates’ age range  
Age  
Range  
NPD 
Department 
Strategy 
Department 
Marketing 
Department 
Quality 
Department 
HR 
Department 
SAPCO 
Department 
Total 
25- 29 - - - - - - - 
30-32 - 2 - - 1 - 3 
33-35 - - - 1 - - 1 
36-38 - 4 - - 1 - 5 
39-41 6 1 1 - 1 - 9 
42-44 - - - - 1 - 1 
45-47 - - - - - - - 
48-50 1 1 - - - 1 3 
51-anove 1 - - - - 1 2 
Total  8 8 1 1 4 2 24 
 In age 18 students finish high school. Boys cannot employ before compulsory military service. The service is 
24 months  
 Usually university degree (BSc/ BA) takes minimum 4 years  
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       C: The 24 candidates’ degree titles   
No 
NPD Department Strategy Department Marketing 
Department 
Quality 
Department 
HR Department SAPCO 
Department 
1 MA in Philosophy      
2 BSc in Industrial engineering       
3 BSc in Industrial engineering      
4 MSc in Industrial engineering      
5 MSc in Mechanical engineering      
6 MSc in Mechanical engineering      
7 MSc in Mechanical engineering      
8 PhD in Electronic engineering        
9  MBA     
10  BSc   IT     
11  MBA     
12  MSc   Industrial engineering     
13  PhD    Management     
14  MBA     
15  MSc    Industrial engineering     
16  MA   in Management      
17   BA   Management     
18    MA Mechanical 
engineering  
  
19     MBA  
20     MA  Industrial 
engineering 
 
21     MA Psychology  
22     MA Math / IT  
23      PhD  Mechanic 
24      MSc Mechanic 
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       D: The 24 candidates’ pervious work background    
No 
NPD Department Strategy 
Department 
Marketing 
Department 
Quality 
Department 
HR Department SAPCO 
Department 
1 3 years at SAIPA’s R&D      
2 Came after university      
3 2 years at IKCO production      
4 Came after university       
5 12 years at SAIPA’s R&D      
6 5 years at HYUNDAI sale      
7 3 years project manager inspection       
8 20years academic board       
9  4 years academic board      
10  12 years at it field      
11  4 years at industry      
12  10 years at SAPCO     
13  6 years at IT field     
14  10 years research expert     
15  2 years at marketing      
16  2 years research expert       
17   6 years at marketing field    
18    4  years industry    
19     3 years industry   
20     3 years industry  
21     After my uni  
22     3 years IT  
23       4 years in MEGA 
24       15 years academic 
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IKCO’s current products 
 
 
Suzuki Grand Vitara 
  
Samand & Samand LX 
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Samand Soren 
      
         Samand Soren LX                                        Samand Sarir  
 
    
Peugeot Pars (Persia) LX 
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Peugeot 206 
 
Peugeot 206 SD   
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Peugeot 207i 
352 | P a g e  
 
 
 Renault L90 
  
                 Peugeot 405                                            Peugeot 405 SLX 
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    ROA 
   
                                      Paykan Pickup (Bardo) 
 
                                               RUUNA 
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                                                               DENA 
 
 
 
Paykan 1967  – 15/05/2005 
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IKCO’S COMMERCIAL VEHICLES: 
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359 | P a g e  
 
IKCO’S SITE PHOTOS (TEHRAN): 
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IKCO’S PRODUCTION LINE (TEHRAN) 
 
 
 
 
 
361 | P a g e  
 
 
 
 
362 | P a g e  
 
 
 
 
363 | P a g e  
 
 
 
 
364 | P a g e  
 
 
 
 
365 | P a g e  
 
 
 
 
366 | P a g e  
 
 
 
 
367 | P a g e  
 
 
 
 
368 | P a g e  
 
 
 
 
369 | P a g e  
 
 
 
 
370 | P a g e  
 
 
 
 
371 | P a g e  
 
 
 
 
